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Chapter 1  
Introduction  
1.1  Introduction 
This report presents the outcome of a comparative study on the family reunification 
policies in six European Union (EU) Member States and their impact on the family 
life of the residents of these Member States. This study, ‘Family Reunification: a bar-
rier or facilitator of integration?’ is the result of a research project initiated and coor-
dinated by the Immigrant Council of Ireland. The project was funded under the Inte-
gration Fund Community Actions Programme (IFCAP), which aims to promote the 
integration of third country nationals in EU Member States. 
In the context of the project, six national research teams conducted research on 
the national legislation and policies, regarding family reunification and studied the 
effects thereof on the ability of third country nationals to live with their family mem-
bers in the EU Member States and to integrate into the receiving societies. The re-
search teams focused on the question of whether the family reunification rules hinder 
or facilitate smooth reunification and what impact the rules have on the integration of 
both the sponsor and the admitted family. Particular attention was given to the ques-
tion to what extent family reunification rules could serve as a tool for the integration 
of immigrants and their families in the EU. The Member States involved were Aus-
tria, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
The rationale for this project came from the recognition of a growing trend of 
national governments amending family reunification policies and legislation without 
thorough debate or research into the potential result of such changes. This project, in 
the absence of concrete research in this area, seeks to offer an opportunity for all 
relevant actors to learn from and reflect on the tangible consequences of more strin-
gent conditions on family reunification of third country nationals with their family 
members residing in the Member States. All six EU Member States represented in 
this study have committed to respect the right to family life, as enshrined in Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In addition to this com-
mitment, four of the Member States have legally bound themselves to respect the 
right to family reunification for third country nationals by adopting the Family Reuni-
fication Directive (Directive 2003/86) . This directive aims to promote family reunifi-
cation and, thus, promote the integration of third country nationals and their family 
members. The recognition that family reunification is beneficial to integration has 
also led to the adoption of a strong right to family reunification for Union citizens 
exercising their freedom of movement within the EU. These rules are established in 
the Union Citizens Directive (Directive 2004/38).  
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1.2  Terminology 
The term ‘family reunification’ is to be understood in a broad sense. It covers situa-
tions in which a family unit of third country nationals is established abroad at a time 
where the sponsor has already acquired legal residence in the Member State (family 
formation), as well as situations whereby the family relationship pre-existed in the 
country of origin (family reunification). Furthermore, the extent to which a family 
unit established in one of the Member States is protected from the expulsion of one 
or more of the family members (family retention) is also explored. The persons who 
are regarded as family members in the participating Member States are further de-
fined in chapter two. 
The term ‘sponsor’ in this report refers to a resident in one of the Member States 
who wishes to live with his or her third country national family member(s) in that 
Member State. The sponsor can be a third country national, a Union citizen who has 
used his or her right to free movement, or a national of the Member State in ques-
tion. For the purpose of clearly defining the two last groups, we reserve the term 
Union citizen for those EU nationals who have moved to another EU Member State 
and are seeking family reunification, formation or retention there. Union citizens who 
remain in their country of nationality and have not availed of their right to free 
movement, therefore falling under the scope of national law, are defined as ‘own 
nationals’. References to own nationals who are able to invoke the Union citizens 
Directive because of previous use of the right to free movement are explicitly high-
lighted.  
The term, ‘third country nationals’, applies to nationals from a country not be-
longing to the EU or EEA. For practical reasons, this term is, consequently, abbrevi-
ated to TCNs. The different treatment of certain categories of TCNs who enjoy a 
privileged status e.g. Turkish nationals and highly skilled workers is briefly highlighted 
also. Finally, refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection are dealt with sepa-
rately in this report. 
1.3  Selections 
Selection of states 
The strategic selection of the six Member States represented in this study was based 
on a number of considerations including the varying legal frameworks across the EU. 
Ireland and the United Kingdom have not opted-in to the Family Reunification Di-
rective. These divergences illustrate the influence (or absence thereof) of EU law on 
policy makers when drafting legislation and policy as well as on decision makers in 
their executive functions. Furthermore, the transposition of the directive in terms of 
EU harmonisation is also evident. Portugal, for example, has a distinguished position 
as it has only quite recently become a country of immigration. Its legislation and per-
ception of family reunification is also quite distinct, as it preserves for all residents a 
strong right to family reunification and it provides the same rights to Portuguese 
citizens as it does to Union citizens exercising their right to free movement.  
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Selection of the categories of sponsors 
This study considers three separate categories of third country national family mi-
grants, each distinguished by the status of the sponsor: family migrants sponsored by 
(i) third country nationals; (ii) Union citizens; and (iii) own nationals. The sponsors 
have different rights in all three categories. Union citizens enjoy the strongest right to 
family reunification, derived from the Union Citizens Directive; in the majority of  
Member States third country nationals rely on the Family Reunification Directive 
and, therefore, on all principles of Union law, whereas own nationals (and third coun-
try nationals resident in Ireland or the UK) are only able to invoke national legisla-
tion. In all cases, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
protects family life to a certain extent. Amongst third country nationals, four groups 
have been distinguished. Aside from the large group of regular TCNs, two groups are 
specifically detailed as they enjoy more privileged rights: Turkish nationals (Associa-
tion Agreement with Turkey) and highly skilled workers (Blue Card Directive). Addi-
tionally, in the majority of Member States, refugees can invoke the more favourable 
rules on family reunification through the Family Reunification Directive, and also the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which obliges States party to the 
Convention to protect the family life of refugees. The assessment of the rules on 
these heterogeneous groups and their actual family reunification, can contribute to an 
understanding of the impact the (different) rules have on the family life and the inte-
gration of sponsors and their family members.  
 
Selection of themes 
Given the wide range of differing requirements for family reunification across the 
countries participating in this study, the project partners decided to focus on, and 
thus limit the comparison to, the four main types of requirements: accommodation, 
income, age and integration.1 Similarly, given the difficulties in finding a uniform defini-
tion of ‘integration’, on the one hand, and the need to draw comparisons across 
countries on the other, the study focuses on four areas identified as essential to inte-
gration by the European Commission. These include: employment, education, social 
inclusion and language skills. In addition, consideration was given to the impact of 
family reunification policies on family reunification itself: and whether or not the 
rules promote or hinder the reunification of family members. In this context, an as-
sessment is made regarding the most beneficial family reunification rules in terms of 
the integration of sponsors and their family members. 
1.4  Research Methodology 
This study adopted a mixed method approach. Data was drawn from four main 
sources. Firstly, desk research included a review of existing literature (studies that 
have evaluated the requirements for family migration on integration and/or its ef-
                                                        
1 Integration requirements are defined as those that purport to aid the integration of TCN family 
members into their host country. 
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fects), national and European case-law, parliamentary documents and commentaries 
on national legislation (e.g. from NGOs, national advisory committees or interna-
tional monitoring committees). Secondly, quantitative data was analysed, with particu-
lar attention given to official immigration statistics and integration test pass rates. 
Thirdly, primary qualitative research was based on interviews with: (i) individuals who 
are subject to family reunification legislation and policies, (ii) lawyers and representa-
tives of NGOs who work with these individuals; and (iii) policy makers who are re-
sponsible for developing/implementing family reunification policies. 
The qualitative research was conducted using focus groups and individual inter-
views. Semi-structured discussion guides, developed jointly by project partners, were 
used to ensure consistency between interviews and across countries participating in 
the research. Individuals were asked about their motivations for applying for family 
reunification, views on the substantive criteria to be fulfilled and the application 
process, as well as the impact of the requirements and application process on their 
family and on their integration process. NGO participants were asked to detail their 
views on the link between family reunification and integration, the rationale for, and 
impact of, requirements for family reunification and the factors that they considered 
to be important to integration. Policy makers were asked about the reasoning behind 
family reunification policies, the evidence on which they are based and proof of their 
effectiveness in terms of their original aims. Transcripts and notes were analysed 
using thematic analysis and compared to findings from qualitative research conducted 
by others. In total, throughout the six Member States, 95 interviews have been held 
with individuals, 47 with lawyers and NGO’s and 17 with policy makers. 
The information in the national reports is current as of mid-December 2012.  
1.5  Content 
The comparative report contains  a total of seven chapters. Chapter two assesses the 
requirements for family reunification and compares these requirements across the six 
EU Member States, and also between the different groups. The same exercise was 
undertaken with regard to the rights and obligations of the family members after 
admission to the EU Member State. 
Chapter three looks at the extent to which family members are able to invoke the 
rights outline in chapter two by scrutinizing the application of these requirements in 
practice. It deals with the organisation and duration of the procedure, the level of 
discretion exercised by immigration authorities, the right to appeal and legal aid and 
the verification of marriages (where applicable) in the framework of combating 
fraudulent marriages. This chapter further outlines the experiences of applicants. 
How they perceive the procedure and its impact on their attitude and feelings. 
Chapter four investigates the development of national policies in the six EU 
member States represented and the political debates surrounding the evolution of 
same. The positions which were taken, the justification for changes and the impact of 
evaluations and statistics on these positions was explored. This chapter furthermore 
probes the interaction between national and European decision making on family 
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reunification and asks the overarching question: Do governments or family members 
benefit from the European harmonisation? 
Chapter five offers an overview of the case law in the EU Member States, focus-
ing on the four main requirements. The differences and similarities between national 
judgments are examined and explanations are sought. The dynamics between national 
and European case law is also detailed and the impact of European case law on fam-
ily reunification in terms of the rules, and of family reunification policies. 
Chapter six answers the research questions on the basis of both quantitative and 
qualitative data. It evaluates to what extent the development of requirements for 
family reunification has impacted on the numbers availing of family reunification, but 
also to what extent the requirements have impacted on the sponsor and the family 
members in question. It is explored whether they experienced problems in meeting 
the requirements. The question is then posed whether, and if so, in what way, the 
sponsors adjusted their behaviour in order to fulfil the requirements. Furthermore, 
the chapter examines whether certain conditions affect specific groups more than 
others. Following this analysis, the question of the impact of the requirements on the 
integration of both the sponsor and the family members is addressed. Special atten-
tion is paid to the pre-entry test and the integration requirements after arrival. Do 
they help family members to feel at home and to participate in the host society?  
Chapter seven brings the study to an end by presenting a series of conclusions. 
The chapter draws upon some findings on other effects of the development on the 
right to family reunification within the EU Member States. The goal of adopting 
common standards has been, not only to harmonise policies among the different 
Member States, but also to bridge the gap between the rights awarded to Union citi-
zens and third country nationals. Are these goals being achieved? And what does this 
harmonisation mean for the position of ‘own nationals’ who remain largely depend-
ent on the national legislator? 
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Chapter 2 
Legislation on Family Reunification and the Legal 
Position of Admitted Family Members 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the applicable legislation on family re-
unification in the six Member States that have been studied. The conditions for fam-
ily reunification that are imposed vary not only between the different states but also 
between different categories of people who wish to enjoy family life with a family 
member in the state in which he or she resides. The similarities and differences both 
between the different target groups and the different Member States covered by this 
study will be assessed. First, the conditions that must be met in order for a family 
member to join a sponsor are set out. The second part of the chapter will analyse 
what requirements family members must fulfil in order to remain in the Member 
State and to consolidate their status. Both sections will first deal with the rights of 
family members of third country nationals, followed by an outline of the rights of 
family members of Union citizens and, subsequently, own nationals.  
Before we start, it is useful to mention that Ireland inhabits a somewhat special 
position in this chapter. Irish legislation does not provide an explicit legal right to 
family reunification or to reside in Ireland on the basis of existing family relationships 
in all circumstances. The only persons who have a statutory right to family reunifica-
tion are EU/EEA nationals, scientific researchers working in Ireland under Directive 
2005/71/EC (hereinafter: Researchers Directive) and persons granted refugee status 
or subsidiary protection. Therefore, there is also no harmonization of the family reu-
nification admission criteria or formally stated income, housing, integration require-
ments and age limits. 
2.2  Admission of TCN Family Members 
2.2.1 Personal Scope 
Matters of family reunification generally revolve around the ‘nuclear family’. How-
ever, there is no uniform policy to answer the question of who exactly is part of the 
‘nuclear family’. National policies diverge on matters such as minimum age require-
ments for spouses, the acceptance of same sex partners and the definition of subsist-
ing relationships. Family reunification mostly, but not solely, deals with issues that 
concern the ‘nuclear family’. There are family members who are not considered part 
of the ‘nuclear family’ but who might be eligible for a residence permit on grounds of 
family reunification nonetheless. Certain states, for example, allow dependent adult 
children, who have not yet formed a family of their own, or dependent elderly par-
ents to join their family member(s).  
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Spouses and unmarried partners 
Spouses of third country nationals are considered part of the nuclear family in all six 
participating states. Yet not all spouses are eligible for family reunification. Both Aus-
tria and the Netherlands maintain a minimum age requirement for spouses of 21 
years. While Germany and the UK require a spouse to be 18 years of age, Ireland and 
Portugal have no such requirement. Neither civil2 nor unmarried partners are granted 
family reunification rights in Austria and Germany. Ireland, the Netherlands3 and the 
UK do allow for family reunification of registered partners and unmarried couples 
who are able to prove they are in a subsisting relationship. Ireland requires that a 
couple should have lived together for four years before allowing family reunification. 
Portugal does not require a couple to be officially registered as partners. However, 
the ‘de facto relationship’ of unmarried partners must be recognized under law.4 
 
Same sex partners 
Germany and Austria require same sex partnerships to be registered in order to re-
ceive family reunification rights. The registration requirement is often impossible to 
meet for same sex couples, given the fact that many home countries do not register 
same sex couples and some even persecute homosexuals. Portugal allows for the 
family reunification of same sex couples but, again, the relationship must be recog-
nized under law. Irish law does not specifically regulate family reunification of same 
sex couples, in practice, however, same sex partner are generally treated in an equal 
manner to unmarried partners. The UK and the Netherlands grant family reunifica-
tion rights to same sex couples whether they are married, in a registered partnership 
or in a subsisting relationship.5 
 
Minor children 
Children under the age of 18, whether or not adopted or in the custody of the spon-
sor, are generally allowed to reside with their parents. The same applies to the chil-
dren of the spouse. All states covered by this research, except for Portugal, require 
that the child is not married and has not formed an independent family unit. The UK 
and Ireland demand an additional criterion to be met, namely that the child is de-
pendent on the sponsor. Where there is still a parent abroad who also has custody 
over the child, the situation becomes more complicated. The explicit consent of the 
other parent is then generally required. Germany, however, does not grant a right of 
                                                        
2 Unless the partners are same sex. 
3 The provision that grants an unmarried partner a right to family reunification was abolished on 
1 October 2012. At the time of writing this report a proposal has been put forward by the govern-
ment to reinstate this provision.  
4 ‘A de facto partnership’ is defined as ‘the juridical situation of two persons who, irrespectively of 
their sex, have been living in conditions analogous to that of two spouses for over two years’. Suffi-
cient proof of a de facto relationship must be provided, such as a declaration by the local authorities, 
a common mortgage or a shared income tax form.  
5 After the provision that grants an unmarried partner a right to family reunification was abolished, 
the Dutch government decided to allow same sex couples to be granted a visa so as to enable them 
to get married in the Netherlands and subsequently qualify for family reunification. It is unclear 
whether this policy will remain in place once the provisions with regard to unmarried couples are re-
introduced.  
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residence to these children. These children may be allowed to enter and reside in 
order to prevent exceptional hardship. Furthermore, Germany has introduced special 
requirements for children from age 16-18 in its legislation. These requirements will be 
examined below.  
 
Adult children 
Adult children are generally only allowed to reunite with their TCN parents where 
there are exceptional circumstances. Portugal is the exception to this rule. In Portugal 
parents and adult children may reunite when the child is unmarried, dependent and 
enrolled in a college or university course in Portugal.6 The UK only allows adult chil-
dren to join their parents under very specific and demanding conditions. The adult 
child must require long-term personal care, which cannot be provided in the country 
of origin because it is not affordable or available. Further, the sponsor must sign a 
form in which he or she declares responsibility for the family member’s care without 
having recourse to public funds for the following five years. Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and Ireland do not have provisions that allow family reunification of 
adult children and their parents when certain criteria are met. However, there are 
provisions that serve as a safety net for very exceptional cases. In Ireland, the Minis-
ter for Justice and Equality can always use his or her discretionary power to grant 
legal residence to an adult child. Both German and Dutch law contain clauses that 
aim to provide a legal ground on which residence rights can be granted in cases where 
(exceptional) hardship would arise when an adult child does not receive permission to 
reside with a parent. As a last remark on this topic, it should be noted that all coun-
tries must adhere to Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights (hereafter 
ECHR). The European Court on Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) has recognized 
in its case law that the family bond between parents and children who do not have a 
family of their own does not cease to exist when a child reaches majority.7 However, 
this is usually not explicitly laid down in national legislation.  
 
Parents 
The above-mentioned rules that apply to adult children are to a large extent also ap-
plicable to the situation of parents of TCN immigrants. Portugal only requires de-
pendence to be established, while the other countries apply much stricter rules. Aus-
trian law does not contain provisions that give rights to parents of TCN immigrants. 
Parents are only allowed to enter Germany or the Netherlands for family reunifica-
tion purposes if their situation is caught by the hardship clause, which is a very high 
standard to meet. The parents of third country nationals residing in the UK fall into 
the same category as adult children, therefore the same criteria are applicable.  
 
                                                        
6 This applies for adult children until the age of 25. If the child is disabled the age restriction may be 
waived.  
7 Osman v. Denmark, 38058/09 [2011] ECHR 926 (14 June 2011) 
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Other family members of the extended family 
Austrian, Dutch and Irish laws do not contain provisions that grant family reunifica-
tion rights to other members of the extended family. Germany allows members of 
the extended family to enter and reside in the country if they no longer have similar 
family ties abroad and family reunification is required to prevent exceptional hard-
ship. Portugal allows for siblings to reunite as long as the sponsor has custody over 
the siblings. In the United Kingdom, grandparents, brothers, and sisters are eligible 
for family reunification under the same conditions as parents and adult children.  
2.2.2  General Requirements 
Eligibility of sponsor for family reunification 
The matter of eligibility for family reunification of a TCN hinges on the sponsor’s 
prospect of settlement in the host country. Portugal grants all holders of a valid resi-
dence permit a right to family reunification. There is no requirement for a minimum 
period of residence to be met. Austria does not require a minimum period of resi-
dence either, however, Austrian immigration policy is unique in that a quota regula-
tion is in place. There is a limit to the number of third country national family mem-
bers to whom a residence permit can be issued each year. In 2012, the quota was set 
at 4,660 residence permits. When the quota is exhausted, the applications are priori-
tised for the following year’s decisions. The maximum waiting time between the filing 
of the application and the decision is three years.8 German law requires that a spon-
sor holds either a permanent, EU long-term or temporary residence permit (only if 
there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining permanent residence). The application for 
family reunification may be filed when there are legitimate expectations that the per-
mit will be granted. If the marriage was concluded after the sponsor was allowed 
entry into the country, the right of a sponsor with a temporary permit to be joined by 
his or her spouse can only be exercised after two years of legal residence. In this re-
gard, Germany is the only country that distinguishes between family formation and 
family reunification, even though the CJEU has held that such a distinction is con-
trary to the Family Reunification Directive.9 Ireland does not generally require a 
sponsor to have resided in the country for a certain period of time. Only sponsors 
who are work-permit holders are to show that they have held employment in Ireland 
for twelve months prior to the applications and with that there is a certain period of 
legal residency required for some third country nationals in practice. In the Nether-
lands, sponsors can only apply for family reunification after one year of legal resi-
dence and they must be in the possession of a permit for a non-temporary goal. In 
the UK, in order to qualify for family reunification, a TCN migrant must be present 
and settled. The word ‘settled’ in this context means that he or she has been granted 
indefinite leave to remain. The right to family reunification for non-settled TCNs 
only extends to dependent members of the nuclear family. Additionally, the family 
                                                        
8 Austria is the only Member State bound by the Family Reunification Directive that is allowed to 
maintain a three-year time limit, due to the standstill clause included in Article 8 (2). 
9 Chakroun [2010] CJEU C-578/08 (04 March 2010) 
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member must not intend to stay in the UK beyond any period of leave granted to the 
sponsor. This study focuses, however, on immigrants who wish to integrate and settle 
in the host country. Therefore, temporary family reunification rights are beyond the 
remit of this study. The national reports do provide additional information on the 
family reunification rights of immigrants with temporary stay for whom permanent 
settlement is generally not foreseen (e.g. students). 
 
In-country application  
Many of the conditions for family reunification have to be complied with before the 
family member enters the country. Austria, Germany and the Netherlands require 
family members to obtain authorization to enter the country for the purpose of fami-
ly reunification from their home country or from the state in which they permanently 
reside. Entry clearance is one of the prerequisites for the issuance of a permit on fam-
ily reunification grounds. This requirement is applied in avery stringent fashion; with-
out the appropriate authorizationan application for family reunification is highly un-
likely to succeed. Portugal can be qualified as sitting at the other end of the spectrum, 
as family members may apply for family reunification both from abroad and in the 
country in which the sponsor has legal residence. In the UK, only some categories of 
family members, who are already present in the UK, can apply for leave to remain on 
grounds of family life with a TCN immigrant. Students and adult dependants are ex-
amples of groups that must return to their home country before they can apply for 
entry clearance and, subsequently, family reunification. Chapter 3 will go into further 
detail about the practical consequences of these rules that seem to be just of a proce-
dural nature at first sight, but as it turns out impact the experience of family members 
greatly.  
2.2.3  The Main Requirements 
Income 
Sponsors who wish to reunite with a family member in one of the countries that par-
ticipated in this study must always fulfil certain income requirements. Having stable 
and/or regular financial resources which meet a certain standard is imperative in all 
countries in order to serve as a sponsor for family members. It is of importance that a 
state is confident that a sponsor will be able to look after his or her family without 
having recourse to public funds. The required income levels always vary according to 
the composition of the family; both the number of family members and the features 
(i.e. the age of the children10) of the individual family members can influence the ex-
act required amount. How the sustainability of the income is assessed, and which 
sources of income are accepted, also differs between countries. 
 
  
                                                        
10 This is the case in Germany. See Table 1. 
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Table 2.1. Conditions for family reunification (end 2012). Third country nationals 
States Age-limit 
spouses 
 
Pre-
entry 
test11 
Income requirement  
Appropriate 
accommoda-
tion 
 
Period of 
legal resi-
dence 
Required 
income 
level for a 
family 
consisting 
of a spon-
sor, his or 
her spouse 
and two 
children 
(monthly) 
Median 
Equivalent 
net in-
come12 
(monthly) 
per coun-
try (2011) 
Austria 21 Yes 1473, 12 
euros (net) 
(plus regular 
expenses13) 
1777 euros 
 
Yes, must 
meet local 
standards 
No. How-
ever, quota 
for TCN 
family 
members.14 
Max. three 
years. 
Germany 18 Yes 121315 euros 
(net) (plus 
rent) 
(Level of 
subsistence 
income for 
the unem-
ployed) 
1693 euros Yes No. Unless 
family 
formation: 
two years of 
prior legal  
residence 
required. 
Ireland No No 2608,67 
euros (net) 
(Income 
level of the 
‘Family 
Income 
Supplement 
Scheme’) 
1657 euros 
 
 
No No, how-
ever, one 
year of prior 
employment 
is required 
for holders 
of a work 
permit.  
Netherlands 21 Yes 1572,70 
euros (gross) 
 
(100% of 
minimum 
wage) 
1693 euros No YES, one 
year. 
                                                        
11  See table 2 for more information on all the integration requirements.  
12  http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_di03&lang=en. 
13  E.g. rent, loan payments or alimonies. A lump sum of maximal EUR 260.35 can be deducted from 
the rent costs.  
14  The quota rule implies that every year, the federal state defines a maximum number of TCN family 
members, to be admitted. If this quota is exhausted, the family reunification application is prioritised 
for the next year. The maximum waiting period between application and decision is three years.  
15  The income level required depends on the age of the child: € 219 (0 - 5 years) € 251 (6 – 13 years) 
and  €287 (14 - 17 years). For the purpose of this calculation the middle category was used.  
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Portugal No No 1188,25 
euros16 
(gross) 
 
(100% of the 
minimum 
wage plus 
50% for each 
additional 
adult and 
30% per 
each child 
under 18 
years old.  
701 euros Yes, criterion 
public health 
No 
United 
Kingdom 
18 Yes 2458, 64 
(gross) 
euros17 
1428 euros Yes, criteria 
public health 
and over-
crowding. 
Exclusive 
ownership not 
required 
Yes 
 
In Austria, sponsors (or other family members living in the same household) must 
have an income that equals the assured minimum income of pensioners. It should be 
noted that regular expenses, such as rent18 and loan repayments, are deducted from 
the sponsor’s earnings when establishing his or her income. Social benefits that are 
received or may be received in the future are generally not taken into account when a 
first application is made.19 Certain benefits, however, may be considered as contribut-
ing to the stable and regular income.20 For persons and their family members who 
intend to settle in Austria but who have a residence permit excluding work, the in-
come requirement is doubled. In Germany, the minimum required income is based 
on the subsistence income that is established for unemployed persons to which the 
rent (including heating, etc.) must be added. Expected earnings of a sponsor’s spouse 
or registered partner are taken into account when there is a job offer on the table or a 
signed employment contract. Assets and benefits from public funds based on own 
contributions are also sources of income that are considered by the authorities. The 
income is scrutinized for its sustainability by the authorities in the federal state. The 
manner in which this is done thus differs between states. For example, the authorities 
in the federal state of Hamburg make a ‘forecast decision’, in which not only the 
current employment contracts but also the previous educational and employment 
history are taken into account. Such a ‘forecast decision’ on a case by case basis may 
                                                        
16  In Portugal employers are obliges to pay the annual salary in 14 months. The annual salary was 
converted to 12 months in this table. The required income level is lowered,  when the sponsor is in-
voluntarily unemployed, to 50% of the minimum plus 30% of the minimum wage per each relative. 
17  The income level was converted from pounds into euros (exchange rate 23 January 2012). 
18 A lump sum of max. 260, 35 euros can be deducted from the rent. 
19 They are taken into account when a temporary residence permit is renewed.  
20 See chapter 5 for more information on this topic.  
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not be considered very beneficial for the predictability of the assessment but it does, 
however, enable the authorities to take individual circumstances into account.  
In Ireland the weekly earnings of a sponsor who is a work-permit holder must 
not be below the minimum standard set by the Family Income Supplement Scheme. The 
national rapporteurs calculated that in order to fulfil this income requirement a spon-
sor, who wishes to reunite with a spouse and/or child, must earn approximately 133 
per cent of the median equivalised net income which is the highest level that is re-
quired of all states that were researched. As mentioned before, Ireland requires a 
TCN sponsor who is a work permit holder to have been in full-time employment for 
no less than twelve months before being eligible for family reunification. Addition-
ally, the immigration authorities not only assess an applicant’s past earnings but also 
require the submission of an employment contract which will be valid for at least one 
year from the date of entry of the family member.  
The Netherlands is the only country where the demanded level of income does 
not increase in accordance with the number of children who wish to reunite with a 
TCN immigrant. Furthermore, the Dutch legislator lowered the income threshold for 
a single parent who wishes to reunite with a child. The income requirement in the 
Netherlands derives from, and is equal to, the minimum wage. The sponsor has to 
show either a one-year employment contract or that he or she has been continuously 
employed for the previous three years and has received a monthly salary that matches 
the income requirement.21 This rigid requirement is in stark contrast to the German 
example mentioned above. Sponsors who have reached the age of 65 years and spon-
sors who are permanently incapable of working for medical reasons are exempted 
from the income requirement. 
The application of Portugal’s income requirements can be qualified as being sig-
nificantly more lenient than the requirements of the other countries that were stud-
ied. The minimum wage serves as the standard which sets out the income threshold 
that is to be met. However, in the event that the TCN sponsor is involuntarily unem-
ployed, an income of 50 per cent of the minimum wage will suffice. The latter possi-
bility was introduced in 2009 because the government was of the opinion that unem-
ployment and the increase in temporary work, as a consequence of the economic 
situation of the country, disproportionately affected immigrants. Portuguese law addi-
tionally requires that the income is stable to the extent that it is expected to subsist 
for at least 12 months.  
In the UK, the required level of income increased drastically in 2012. Previously, 
a sponsor’s income had to be higher than the threshold for income support. The UK 
rapporteur writes that the new conditions require a sponsor who wishes to reunite 
with a partner and a dependent minor (and one of the child’s parents has limited 
leave to remain in the UK) to meet a financial requirement which represents approxi-
mately 173 per cent of the national minimum wage. The settled TCN’s income may 
be generated from employment and self-employment. If the threshold is not met, 
other sources of capital or income can be relied upon to close the gap. However, in-
come from family members living in the same household may not be taken into ac-
                                                        
21 Self-employed sponsors have to show a stable income for a period of one year. 
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count. Support from third parties can also not be relied upon. With the exception of 
disability related welfare benefits and carer’s allowance, most social welfare allow-
ances and benefits cannot be used as a source of income to meet the requirements.22 
If a spouse or partner is not already present in the UK and in possession of a valid 
work permit the (prospective) income of the spouse or partner may also not be taken 
into account. The income requirement must be met the moment a family member 
applies for leave to enter and, at a later stage, when applying for further leave to re-
main. 
 
Pre-entry test 
Ireland and Portugal do not oblige family members to pass a pre-entry test before 
they enter the country for the purpose of family reunification. Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK do have a pre-entry test in place that must be passed before 
permission to enter the country for family reunification purposes will be granted. In 
these countries, family members must show that they have sufficient knowledge of 
the national language (in the Netherlands the test also includes knowledge of Dutch 
society) before they are given permission to enter the country. In all four countries 
the level is established at A1.23 The test for Austria and Germany consists of speak-
ing, listening, reading and writing skills, the Dutch test only includes the first three 
capacities, whereas the test for the UK is limited to speaking and listening. Family 
members who are unable to pass a test due to a medical condition may be exempted 
if they can provide a medical certificate. Germany and the Netherlands have linked 
the pre-entry test to the visa requirement, which implies that nationals who are not 
required to acquire a visa before entering the country are exempted from the test.24 
This largely concerns nationals from so-called ‘western countries’. Turkish workers 
are also exempted in Austria and the Netherlands because of the Association Treaty 
with Turkey. The UK has linked the requirement to the presumed lack of knowledge 
of the language, as nationals from the majority English speaking countries are ex-
empted.25 
In Austria, one has to show a certificate26 proving A1 German language skills, be-
fore entering the country. Only minor children under the age of 14 are, in addition to 
the already mentioned groups, exempted.  
                                                        
22 Income related welfare benefits, contribution-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, contribution-based Em-
ployment and Support Allowance, Incapacity Benefit, Child Benefit, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax 
Credit or any other source of income not specified in the Immigration Rules.  
23  Basic language use: in terms of the European Council’s Common European Framework of Refer-
ences. 
24 A list of countries whose nationals are exempted from the visa requirement in Germany can be 
found here: http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/EN/EinreiseUndAufenthalt/StaatenlisteVisumpflicht 
_node.html; A list of countries whose nationals are exempted from the visa requirement in the 
Netherlands can be found here: http://www.government.nl/issues/visa-for-the-netherlands-and-
the-caribbean-parts-of-the-kingdom/documents-and-publications/leaflets/2012/10/04/countries-
whose-nationals-do-not-need-a-schengen-visa-for-the-netherlands.html 
25 Antigua & Baruda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, New 
Zealand, St Kitts & Nevis, St Lucia, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America 
26  The certificate must be older than one year.  
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In principle, applicants for family reunification in Germany, need to hand over a 
certificate, evidencing their required knowledge. However, if the diplomatic represen-
tation at the embassy is convinced that an applicant meets the A1 level, the require-
ment of a certificate can be waived. It must be kept in mind that the diplomatic rep-
resentation also holds this power in reversed situations. If the family member is able 
to present a certificate that attests to his or her language abilities but the consular 
staff is not convinced, for instance if the certificate was issued long ago, the consular 
staff can require a new, more updated certificate. Germany is the only Member State 
which has established an infrastructure of preparation courses worldwide. An 
evaluation of the Ministry of Interior demonstrates significant differences in pass 
rates between applicants who have followed a course and the ones who have not (see 
also chapter 6). Germany does not exempt minors from having to fulfil a language re-
quirement, if they are between the ages of 16 and 18 and only if their parents are al-
ready residing in Germany, unless it is determined the child has positive integration 
prospects. These minors must show a significantly higher level of command of 
German than is required from spouses. Their language skills must be qualified as 
being of C1 level by a certified language/educational institute.27 
The Netherlands requires spouses to take a specifically designed integration test 
at an embassy in the spouse’s home country or country of permanent residence. 
Family members are tested on their knowledge of the Dutch language and of Dutch 
society. A computer determines whether the candidate has passed the test. The com-
puter’s decision cannot be appealed. It is possible to take the test multiple times, 
however a fee must be paid per test taken. A hardship clause can be invoked if a 
family member for certain reasons is unable to pass the test and is not allowed to 
enter the country. However, the requirements are rarely waived on the basis of this 
clause.  
A family member who applies for leave to enter or remain in the UK must ini-
tially fulfil a language requirement. People who have obtained a master’s degree or 
PhD taught in English are presumed to have sufficient knowledge of the English 
language. Minor children and elderly family members above the age of 65 are ex-
empted from the requirement. If a family member cannot meet the requirement due 
to ‘exceptional compassionate circumstances’ there is a possibility of the condition 
being waived.  
 
Housing 
Ireland and the Netherlands do not impose accommodation requirements on TCN 
migrants who wish to be reunited with a family member. In Portugal, an applicant has 
to show evidence of the presence of available housing, e.g. by showing a rental agree-
ment, without any further requirements. In Austria, the property must meet the ‘local 
standard’ and has to be big enough for all family members for it to be considered 
suitable. German law requires sufficient living space to be available for all family 
                                                        
27  Germany is the only Member State bound by the Family Reunification Directive that is allowed to 
impose these conditions, due to the standstill clause included in this derogation of Article 4 (1), last 
paragraph. 
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members. The term ‘sufficient’ is measured against the minimum space that is man-
datory for social housing.28 The UK links the accommodation requirement to the 
criteria which are set out in national public health laws and statutory overcrowding is 
prohibited. The property must be owned or occupied exclusively by the TCN spon-
sor and his or her family members. With regard to ownership, it must be noted that it 
is sufficient if a property is partially owned and that only an area of the house is ex-
clusively occupied.  
2.2.4  Refugees 
Convention refugees, persons with subsidiary protection and other persons with asy-
lum related claims require special attention with regard to the conditions for family 
reunification as they are exempted from many of the requirements. The family mem-
bers who are allowed to join a sponsor (personal scope) may also differ slightly from 
other groups of TCNs. In all the countries covered by this research, spouses, (same 
sex) civil partners and (unmarried) minor children derive residence entitlements from 
the refugee permit granted to the sponsor where the family bond existed prior to the 
departure of the sponsor. In the Netherlands, the family bond is defined differently 
from other third country nationals, as additional requirements apply. The ‘effective 
bond’ criterion demands that the family lived together in the country of origin at the 
time of the sponsor’s departure and, additionally, in the case of children, that they are 
morally and financially dependent on the sponsor. A short period of separation as a 
result of the flight should not be objected to, according to the national case law. The 
UK and Ireland require the marriage or civil partnership to be ‘subsisting’. The UK 
does not only grant rights to spouses and civil partners but also to unmarried partners 
if they have been in a relationship that equals marriage for at least two years. The 
Netherlands only does so when the partner is dependent on the refugee (and the 
effective bond criterion is met). In Germany, unmarried partners and spouses receive 
equal treatment with the exception that unmarried partners must show they possess 
German language skills at A2 level. In Ireland, family members beyond the nuclear 
family can be granted legal residence, at the discretion of the Minister for Justice and 
Equality, when they are dependent. Portugal not only explicitly allows the family 
reunification of the nuclear family, but also of unmarried partners (if the relationship 
is recognized under law), dependent parents, dependent adult children of the refugee 
and minor brothers and sisters over whom the refugee has custody. All the countries 
grant parents of minor children with refugee status a derivative right of residence. 
As previously mentioned, family reunification requirements often do not need to 
be met by refugees. The main difficulty arises when family members apply for family 
reunification from their home country. Although a visa for this group is not always 
obligatory, they usually apply for a visa at the foreign representation which can be is-
sued as soon as the national asylum authority has decided that the family reunification 
will be granted. We will see in chapter 3 that the cooperation between the representa-
                                                        
28 Children under the age of three are generally not taken into account for the purpose of the calcula-
tion. 
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tion and the domestic asylum authority that is required to properly deal with these 
types of cases gives rise to certain difficulties. In Germany and the Netherlands, 
spouses and minor children of refugees receive a derivative right of residence if the 
application for family reunification is filed within three months after the refugee 
status was granted and there is also no possibility of enjoying family life in a third 
country to which the applicants have close ties. In the Netherlands, if the application 
was filed after three months, or if the marriage was concluded after the admission of 
the refugee, the spouse must comply with the regular requirements, except for the in-
tegration requirement. In Germany, all the regular conditions must be complied with 
in these situations. Only when the application was not submitted within three 
months, but the marriage was concluded before the departure of the refugee, the 
spouse is exempted from the language requirement. In the Netherlands, if the family 
members have a different nationality, the requirements are only waived if there is no 
possibility to exercise the right to family life in a different country. In that case the 
family member is still not entitled to the derivative refugee status, but to a dependent 
regular permit. Thus, their position is much weaker if the marriage breaks down. 
Austria and the UK allow family members of refugees a right of residence, regardless 
of whether the application was submitted within a certain time limit. If the marriage, 
however, was not concluded before the refugee’s departure from the home country, 
all regular requirements for TCN family members must be fulfilled. Portugal does not 
impose any housing, income or integration conditions on family members, regardless 
of whether the family bond existed before the refugee left his or her home country. A 
last point of interest is the Austrian situation of family members of persons with 
subsidiary protection. After the status has been granted, they have to wait for one 
year before their family member can apply for family reunification. 
2.2.5  Privileged Groups 
Turkish workers 
Turkish workers hold a special position because of the Association Agreement that 
was concluded between the EU and Turkey in 1980. This agreement, in conjunction 
with Decision No 1/80 of the Association Council (1980), is generally interpreted as 
containing a so-called ‘standstill clause’, which prevents Member States from subject-
ing Turkish nationals to stricter rules on access to the EU labour market than the 
ones that were in place when the agreement entered into force. This may have as a 
consequence that they are exempted from certain immigration restrictions as well, 
such as visa, fees and integration requirements. It is interesting to note that there is 
no general agreement on how the standstill clause should be interpreted. Germany 
does not exempt Turkish nationals from any requirements (see chapter 5). Turkish 
family members are subject to some requirements in the Netherlands that were in-
troduced after the agreement came into effect. The minimum age requirement of 21 
years and the income requirement of 100 per cent of the minimum wage must be ful-
filled by Turkish nationals, even though these conditions were introduced at a later 
stage. However, the pre-entry test is not applicable, the fees are signifcantly lower for 
Turkish nationals than for other third country nationals, and unmarried partners are 
still allowed to reunite (this will be reintroduced for all categories). 
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In Austria, two different situations can be distinguished: the family reunification 
of a TCN (including Turkish nationals) sponsor with Turkish national family mem-
bers, and the family reunification of an Austrian national sponsor with a Turkish na-
tional family member. Both groups are exempted from the pre-entry test and the in-
tegration requirements after admission (unless the Turkish national is applying for 
permanent residence). There is also no minimum age requirement for spouses in 
place. Family members of Austrian sponsors may, additionally, await the decision in-
land (regardless of whether ot not they entered the country legally) and are exempted 
from the income and accommodation requirements. The rapporteur from the UK 
also mentions a privileged position of Turkish nationals in its national report, stating 
a right to remain and protection from expulsion as examples of these privileges.  
 
Highly skilled workers 
The position of highly skilled workers and their rights to family reunification are 
regulated by Directive 2009/50/EC. The directive stipulates that for the purpose of 
family reunification Directive 2003/86/EC applies but that a number of derogations 
for family members of highly skilled workers must be upheld. The preamble of the 
directive sets out clearly that favourable conditions for family reunification and access 
to work for spouses are a fundamental element of the directive. These lenient condi-
tions serve as a tool to attract highly qualified third country workers. Ireland and the 
UK are not bound by the directive, unlike the other countries that participated in this 
study. The directive does not allow Member States to impose pre-entry tests for fam-
ily members. Neither is a certain period of legal residence of the sponsor required. 
Even though the directive allows for the introduction of language requirements after 
family reunification has been granted, Member States generally only impose language 
requirements if a family member wishes to obtain a permanent residence permit. Ger-
many also exempts spouses of highly skilled workers from the age limit it imposes on 
spouses of TCNs. The Austrian quota rules do not apply to highly skilled workers 
and their family members.  
Ireland and the UK give preferential treatment to highly skilled workers on other 
legal bases than the directive. Ireland provides so-called Green Card holders and re-
searchers who reside in Ireland on the basis of the Researchers Directive with more 
favourable family reunification rights. Family members (i.e. spouse and dependants) 
may accompany a Green Card holder or a scientific researcher on admission into the 
State or join later (although in the latter case they will be subjected to regular immi-
gration rules). In the UK highly skilled workers are admitted under the so-called 
points based system (PBS) that applies to economic migrants and students. Depend-
ent members of the nuclear family are allowed to join the highly skilled sponsor 
without having to pass a pre-entry test. While the UK grants spouses of highly skilled 
workers a right to work, in Ireland spouses must first qualify for a spousal dependant 
work permit or independently qualify for an employment permit in accordance with 
general employment permit requirements 
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2.3  Admission of Family Members of Union Citizens 
The Union Citizens Directive (2004/38/EC) allows spouses, registered partners, 
couples who can attest to their durable relationship and children up to the age of 21 
to join a Union citizen who has exercised his or her mobility rights. The directive also 
grants rights to many members of the extended family if they are dependent on the 
Union citizen. This holds especially true for children older than 21, grandchildren, 
parents and grandparents, but other family members might also qualify if they were 
dependent or part of the household of the Union citizen in the country from which 
the family has come. Family members who require personal care by the Union citizen 
because of serious health problems must be allowed legal residence as well.  
Union citizens, and their family members, may reside for three months in an-
other Member State without being subject to any conditions. The family must, how-
ever, not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system. After three 
months the Union citizen will have to comply with some conditions which are signifi-
cantly less strict and demanding than the requirements for TCNs. Workers and self-
employed persons may be automatically joined by their family members. Union citi-
zens who are unemployed must provide evidence of sufficient resources and health 
insurance. Under the directive, EU citizens are exempted from having to fulfil any 
housing or integration conditions. Even a common household is not necessarily re-
quired.  
2.4  Admission of Family Members of Own Nationals 
While Portuguese nationals have very strong family reunification rights as their posi-
tion is equal to Union citizens, Dutch nationals are treated in the same manner as 
TCNs and, therefore, have to fulfil many conditions before they can enjoy family life 
with their family members in the Netherlands. The situation is a bit less straightfor-
ward in the other Member States. In Austria, family members of Austrian nationals to 
a large extent have the same position as TCN family members. Unlike regular TCN 
family members, the relatives of the Austrian national are exempted from the quota 
for family reunification and they may file an inland application for family reunifica-
tion. Another important difference between the positions of own nationals and 
TCNs in Austria is the position of the extended family. The personal scope of the 
Union Citizens Directive applies to own nationals. However Austrian sponsors must 
additionally sign a declaration stating that he or she will take financial responsibility 
for the family member for the first five years of residence and the family member will 
have to adhere to the general immigration conditions. 
The only difference between the situation of UK nationals and settled TCNs in 
the UK is that the nationality of a minor can make a difference with regard to the ap-
plication of Article 8 ECHR by the authorities or the court in the UK.29 The national-
ity of a child may not allow for a parent to be expelled.  
                                                        
29 ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 (1 February 2011). 
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In Germany, own nationals are exempted from complying with the housing con-
dition. Furthermore, the income requirement is generally waived for the nuclear fam-
ily. However, the income requirement might apply if both spouses have more links 
with the country of origin of the spouse, for example, if the German national has 
dual nationality, speaks the language and/or has lived in that country as well. Lastly, 
the special conditions for 16- and 17-year-old minors do not apply.  
In Ireland, there are no provisions that grant explicit rights to family members of 
Irish nationals. In practice however, family members of both the nuclear and ex-
tended family may be granted legal residency on a discretionary basis. If the Irish 
national has sufficient income, the family reunification application is more likely to 
succeed. Should the Irish family member be reliant on public funds there may be 
reasons of humanitarian nature, including the right to family life, that may impel the 
Minister to grant a residence permit. For unmarried partners, the four year cohabita-
tion requirement that is applicable to TCN partners in order to prove the family bond 
is reduced to two years. After the CJEU’s ruling in the Zambrano case, a specific appli-
cation procedure was put in place for parents of Irish minor citizens. Chapter 5 will 
elaborate on this further.  
2.5  Rights and obligations of TCN Family Members after Admission 
2.5.1  Temporary Residence Permit 
In principle, the sponsor and the family have to comply with the admission criteria, 
with each renewal of a temporary permit, as long as the residence right of the family 
members is linked to the sponsor. In most cases, this means that the regular require-
ments for family reunification have to be met during at least the first five years after 
arrival. Furthermore, admitted family members are subject to integration require-
ments in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, unless they can prove a sufficient 
level of the language or are unable to do so for medical reasons. Those who are sub-
ject to the integration requirements can be confronted with the withdrawal of their 
temporary residence permit if they fail to fulfil their obligations. In practice, however, 
a family permit can only be revoked in very exceptional cases.  
In order to be able to remain in the country, Austria requires family members to 
obtain proof of level A2 German language skills (speaking, writing, listening and 
reading) within two years of receiving the first residence permit. If a family member 
fails to do so, the two-year time limit can be extended because of personal circum-
stances. The general consequence of failing to comply with this requirement, how-
ever, can be a refusal to prolong the residence permit, an administrative fine30 and the 
possibility of expulsion.31 Rather similar to the Austrian situation, Dutch law requires 
                                                        
30 Where the fines in sum exceed the amount of 1,000 euro, the residence permit may be withdrawn 
and an expulsion order issued, which means the family member cannot enter Austria again for a 
minimum of two years.  
31 Only if the expulsion does not violate Article 8 ECHR. 
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that family members32 pass a civic integration test within three years of entering the 
country. The minimum language level that is required to pass the test equals an A2 
level in speaking, writing, listening and reading. The tests include questions on Dutch 
society. From 1 January 2013, the permits of family members who do not meet the 
requirements within three years after arrival can be withdrawn or not extended.33 
Furthermore, the permit can be withdrawn if the income requirement is no longer 
met. In Germany, admitted family members are required to attend integration 
courses. The initial permit is granted for one year and has to be extended on a regular 
basis until permanent residence is granted. The general requirements have to be re-
examined each time, whereby the immigration authorities are to assess the level of 
participation in the integration course. If this is not sufficient, the permit can be ex-
tended for a shorter period or fines can be imposed. When assessing the require-
ments at the time of renewal, the authorities are able to waive the income and hous-
ing requirements where there is a subsisting family bond. Minor children will always 
be allowed to remain if this is the case. In the UK, the general immigration require-
ments are re-examined after 2.5 years, after which family members can be granted 
another permit for 2.5 years. Subsequently, they will be able to apply for indefinite 
leave to remain. There are no integration requirements after admission and before 
applying for indefinite leave to remain.  
 
Independent permit 
There is a possibility for spouses to obtain an independent (temporary) residence 
status after a certain period of time in case of divorce. In Austria, spouses are entitled 
to an independent permit if they are able to meet the requirements independently. In 
Germany, they are entitled if the marriage lasted for at least three years in the Federal 
Republic Germany, while in the Netherlands this required period of residence has 
recently been extended from three to five years. In Portugal, the family members of 
sponsors with permanent residence must receive an independent residence status 
after two years if the family bond subsists. In this context, it should be noted that 
parents in Portugal cannot be expelled, unless they are a threat to public order, where 
their child resides in Portugal and is dependent on them.34 
In all countries (although in Ireland this is not laid down in the law), less strict re-
quirements apply in cases of death of a spouse or domestic violence. The Irish rap-
porteur also noted an increased awareness at national level of the vulnerable situation 
in which spouses find themselves when they are victims of abuse, yet their residence 
status is dependent on their marital status. Guidelines have been published on how to 
handle these types of situations and applications for independent permits made by 
victims of domestic abuse are generally looked at favourably. 
                                                        
32 Between 18-65 years old. 
33 Article 8 ECHR must be observed.  
34 In the cases that are foreseen for the application of this special article of the law, foreign citizens 
have to meet at least one of the following conditions: (a) were born and have residence in Portu-
guese territory; (b) have effective custody of minor children of Portuguese nationality and residing in 
Portugal; (c) have minor children, nationals from a third country and residents in Portuguese terri-
tory over whom they have effective parenthood and ensure their livelihood and education; and (d) 
who have lived in Portugal since less than 10 years old and live in the country. 
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In the absence of the special circumstances mentioned, it is usually not possible 
for the family member to obtain an independent permit if, in the meantime, the spon-
sor no longer fulfils the requirements mentioned above, e.g. the income requirement, 
or in case of divorce. However, it must be noted that, for example in Germany and 
the Netherlands, the income of the spouse may be taken into account in order to ful-
fil the income requirement when a residence permit is renewed.  
2.5.2  Permanent Residence Permit 
In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK, a permanent residence 
permit (or in the case of the UK, indefinite leave to remain) can be granted after five 
successive years of residence in the respective state if there are no public order or 
national security reasons for not doing so. The preconditions for receiving a long-
term residence title in Austria are fulfilling the general immigration requirements and 
having proof of advanced German skills in speaking, writing and understanding. Only 
minors before the age of schooling and persons with medical certificates are exempt-
ed from the integration requirement. German law requires that before a permanent 
residence permit can be granted the income and housing requirements must be met. 
Further, the applicant must have sufficient German language skills (B1) and have ba-
sic knowledge of the legal system, social order and living conditions in the Federal 
Republic of Germany.35 Lastly, either the applicant or the spouse must have made 
contributions to the social pension fund for at least 60 months. In the Netherlands, a 
permanent residence permit cannot be refused to someone who was born there, or 
who entered before the age of four, and who has resided in the Netherlands ever 
since, unless there are serious reasons of public order or national security to justify a 
refusal.  
The income requirement can be waived after ten years of residence and if an 
adult migrant was admitted as a minor and has resided in the Netherlands ever since. 
In all other cases, the applicant must provide proof of a sustainable income (the in-
come of both spouses may be taken into account). Before granting a permanent resi-
dence permit, the Portuguese authorities verify whether the income and housing re-
quirements have been met and whether the applicant has sufficient knowledge of the 
Portuguese language (A2 level). In order to acquire indefinite leave to remain in the 
UK, everyone between the ages of 18 and 65 must pass a ‘life in the UK’ integration 
test and meet the income requirement. Currently it is also sufficient to show progres-
sion from one language level to another. However, this more lenient rule will be abol-
ished as of October 2013. From this date onwards applicants will also have to present 
an English language speaking and listening qualification at B1 level or above. 
                                                        
35 Both integration requirements can be verified with the successful participation in an integration 
course. This requirement can be waived under certain circumstances, for example, in the case of a 
physical, mental or psychological disorder or disability. 
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Ireland does not use the concept of ‘permanent residence’ like the other countries 
that were studied do. The status that resembles the permanent residence permit to a 
certain extent is the permission to remain in Ireland ‘without condition as to time’. 
This is a residence ‘stamp’ that may be granted at the Minister’s discretion to certain 
categories of third-country nationals who are of ‘good character’ and have completed 
eight years of legal residence in Ireland. In Ireland, the term ‘long-term residence’ 
applies to a five-year residence permit which may be granted to work permit holders 
only and which is granted and renewed at the discretion of the Minister for Justice 
and Equality. 
 
Difference in legal position after having obtained a permanent permit 
Although the national differences are substantial, in general with a permanent resi-
dence permit, a TCN migrant obtains a stronger legal position which can protect him 
or her against expulsion. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, in order for a tempo-
rary residence permit to be renewed, all the requirements for family reunification 
have to be met each time. When a permanent residence permit is obtained, a failure 
to meet these conditions does not result in the withdrawal of a residence permit or a 
refusal to grant a renewal. Furthermore, stricter withdrawal grounds apply in cases of 
breaches of public order or national security. Lastly, permanent residence in many 
Member States provides an immigrant with access to more social benefits, more op-
portunities on the labour market and other possibilities, for instance, access to a 
mortgage in order to buy a house.  
2.5.3  Refugees 
In Germany, a spouse and minor unmarried children can obtain a family refugee pro-
tection permit, which provides them with the same rights as their sponsor. However, 
the residence permit stays linked to that of the sponsor and can, therefore, be with-
drawn if the sponsor, for example, is no longer recognized as a refugee. A permanent 
residence permit has to be granted to the sponsor, and thus also to the family mem-
ber who holds a family refugee protection permit, after three years. If the family 
member does not have a derivative refugee status, a permanent residence permit can 
be obtained after he or she has resided in Germany for five years. Irish law states that 
a family member of a refugee is allowed to reside ‘for such period as the refugee is 
entitled to remain in the State’ and this is not affected by the break-up of the family, 
for as long as the refugee remains resident in the country. As said earlier, with the ex-
ception of the without condition as to time permit, Ireland only grants temporary 
permits until Irish citizenship can be obtained. In the Netherlands, the refugee’s fam-
ily member receives the same rights as the refugee. Even though the family members 
do not have to pass any integration tests before admission, they will have to pass the 
regular integration course after admission also within the three-year time limit. A fail-
ure to fulfil the integration requirement will not result in withdrawal of the permit. 
Should the sponsor pass away, or in the event of a divorce, the permit will not be 
withdrawn either, although stricter (regular) criteria apply if the family member does 
not possess a derivative refugee status. If the permit of the sponsor is withdrawn, for 
example because the situation in the home country has substantially and sustainably 
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improved, the family member’s permit will be invoked as well. In Portugal, the posi-
tion of refugees does not differ from other third country nationals in this regard. 
2.6 Rights and Obligations of Family Members of Union Citizens after 
Admission 
Family members of Union citizens obtain a residence permit that is valid for five 
years unless the permit that has been awarded to the sponsor is valid for a shorter pe-
riod of time. After five years a permanent residence permit must be granted. After 
one year of residence, a permit cannot be withdrawn in the event of the death of a 
sponsor or if the sponsor moves away. Generally, the marriage must also have lasted 
for at least three years. However, because children do not lose their right to education 
if the circumstances change after one year of residence, the spouse, in the capacity of 
caretaker of the children, may then still be allowed to remain in the host Member 
State. In the event of a divorce, it is required in Austria that the marriage or partner-
ship has lasted for at least three years, of which one year had to be spent in Austria, 
the former spouse is awarded sole custody or can only exercise the right to access to 
a minor child in Austria, or to avoid special hardship that arises from these changed 
circumstances. A family member is not allowed to reside abroad for longer than six 
months, unless there is a good reason to justify this. If there is indeed a good justifi-
cation, the allowed time period may be extended up to 12 months. Once a permanent 
residence permit is granted, the family member is allowed to reside abroad for up to 
two years.  
Although the legal position of family members of EU citizens is stronger if they 
have a permanent residence permit, the difference with a temporary permit is much 
smaller compared to the situation of family members of third country nationals. The 
EU Citizenship Directive offers much stronger protection to admitted family mem-
bers of EU citizens than are usually awarded to family members of third country na-
tionals.  
2.7 Rights and Obligations of Family Members of Own Nationals after 
Admission 
Austria differentiates between the legal position of family members who are part of 
the nuclear family and family members who are part of the extended family. While 
members of the nuclear family have unrestricted labour market access and a right to 
settle, members of the extended family do not. Yet, members of the extended family 
may change their residence title. However, first they must obtain an immigration 
quota spot and fulfil the general requirements. Only then they may acquire a work 
permit. In order to obtain a permanent residence permit family members must have 
resided for five subsequent years, fulfil the general housing and income requirements, 
and provide proof of B1 German language skills. If the marriage or registered part-
nership has dissolved an independent right of permanent residence is still granted if 
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the marriage or partnership lasted for at least two years, provided the general condi-
tions and integration requirement are met. 
Family members of German nationals can obtain a permanent residence permit 
after three years of residence, in contrast to TCN family members who have to wait 
at least five years. In order to obtain a permanent residence permit, the family mem-
bers will have to show evidence of basic language skills. Further, the family member 
must not be reliant on public funding. Family members of own nationals are also bet-
ter protected against expulsion than TCN family members are.  
As previously stated, family members of Dutch and UK nationals are treated in 
exactly the same manner as family members of TCNs. This means that they are sub-
ject to the most stringent rules out of all Member State nationals. Family members of 
Portuguese nationals have the strongest position as they are equated with the family 
members of Union citizens.  
Ireland provides the least security to family members of any group, including 
family members of own nationals, because there is no entitlement to the consolida-
tion of residence. This means that the family members find themselves in an insecure 
and dependent position until they become citizens of Ireland or succeed in an appli-
cation to the Minister for the discretionary granting of a ‘change of status’, for exam-
ple on the basis of domestic abuse suffered by them.  
2.8  Conclusion 
After having compared the six different Member States, it has become apparent that 
Portugal is very lenient in its family reunification policies compared to the other 
countries. Consequently, there is less discrepancy between the different target groups 
that were studied in Portugal than in the other Member States. Union citizens have 
been granted the strongest family reunification rights out of the different groups of 
immigrants. Portugal is the only country that provides its own nationals with the 
same rights. In all other countries, a situation of reverse discrimination towards Un-
ion citizens occurs to a certain level. While refugees, Turkish nationals and highly 
skilled workers hold a privileged position, all other third country nationals have to 
adhere to very strict conditions. With regard to the income requirement it must be re-
marked that the required income level for work-permit holders in Ireland seems ex-
cessive compared with other countries. The Netherlands only accepts very few docu-
ments that serve as evidence of a regular and stable income. With regard to the inte-
gration requirements, it is the Austrian situation that is rather striking as it is the only 
Member State that has an integration test at three different stages before permanent 
residence can be obtained: pre-entry, post-entry (within two years) and when applying 
for permanent residence. Although the Netherlands also imposes three stages, the 
levels do not increase a third time. The quota that is in place is another feature of 
Austrian immigration policy that can greatly influence the experience of family mem-
bers who apply for family reunification. It will be interesting to see in the next chap-
ter to what extent these types of requirements, which seem to be merely of a proce-
dural nature, possibly impede the exercise of a family member’s right to family reuni-
fication. Lastly, it is interesting to note that the benefit of instruments, such as the 
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Family Reunification Directive and the Long-Term Residence Directive, not only lies 
in a certain level of harmonization but also within a common frame of reference. 
These instruments make it easier to provide insight into the policies of different 
countries and to compare and evaluate them. The lack of a codified and harmonized 
family reunification policy in Ireland not only makes Irish policy difficult to compare 
to other countries, but also causes legal uncertainty for the applicants. It also raises 
questions of arbitrariness in decisions on family reunification in Ireland. 
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Chapter 3 
Application of the Procedure 
3.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we learned about the requirements for family reunification 
applicable to the different target groups. But how do these requirements affect the 
right to family reunification in practice? Are family members able to invoke their 
rights? The practical consequences of the legal rights largely depend on the way these 
requirements are applied, how the application procedure is organized and what pro-
cedural safeguards the sponsor and his or her family members enjoy. These three as-
pects will be addressed in this chapter, based on the different sources the national 
rapporteurs collected: legislation, research reports, case law, criticism from NGOs, 
Inspectors (UK) and the Ombudsman (Portugal), parliamentary documents and inter-
views with stakeholders. First, we offer an overview of the application procedure and 
the actors involved in the decision making process, second, we focus on some critical 
elements of the procedure (applying abroad, the duration of the procedure and the 
safeguards for refugees), and third, the practice of the procedural safeguards is ana-
lysed. Furthermore, we will highlight some national developments on the combat of 
fraudulent marriages. How does this combat affect couples attempting to reunite? 
Finally we turn to the experiences of our respondents with the procedures; how did 
they perceive and experience the way their application had been assessed?  
3.2  Actors Involved 
Horizontal division of competences 
In most of the Member States in the study, the emphasis of migration control has 
shifted from the desks in the host country and at the national borders to consulates in 
the countries of origin, offering Member States more possibilities to prevent unlawful 
residence in the country. Due to this development, applying for family reunification 
abroad has become more and more the starting point, which has led to a growing role 
for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Article 13 (1) of the Family Reunification Direc-
tive prescribes a clear order: it obliges Member States to authorize the entry of the 
family members, inter alia, by facilitating obtainment of the visa as soon as the appli-
cation has been accepted. This implies that the visa is to be issued after the positive 
decision has been taken by the Ministry of Interior. In practice, however, consulates 
sometimes take part in the decision making, for instance by verifying documents and 
the identity of applicants or checking on counter-indications on national security 
grounds. What effects do these shared competences have for the application proce-
dure?  
The involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in family reunification espe-
cially leads to problems in Austria, Germany and Portugal. Applicants experience 
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obstacles because of inconsistencies in the decision making, lack of transparency and 
in any case delays in the application procedure.  
In Austria, although in principle the decision of Home Affairs is decisive, Aus-
trian consulates have the discretion to refuse a visa if evidence is provided that the 
individual’s entry poses a threat to public order and security. They may take up in-
quiries on their own initiative in this regard and in practice they use their margin of 
appreciation rather extensively. This leads to significant problems for individual appli-
cants, especially for family members of refugee and subsidiary protected families who 
are faced with longer waiting periods in difficult situations.  
In Portugal, the unclear scope of competences and the high level of competition 
between the two ministries generate different (if not contradictory) decisions affect-
ing the right to family reunification. The two main problems applicants experience is 
the long time the consulates take to issue a visa – respondents complained about 
‘apathy’ at the consulates – and their renewed assessment after approval by the immi-
gration authorities (SEF). This review implies requests for extra documentation or 
proof of family relationship or even reversal of the positive decision. The officials of 
the consulate argue that the relatives are in front of them and sometimes give rise to 
suspicions, for example, with regard to the age of children or the family relationship. 
At the same time, the reason for the delay is often not explained to applicants, even if 
it is motivated by certain doubts. In August 2012, the legislation was slightly amended 
in a way that may even extend the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
new formulation can be interpreted as the SEF no longer taking a final decision, but 
making a proposal which can be revised by the consulates.  
In the UK, Entry Clearance Officers posted in overseas countries are responsible 
for issuing visas but, increasingly, also for taking the decision on admission for family 
reunification reasons. Since 1999, a Joint Entry Clearance Office (JECO) has to en-
sure effective coordination between Entry Clearance Officers and the Home Office. 
However, recent reports by the Chief Inspector of the United Kingdom Border 
Agency (UKBA) have highlighted a number of deficiencies in the decision making of 
Entry Clearance Officers. These include failing to clearly indicate what evidence is re-
quired for a successful application, overlooking relevant evidence submitted with ap-
plications and, in certain instances, applying higher evidential requirements for appli-
cants from some states (e.g. Pakistan) than for applicants from other countries. This 
practice not only leads to insecurity, but also to arbitrariness and discriminatory treat-
ment.  
In Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands, the role of the Ministry responsible for 
migration as primary responsible actor is less, or not disputed. That does not alter the 
fact that the visa application procedure itself leads to delays. The German embassies 
apply a special authentication procedure for documents on identity, nationality and 
family relations from countries of origin which are on a special list (currently more 
than 40 countries). This authentication takes several months.  
The Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, in processing visa applications, is 
merely facilitating the work of the Minister for Justice and Equality, who decides on 
the policy. But here the opposite effect arises: the applicant who has been granted a 
visa is still not guaranteed entry to the state. The decision to grant leave to enter is up 
to an immigration officer on arrival, whose decision is not subject to an appeal. 
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 In the Netherlands, in order to harmonize and gain more control over the appli-
cation process, more competences regarding long-term visas have recently been 
shifted to the Ministry of Security and Justice. This could be motivated by the aim of 
a more centralized, restrictive admission policy. One respondent told that his spouse 
was granted a tourist visa by the ambassador, despite general instructions to deny a 
visa in cases of an intention to marry. After arrival, the Dutch immigration authorities 
tried to correct the ambassador’s decision by revoking the visa, taking the woman’s 
passport and attempting to prevent the marriage. 
 
Vertical division of competences 
In all Member States, the agencies responsible for deciding on the applications for 
family reunification are under the jurisdiction of the national Ministry for Home 
Affairs or the Ministry of Justice (the latter is the case in Ireland and the Nether-
lands). The national family reunification policy is executed centrally, except in Austria 
and Germany, where the federal structure has resulted in a different division of com-
petences.  
Especially in Austria, the federal system affects coherent decision making on ap-
plications. The competence to decide on an application for admission or renewal of 
the permit has recently been shifted to the heads of the federal states, who have made 
the regional or city administrations responsible. At the review stage, the Federal Min-
istry of Interior still functions as the second instance. Although this ministry is to 
ensure a uniform application of the rules, a respondent observed, as a counsellor, dif-
ferent practices between the states, and even between local authorities of the same 
federal state. In particular, the introduction of a new criterion on the income re-
quirement in 2005, not clarifying whether this should be the net or gross sum of the 
social welfare level, left wide margins of discretion for the immigration authorities, 
resulting in a divergent implementation practice. With an amendment of the Act, the 
federal legislator has limited this discretion significantly. The legislator now only al-
lows exemptions on grounds of Article 8 ECHR, which is, however, practically only 
applied after arrival, for instance at the moment of renewal of the residence permit. 
In Germany, the responsibility at federal level results in a more uniform imple-
mentation of the Residence Act, via a binding regulation and special ordinances. At 
the state level, the Ministry of Interior establishes binding guidelines for the way local 
immigration authorities should use their discretion. The German Constitution proba-
bly contributes to this coherence because of the mandatory involvement in the legis-
lative process of the Bundesrat, which represents the governments of the states. With 
regard to the implementation of the federal integration legislation, the role of the 
states and municipalities is just as important as in Austria.  
Despite their uniform national structures, the other four Member States also dif-
fer in the level of centralization. The Dutch system has become strictly centralized 
during the last 15 years. Before, local officials of the Aliens Police served as the con-
tact points for sponsors and their lawyers, using their knowledge of the cases while 
advising the immigration authorities. It enabled lawyers to explain the individual cir-
cumstances of a case in more detail and to obtain information on the processing of 
the application. With the current anonymous assessment of the applications, these 
possibilities have been significantly reduced. The centralization also furthers a stricter 
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application of the formal requirements, like the three-month period for refugees, the 
income or visa requirement, which is problematic in view of the obligation of the 
Family Reunification Directive and the Union principles (especially the principles of 
effectiveness and proportionality) to take all individual and concrete circumstances 
into account.39 As the Dutch court tends to scrutinize an appeal marginally, a correc-
tion mechanism at a later stage is minimal. On the other hand, the detailed level of 
the legislation enables family members to invoke rules and rights which should be ap-
plicable to them.  
On the other side of the coin, we find the Irish system, lacking detailed criteria or 
safeguards for most categories. The Irish legislation, which only entails a statutory 
right for Union citizens, refugees, subsidiary protected and scientific researchers who 
have been admitted to Ireland under the Researchers Directive, leaves a much wider 
scope of discretion for the authorities, compared to those in the other Member States 
studied. According to the Irish High Court (Hogan J.), the nominated civil servants 
are free to decide on an application or deportation order, but the Minister for Equal-
ity and Justice always remains responsible for these decisions. However, no real guid-
ance is offered, specifically regarding criteria on partnerships (prior cohabitation or 
not), or arranged or proxy marriages. As the reasons for a decision are not always giv-
en in much detail, family members sometimes don’t know why their application has 
been rejected. This system of a fragile legislative basis and a wide discretion for im-
migration authorities might allow officials to take all individual circumstances into ac-
count, but there is no guarantee to that effect. At the same time, the disadvantages 
are considerable: the risk of arbitrariness, lack of security of status, lack of transparen-
cy and infringements of (the right to) equal treatment, and difficulties to invoke cer-
tain rights before the court. Ireland is allowed to pursue this defective system towards 
third country nationals, as it is not bound by the Family Reunification Directive. Yet, 
the applicability of the Union Citizens Directive has forced the Irish government to 
establish the right to family reunification for Union citizens in the law, offering this 
group more security and legal safeguards and also raising the question of what rights 
to give Ireland’s own citizens in terms of family reunification with third country na-
tionals.  
3.3  Applying Abroad: The Practice 
Family members of third country nationals, not being refugees, generally have to 
lodge their application and await the decision in their country of origin, or at least 
abroad.40 Thus, embassies are the agencies dealing with the application in the first 
instance. If no diplomatic representation is available, family members have to travel 
to neighbouring countries in order to lodge the application personally. The smaller 
the Member State, the more often applicants face this problem. The Austrian report 
                                                        
39 Chakroun [2010] CJEU C-578/08 (04 March 2010). 
40 In Austria, family members of refugees also have to apply for a visa before being able to apply for 
family reunification in the country. They are therefore forced to await the issuance of an entry visa 
abroad, which in practice takes a long time. 
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mentioned this as an obstacle in general, but the German and Dutch reports point 
out the problems occurring in war regions. Family members have to travel long dis-
tances through unsafe areas, and even several times if passing a pre-entry test is re-
quired. Indeed family members are exempted from the pre-entry test if their sponsor 
is a refugee, but not if he or she received a permit on humanitarian grounds instead 
of a refugee status. 
Not all Member States are equally rigid concerning the obligation to apply for 
family reunification abroad. Austria, Germany and the Netherlands apply this require-
ment the most strictly. By way of derogation, Austria does not refer family members 
of Austrian nationals back to the Austrian consulate, provided they have entered Aus-
tria legally. The provision especially targets former asylum seekers, who have mostly 
entered the country on an irregular base. This exemption is moreover only valid as 
long as the residence is legal, for instance before the visa has expired. Solely Turkish 
nationals covered by the Association Agreement, who are family members of Aus-
trian nationals, are entitled to await the decision inland. As already mentioned, invok-
ing Article 8 ECHR is hardly ever successful in the case of a first application. In 
Germany and the Netherlands, the requirement can be waived if the family member 
already legally resides in the Member State on other grounds, for instance for reasons 
of study or on humanitarian grounds. European and Dutch case law obliges the 
Dutch immigration authorities to assess whether Article 8 ECHR compels them to 
declare the application admissible.  
In principle, applicants for leave to remain in the UK as a spouse or partner are 
allowed to await the decision in the UK if they have not breached the Immigration 
Rules (e.g. overstaying, residing illegally), although the first 28 days of overstaying are 
not taken into account. Furthermore, the marriage or registered partnership must not 
have concluded (or the relationship not have started) after a decision to deport or re-
move them from the UK. The UK courts proved to be reluctant to break up obvi-
ously genuine families, entitled to family reunification, by sending them abroad to 
wait in a long queue for the visa. As TCN family members have a directly effective, 
automatic right under EU law to enter the UK to join or accompany their EEA fam-
ily members, they don’t need to apply for an entry visa, known in the UK as an ‘EEA 
family permit’. In practice however, airline carriers will often refuse to carry passen-
gers who are not able to point to a document confirming their right to enter the UK. 
3.4  Duration of the Procedure 
Earlier studies have shown that the duration varies widely among Member States 
(Pascouau & Labayle 2011). Although the Member States differ in the legal time lim-
its for decision making, they have in common that time limits are no safeguard for a 
timely decision. The Member States in which applicants suffer the most from long 
procedures are Austria and Ireland.  
Although the Austrian legislation mentions a time limit of six months, the in-
volvement of the two agencies described above (abroad and inland) can lead to con-
siderable delays in practice. The delay causes extra complications, as the date of deci-
sion determines which requirements are applicable. Depending on the respective 
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content of transitory provisions, family members also have to meet requirements 
introduced or strengthened after the date of their application. Due to this system, a 
delay can imply that during the application process children lose their eligibility to 
reunite, as they have come of age in the meantime. Furthermore, applicants may face 
the annual admission quota, unless their sponsor is a highly skilled worker or an Aus-
trian national. If the quota is already exhausted, the decision may be postponed for a 
period of up to three years. There is no right to appeal such a postponement. If a 
decision has not been taken within six months, applicants have the right to take the 
application to the authority in second instance. As a consequence, however, they will 
lose the possibility of a review. The idea of having the first decision being the final 
deters applicants from using this right. Another reason why this legal remedy is not 
very effective is that the time limit doesn’t include the period during which the appli-
cation is processed at the embassies, where most of the delays occur.  
In Ireland, a mandatory processing time for applications for visas or residence 
permits is absent, with the exception of an accelerated process in the case of a quali-
fying family member of a Union citizen. Unlike Austria, a delay in decision making is 
one of the main reasons for litigation. In a judgment on this issue, the court referred 
to the website of the Irish Naturalisation and Immigration Service, which informed 
applicants that the average time for processing refugee family reunification applica-
tions is 24 months (visited in January 2008). According to Hedigan J., this is not a 
reasonable time, as ‘every effort must be made to ensure reunification as quickly as 
possible’. The possibility of submitting a fresh application at any time would not dis-
miss the state from this obligation. After all, this could imply that children lose their 
eligibility for reunification if they have come of age in the meantime.41 
In some of the Member States studied, measures have been taken to shorten the 
procedures. Since October 2012, in the Netherlands, not deciding according to the le-
gal time limits implies a financial sanction for the IND. Two weeks after an applicant 
has given notice of default, the IND has to pay an administrative fine to the applicant 
for each day that it decides later than those two weeks. Furthermore, the residence 
permit is going to be automatically issued within two weeks after an application for 
family reunification, if the family member has arrived on a long-term visa for this 
purpose.  
In Portugal, one of the reasons for installing liaison officers at consulates in cer-
tain countries of origin was to speed up the processing of the visa applications. This 
decision, taken in 2006, has not prevented that still in 2010, the large majority of 
complaints lodged by TCNs to the Ombudsman, dealt with the delays in family re-
unification procedures. The Portuguese rapporteurs consider the absence of a legal 
time limit as the main reason for the delays. However, taking into account the experi-
ences in other Member States, this is not necessarily a guarantee for speedy decision 
making.  
                                                        
41 POT v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 361 (High Court of Ireland No-
vember 19, 2008) (Hedigan J.) no. 361.  
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3.5  Refugees and Subsidiary Protected 
In most Member States, the family reunification procedure of refugees is quite similar 
and relatively simple, as the fulfilment of requirements on income, housing or inte-
gration are not to be assessed. The most important objects for verification are iden-
tity and family relationship. If evidencing the existence of the family relationship by 
way of documentation is not possible, DNA testing is offered. However, due to extra 
conditions, refugees settled in Austria, the Netherlands and the UK face specific 
problems in reuniting with their families.  
In Austria, the issuance of a visa to family members of refugees often takes more 
than six months, which results in families waiting in difficult circumstances. Com-
bined with the long asylum procedures the sponsor has to endure before being 
granted protection, it can take many years before they are reunited. In the case of the 
subsidiary protected, this is even longer, as their family members can only apply for 
reunification one year after the protection has been granted. Furthermore, the quota 
system is applied to family members of refugees and the subsidiary protected, if they 
reunite on the basis of the Residence and Settlement Act. This element of the quota 
system has been most sharply criticized. They are only exempted from the quota sys-
tem if the humanitarian situation compels family reunification. Unlike many other 
countries, refugees do not get permission for extended family reunification. 
In the Netherlands, the additional requirement of having an ‘effective family 
bond’ can constitute a considerable impediment in practice: not only the requirement 
itself but also the methods to identify this bond.42 There is a lot a stake as family 
members who are not successful in meeting this criterion face the consequence that 
the regular requirements of income, fees, long-term visa will not be waived. In par-
ticular, the identifying assessment regarding family members without biological ties 
includes long interviews at the Dutch embassy in the country of origin, after which 
the statements are compared with the information the sponsor provided during the 
asylum procedure in the Netherlands. Different answers or gaps can be considered as 
proof of the absence of an effective bond. The answers of the children in separate 
interviews are evaluated accordingly. Observers (a Dutch lawyer and a children’s 
advocate) concluded that the position of children is not taken into account when 
conducting these interviews and evaluating their statements. Interrogations of very 
young children take place, they are not fully prepared, cannot be accompanied and 
the interviews can last up to six or eight hours, without adequate breaks or food and 
beverage. The Dutch government justifies these methods as combating fraud. It, 
therefore, presented the increased number of rejections (from 12 per cent in 2008 to 
                                                        
42 In short, the requirement of an ‘effective family bond’ implies that the family members must 
have lived together in the country of origin at the moment of departure of the refugee, unless 
there was a good reason for a temporary separation. As a result of this, refugees who have 
formed a family outside their country of origin, e.g. during their stay in a refugee camp, do not 
enjoy the more favourable right to family reunification as established in the Family Reunifica-
tion Directive. Own children who have lived with another family or who have been missing for 
a long time can, in principle, only be reunited if the refugee meets the regular requirements, 
such as income. See also para. 2.2. 
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81 per cent in 2011) as a success. Requiring an effective family bond in addition to 
the condition that the family relationship should be proved, is, nevertheless, in con-
travention of the Family Reunification Directive. According to Article 10 (1), the use 
of the definition of a family as provided in Article 4 (1) is mandatory; Article 9 (2) of 
the directive makes clear that the more favourable rules for refugees are only manda-
tory in case of family reunification, as it allows Member States to apply the regular 
conditions in case of family formation. The UK applies criteria which are more or less 
similar to the Dutch. Minor children of refugees must have formed part of the family 
unit of the refugee at the time that he or she fled the country. With regard to spouses 
or unmarried partners, the criteria are harsher than the Dutch ones, as the UK re-
quires a certain period of cohabitation: they must have lived together for two years or 
more before arrival of the refugee in the UK. Although this practice may constitute a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR, the UK is, unlike the Netherlands, not bound by the 
Family Reunification Directive. 
3.6  Right to Appeal and Legal Aid 
In all Member States there is a right to appeal. Most of them have established three 
stages: during the first one the decision is reviewed by the immigration authorities, 
the second instance is an independent court, and the scope of scrutiny of the third 
instance is often limited to formal questions of law.43 Many respondents did not con-
sider the review stage as effective, as the responsible ministry was not likely to change 
its position. In Germany, it was observed that only a change in circumstances, for in-
stance a higher income, led to a positive outcome of the review. For family members 
of refugees in Ireland, a change in circumstances or availability of new evidence are 
the only opportunities to get a new decision on their application for family reunifica-
tion. The website of the INIS informs them that if they have ‘significant new information’ 
it is open to them to submit a new family reunification application. Appeals, to an ap-
peals officer within the Ministry, are only available against the refusal of a visa appli-
cation and against the refusal of residence permits to the family members of 
EU/EEA nationals. In practice, TCNs are also able to request a review against the 
refusal of a residence permit, but there is no legal entitlement to this being provided. 
Furthermore, standards of decision making are criticized; in some cases a review may 
be undertaken by the original deciding officer at first instance. Irish NGOs described 
the administrative and judicial system in immigration cases (including the civil legal 
aid scheme) as ‘inadequate’, ‘not applicant friendly’, ‘prohibitively costly’ and ‘hugely lengthy’. 
Yet the High Court, which is not able to review the merits or substitute the decision 
itself, has so far not held the heavily criticized procedural rules, or lack thereof, to be 
in violation of Articles 8 or 13 ECHR.  
At the same time, the national reports make clear that appealing against the denial 
of a review is for a number of reasons not an attractive strategy. First, following an 
appeal procedure takes a lot of time: the Austrian report mentions that an appeal 
                                                        
43  In Austria, the second instance is the Ministry of the Interior. 
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procedure at the High Court takes on average two years. In particular, if the first 
decision has already taken a long time, appealing implies that family members are 
compelled to live separately for years, since in most cases the family members have to 
await the decision in their country of origin. Second, a review of the decision by the 
court is hard to predict (in Ireland because of the lack of statutory entitlements to 
family reunification) or rather unlikely (in Austria or the Netherlands due to the mar-
gin of appreciation it leaves to the immigration authorities). Third, the procedure 
could amount to a high financial burden; although legal representation is not always 
required, NGOs consider family reunification legislation as too complex to bring for-
ward all legal arguments without professional support. In Austria and Germany, the 
costs for the required legal representation will only be carried by the state if the court 
judges the appeal to be potentially successful. In addition, in Austria the possibility of 
reimbursement is limited to appeals at the High Court. In Ireland, procedures on 
family reunification applications are not covered by legal aid at all. Furthermore, ap-
plicants who challenge decisions of the State through the High Court are faced with 
the enormous financial risk of having to pay the State’s legal costs. 
For all these reasons, taking a case to court implies taking a risk that the denial 
will stand, while much more time and money are consumed. The Portuguese report 
explicitly mentions that instead of appealing, by far most family members choose to 
submit a new application for family reunification, hoping that this time another offi-
cial will assess their case. A Dutch lawyer also said that he advises most clients to do 
so. 
According to the Austrian rapporteurs, family members not only need a lawyer 
for their admission procedure, but increasingly also to have their residence rights 
safeguarded after admission. They pointed to the growing number of conditions, the 
annual renewal, the moment they have to meet the language requirement and the ap-
plication for permanent residence rights. The UK report is alarming on the shortage 
of legal aid in future, due to recent cuts in this specific area. Furthermore, due to 
changes to the Immigration Rules in 2012, all immigration matters will be removed 
from the scope of legal aid, with the exception of asylum and detention. NGO repre-
sentatives interviewed in this study, expect that this amendment will restrict legal 
advice on immigration law to those who can afford it. According to them, migrants 
often don’t know where to turn for advice if they can’t afford to pay. 
3.7  Fraudulent Marriages 
In Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, an increasing attention to possi-
ble fraudulent marriages can be observed. This attention is frequently evident during 
the assessment of the first application, when the family relationship has to be identi-
fied. In all four countries, a specific procedure has been defined in order to detect a 
fraudulent marriage. They have in common that the measures specifically target bi-
national couples. In Austria for instance, since 2005, civil marriages of Austrian na-
tionals with TCNs have been automatically forwarded to the Immigration Police, 
which may initiate inquiries on the couple’s life in case of doubt. The Constitutional 
Court judged that this different treatment of own nationals, compared to Union citi-
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zens exercising their mobility rights, was justified. The Act of 2005 had just abolished 
their equalization with Union citizens.  
This suspicious approach might have increased during recent years, but it stems 
from an older discussion on the national as well as the European level. For decades, 
Member States have expressed concern about the supposedly large number of fraud-
ulent marriages that circumvent restrictive immigration policies. They introduced na-
tional legislation to combat fraudulent marriages, and the concept of fraudulent mar-
riages has also found its way into European immigration policy, such as the Directive 
on the Right to Family Reunification.  
Before fraudulent marriage was targeted in the Family Reunification Directive, it 
appeared in soft law. The Resolution on the harmonization of national policies on 
family reunification adopted in June 1993 in Copenhagen noted that the marriage 
‘must not have been contracted solely or principle for the purpose of enabling the 
spouse to enter and take up residence in a Member State’.44 In 1997, the Council of 
Ministers adopted a Resolution on measures to be taken on the combating of fraudu-
lent marriages.45 The 1997 Resolution notes that fraudulent marriages constitute a 
means of circumventing the rules on entry and residence of third country nationals, 
and that Member States should adopt equivalent measures to combat the phenome-
non. The Resolution defines a marriage of convenience as ‘a marriage concluded be-
tween a national of a Member State and a third-country national, with the sole aim on 
circumventing the rules of entry and residence of third country nationals and obtain-
ing for the third country national a residence permit or authority to reside in a Mem-
ber State’ (Article 1). 
The 1997 Resolution contains a list of so-called objective factors that indicate a 
marriage of convenience: 
–  the fact that matrimonial cohabitation is not maintained; 
–  the lack of an appropriate contribution to the responsibilities arising from the 
marriage; 
–  the spouses have never met before their marriage; 
–  the spouses are inconsistent about their respective personal details (name, ad-
dress, nationality and job), about the circumstances of their first meeting, or 
about other important personal information concerning them; 
–  the spouses do not speak a language understood by both;  
–  a sum of money has been handed over in order for the marriage to be contracted 
(with the exception of a dowry in the case of nationals of countries where the 
provision of a dowry is common practice); 
–  the past history of one or both of the spouses contains evidence of previous mar-
riages of convenience or residence anomalies. 
 
                                                        
44 Resolution on the harmonization of national policies on family reunification, Ad Hoc Group Immi-
gration of Copenhagen, 1 June 1993 [SN 2828/I/93 WGH 1497] REV 1, point 4 under principles 
governing Member States policies on Family Reunification, Further Conditions concerning Spouses. 
The text of the Resolution can be found in E. Guild & J. Niessen, The Developing Immigration and Asy-
lum Policies of the European Union, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1996, p. 251-256. 
45 Council Resolution of 4 December 1997, 97/C 382/01, Official Journal C 382, 16-12-1997. 
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The Resolution, though not binding, provided that Member States should bring their 
national legislation into line by 1 January 1999 (Article 6). Both the Family Reunifica-
tion Directive and the Union Citizens Directive include the right of Member States to 
refuse admission and withdraw or refuse the extension of a residence permit if it has 
been established that a marriage, relationship or adoption was concluded with the 
sole aim of acquiring admission or residence in the Member State. In the interpreta-
tive guidelines of the Union Citizens Directive, the European Commission has again 
provided a list of indicative criteria, which resembles that of the 1997 Resolution.46 
 Many of the indicative criteria Member States use are similar to these European 
lists, but the national reports also refer to criteria that go beyond these, like the dif-
ference in age or an unusual combination of nationalities. Furthermore, the Portu-
guese report mentions as additional indicators: marriage with pre-nuptial agreements, 
such as separation of marital property; marriages with indigents, prostitutes or per-
sons with mental disabilities; the absence of any cultural or social sharing between 
spouses. In Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, immigration authorities tend to 
start an assessment if indicators on their national list are applicable. The German and 
Portuguese authorities are not instructed on the applicability of the number of crite-
ria, but the judgment of the Dutch authorities that a marriage is fraudulent, always 
needs to be based on more than one criterion. The sole fact that there is, for instance, 
a large difference in age is not sufficient. In practice however, such characteristics or 
a specific or unusual combination of nationalities (e.g. EU nationals with Egyptians) 
could result in the suspicion of a fraudulent marriage (Bonjour & De Hart 2013).  
The way the possible fraudulent character of the marriage is assessed also shows 
similarities: conducting interviews with both spouses simultaneously, house calls at 
the sponsor’s home and seeking information from third parties. The increasing use of 
DNA testing in connection with the proof of biological relationships serves the same 
purpose. The federal states in Germany enjoy a wide discretion in both the methods 
used and the conclusions they draw from their findings. In Bremen, for instance, the 
immigration authorities draw on detailed questionnaires in the individual interviews. 
In the past, all bi-national couples had to undergo a standard survey, until the Admin-
istrative Court rejected this practice. In all states, respondents in this study observed a 
trend towards regular inquiries at the stage of the visa application. 
In the Netherlands, despite its recognition that the exercise of EU mobility rights 
in order to reunite with a TCN is perfectly legal, the Dutch government introduced a 
number of measures to prevent and combat fraudulent marriages and possible abuse 
of the Union Citizens Directive. With these measures, the minister targeted Dutch 
nationals as well as Union citizens. They include intensive assessments of applications 
for family reunification from third country nationals with a Union citizen residing in 
the Netherlands, more requirements on evidence and strengthened criteria for a du-
                                                        
46 Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citi-
zens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States’ COM (2009) 313 final.  
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rable relationship, more exchange of information between the civil administration 
and the IND, but also with Belgium, Germany and Denmark.  
In all three Member States, the immigration authorities judge whether the col-
lected information justifies the suspicion. If they have reached this conclusion, it is in 
practice up to the spouses to rebut this suspicion. The decision that the marriage is 
fraudulent usually has consequences for residence rights, but may also lead to prose-
cution. As the Union Citizens Directive has limited national discretion in this regard, 
the German authorities often refrain from the methods described above when assess-
ing marriages with Union citizens. However, in all cases registrars are obliged to re-
fuse a wedding, if the existence of a fraudulent marriage is apparent. In the Nether-
lands, the municipal official of the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages is only al-
lowed to conclude or register a marriage or partnership if one or both spouses or 
partners do not hold Dutch nationality or the nationality of another EU Member 
State, after the Alien police has advised positively. A negative advice has to be ac-
companied by extensive reasons, and can lead to the refusal to conclude or register 
the marriage. In practice, the civil registrars seldom refuse to conclude a marriage on 
suspicion of its being fraudulent. An evaluation study demonstrated that in the first 
four years after introduction of the Fraudulent Marriage Prevention Act, only 69 
marriages were refused. Couples often appealed such decisions successfully, because 
judges had stricter norms for proving fraudulent marriages than civil registrars and 
immigration officers (Fonk et al. 1998). A second evaluation in 2004 again confirmed 
these low numbers; less than one per cent of marriages was refused, around 40 per 
year (Holmes-Wijnker et al. 2004).  
3.8  Subjective Perceptions of Applicants 
 Now that we have seen how procedures are organized and what the relevant issues 
are concerning these procedures, we turn to the experiences of applicants. The inter-
views demonstrated that the problematic aspects of the procedures deeply affected 
them.  
To understand their experiences, we turn to theories of procedural justice (Thi-
baut & Walker 1974). According to this theory, civilians are satisfied with a proce-
dure, irrespective of the outcome (positive or negative for applicants), if the proce-
dure fulfils certain requirements.  
The first factor in this respect is voice. People want to be able to put forward 
their side of the story, they want to be heard. It seems that often applicants had no 
opportunity to be heard. In this context, the faceless procedure was mentioned as a 
problem, specifically in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The transforma-
tion of immigration authorities in many countries in the past decade, from a street-level-
bureaucracy (with daily face to face contact with applicants) to a system-level bureaucracy 
(with a computerized, standardized procedure) (Böcker & De Hart 2011) seems to 
have certain drawbacks for individual applicants in terms of being able to tell their 
story.  
The second factor is the control of the procedure: to what extent can the appli-
cant influence the procedure, putting forward evidence and arguments. Especially in 
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countries with a high level of discretion, such as Ireland, applicants experienced a lack 
of control. In other countries, such as Austria and Portugal, the dual track procedures 
resulting in the risk of an approval by inland authorities followed by the refusal or 
new demands by the embassy, was often mentioned as a problem. The lack of transi-
tional arrangements in Austria could result in applicants being denied solely because 
they couldn’t meet the new criteria.  
A further issue related to control is the duration of the procedure, an issue al-
ready mentioned earlier in this chapter. The procedure takes longer as more require-
ments have to be met. In most countries, the duration of the procedure was men-
tioned as a problem, although the length of the procedure differed significantly be-
tween the countries. For example, in the Netherlands, respondents complained about 
the length of the procedure for the long-term visa, which took on average six 
months, up to a maximum of 1½ years, after the application was initially refused. In 
Ireland, the procedure has taken as long as three to four years. The fact that even in 
the Netherlands the duration was mentioned as a problem indicated that it was not 
only the actual duration of the procedure itself, but also the lack of transparency and 
the insecurity of the outcome that made the waiting difficult. Those respondents who 
met with the longest procedure described their experience as their ‘life being on 
hold’. 
A final topic mentioned that falls into this category is that migrants in an advan-
tageous legal position, refugees and EU citizens, frequently felt that they could not ef-
fectuate these rights. As explained earlier in this chapter, refugees sometimes still had 
to meet the normal requirements for family reunification, and Union citizens met 
with additional controlling practices and mistrustful authorities.  
Thirdly, the availability of information is relevant. As a consequence of faceless 
procedures, respondents complained that they could not contact the official who had 
handled their application to provide information, ask questions or be informed about 
the state of affairs. Respondents in most countries complained about the lack of, or 
contradictory, information provided. For instance, in the Netherlands, respondents 
calling the IND helpdesks mentioned that they received different answers to the 
same question at different times. 
Fourth, treatment by the authorities is relevant. Applicants want to be treated 
with respect. However, respondents in most countries complained about the mis-
trustful attitude of immigration authorities. Individuals complained that they felt 
treated like criminals, or as if they were cheating the system even when they had a 
right to, or had been granted, a visa. Some received remarks that they perceived as 
discriminatory and humiliating. For example, one British national sponsor of a Pales-
tinian spouse described how her husband’s intentions were interrogated by immigra-
tion officials even though he had been granted a spousal visa: 
 
‘The man asked him what he wanted to do in England and I said that he wants to seek work 
and study English and the man said “is this at your expense or the tax payer’s expense?”. I 
mean, he had his visa and they said it’s alright for him to come here … He was held for 2 
hours going through customs. I think it’s really detrimental for people to feel that they’re not 
wanted here …’ 
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Finally, expertise is found to be relevant, as well as impartiality and independence. A 
decision has to be based on the facts and not on personal judgments. In relation to 
the fourth factor, people sometimes had the impression that decisions were based on 
personal judgments.  
Hence, although the outcome of the procedure was positive for most of the ap-
plicants who were interviewed (the application for family reunification was granted), 
most of them told of their experiences in predominantly negative terms. Except for 
the fact that immigration procedures have a huge impact on the family life and daily 
lives of applicants, the theory of procedural justice may explain this seeming contra-
diction.  
3.9  Conclusion 
The Member States studied have in common that the rights established in legislation 
do not always ensure that these rights can be properly invoked by applicants. This 
partly relates to the practical application and organization of the procedure, but also 
to the room to manoeuvre for immigration authorities, on the one hand, and the lack 
of vital safeguards, like legal aid, on the other hand. Furthermore, some develop-
ments in the family reunification policies enlarge the risk of more lengthy and compli-
cated procedures: the externalization of the admission procedure and the increasing 
attention being paid to fraudulent marriages. 
The lack of transparency of those procedures provokes arbitrariness and differ-
ent treatment on the basis of nationality during the procedure abroad, as the exam-
ples of the UK (different requirements) and Germany (authentication) show. The 
affected nationals pay the price of deficiencies in the civil administration systems of 
their country. The different treatment based on nationality goes beyond procedural 
aspects, like the exemptions on passing the Dutch or German pre-entry test. The 
family members whose nationality results in the obligation to pass the test, also deal 
most frequently with the above-mentioned procedural obstacles. 
Procedural conditions, like time frames, fees or demands for evidence are, seem-
ingly, solely formal criteria. Their dominance, however, can make the material rights 
illusory. The principle of effectiveness, established by Union law, is precisely to en-
sure that procedural rules do not obstruct the exercise of Union rights. This chapter 
shows that the Union rules on free movement have made the Member States rather 
cautious about hindering Union citizens in the exercise of their rights. Regarding 
TCNs however, the practices in the Member States show little awareness that proce-
dural rules should be designed in a way that facilitate TCNs in exercising their right to 
family reunification. 
The way of applying formal or material conditions, as well as the attitude of im-
migration authorities prove to be crucial for the perception of applicants that justice 
has been done. Still, the obligation to take all personal interests and circumstances 
into account and to act in a way that furthers family life is difficult to establish in leg-
islation or to otherwise enforce. Yet, some national practices show that certain incen-
tives actually influence the methods and attitude of immigration authorities. We re-
ferred to the Dutch situation, in which financial sanctions result in more speedy deci-
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sion making, and the proactive role of the Portuguese Ombudsman, who has turned 
the operating procedures in a more family friendly direction. Furthermore, transpar-
ent complaint procedures could contribute to more accountability and learning ef-
fects for the immigration authorities. But besides these options, a legislative right to 
family reunification strengthens the position of applicants without doubt. In Ireland, 
the wide discretion of the immigration authorities in relation to most categories, re-
sults in the risk of arbitrariness and may put applicants in an uncertain and weak po-
sition. As long as Ireland continues to opt-out of the Family Reunification Directive, 
this instrument cannot serve as an incentive to establish a statutory right to family 
reunification for a broader range of categories of sponsors and family members or to 
limit the discretion of the authorities. 
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Chapter 4 
The Development of National Policies  
4.1  Introduction 
In our study, we looked at the development of national family reunification policies 
in the last decade, since 2000. In the first part of this chapter, we answer the question 
of what arguments were used to introduce amendments of family reunification poli-
cies. We have found three main arguments that determine the development of family 
reunification policies: integration, economy-related arguments and fraud. After a dis-
cussion of these three arguments, we look at how they were used in the countries un-
der study in relation to the four main requirements: income requirement, pre-entry 
tests, age requirement and housing requirement. 
In the second part of this chapter, we look at how family reunification policies 
developed. First, the question is to what extent policies have been evidence-based. 
Did governments evaluate the impact of their policies and how did such evaluations 
influence policy making?  
Second, we raise the question of whether a restrictive turn in family reunification 
policies has taken place and if so, how this can be explained. What impact did the 
Family Reunification Directive have? Do developments in Members States that opted 
out of this directive (Ireland, United Kingdom) differ from those that are bound by 
it? 
4.2  Integration, Economy, Fraud 
 Table 4.1. Arguments used in policy debates 
 Integration  Economy  Fraud  
Austria  X  X  X  
Germany  X  X  X 
Ireland   X  X  
UK  X  X  X  
NL  X  X  X  
Portugal   X X  
4.2.1  Integration 
In four of the six countries under study, integration was the main argument in the 
development of family reunification policies in the last decade. This counts for Aus-
tria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In Portugal and Ireland it 
was not. It is striking that integration is the main argument in the four countries that 
demonstrate a development towards a more restrictive family reunification policy. 
This can be explained by looking at the link between family reunification and integra-
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tion and how this is perceived in those countries. But first, we look at the European 
definition of integration.  
 
European integration definition  
The starting point of the definition of integration established by the European Coun-
cil in 2004 is that integration is ‘a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommoda-
tion by all immigrants and residents of Member States’.47 The Common Basic Princi-
ples on integration formed the guidance of the Communication of the Commission 
on a European Agenda for the integration of TCNs, in which it formulated more 
concrete actions for Member States to take.48 The Commission defined this ‘two-way 
process’ as follows: on the one hand, Member States are obligated to receive migrants 
in a good manner, to respect their rights and culture and to point out to migrants 
their obligations. On the other hand, migrants have to demonstrate their willingness 
to integrate and respect the rules and values of the receiving society.49 According to 
the Council and the Commission, family reunification helps to create socio-cultural 
stability facilitating the integration of TCNs into the Member State. Better integration 
would serve the Community objective of promoting economic and social cohesion.50 
These principles and objectives established at the European level show that, during 
the first five years of this century, the value attached to family reunification as a vehi-
cle to further integration, was broadly supported by the EU institutions, including the 
Member States. In the Preamble of the Family Reunification Directive, the Council 
also underlined the Tampere Conclusions of 1999, in which the European Council 
had called for a more vigorous integration policy regarding TCNs, aiming at granting 
them rights and obligations comparable to those of Union citizens.51 
According to the Commission, integration will be much easier when migrants do 
not have to worry about the well-being of their family members in another country. 
Furthermore, having children going to school in the receiving country supports the 
integration of the parents and children.52 The full and correct implementation of the 
migration directives for TCNs as well as Union citizens is thought to be vital for the 
integration of migrants.53 
In order to consult all stakeholders on the need to amend the Family Reunifica-
tion Directive, the Commission formulated some principles in the Green Paper on 
the right to family reunification of third-country nationals living in the European 
Union.54 With regard to integration measures, it stressed that these are only admissi-
                                                        
47 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union, Press Release, 
Doc. 14615/04 (Presse 321), 2618th Council Meeting, Justice and Home Affairs, 19 November 
Brussels. 
48 Commission, ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals’, COM(2011) 455 
final, 20 July 2011. 
49 Ibid., p. 2. 
50 EU Directive on the right to Family Reunification, 2003/86/EC, preamble nr. 4. 
51 Ibid., Preamble no. 3; Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Tampere European 
Council, 15-16 October 1999, paras. 18-21; (Doc. 200/1/99). 
52 European Agenda, supra fn. 48, p. 6 
53 European Agenda, supra fn. 48, p. 7-8. 
54 Commission, ‘Green Paper on the right to family reunification of third-country nationals living in 
the European Union (Directive 2003/86/EC)’, COM (2011) 735 final, 15 November 2011.  
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ble if they serve the purpose of facilitating integration and respect the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity. According to the Commission, the directive contrib-
utes to the integration policy of TCNs who legally reside on the territory of Member 
States. The migrant can be expected to make an effort to be able to function at the 
daily level in the society into which he or she has to integrate. The Member State has 
to be able to ascertain whether a migrant is willing to integrate into the new environ-
ment. Although the Commission recognised that integration requirements can be 
introduced, it made clear that such requirements may not result in hindrance of the 
aim of the directive: furthering family reunification. It is interesting to note that the 
legal division of the Commission went even further by holding the denial of family 
reunification on the sole ground that the spouse had failed the pre-entry test a viola-
tion of the directive.55 
 
The link between family reunification and integration in national policies 
As we have seen, the European Union sees family reunification as furthering integra-
tion. However, not all the countries under study see the link between family reunifica-
tion and integration in the same way. Ireland and Portugal are closest to the Euro-
pean definition of integration. Ireland has not developed an elaborated integration 
policy, but in the context of the integration of refugees, family reunification was seen 
as furthering integration. Portugal has developed an integration policy, but the inte-
gration of migrants is not a controversial issue and family reunification is seen as a 
right that should be protected.  
On the other hand, in Austria, family reunification is seen as uncontrollable and 
more and more as hindering integration, and the same goes for Germany and the 
United Kingdom. The Netherlands seems to have been most explicit in this respect. 
In its reaction to the EC Green Paper on family reunification, the Dutch problema-
tized family reunification in connection to integration, stating that through family re-
unification, backward positions were transmitted onto the next generations. The 
Dutch government also saw family reunification as the result of a lack of integration, 
because non-western second generation migrants who were supposedly not well in-
tegrated, ‘still’ sought a partner from the country of origin (of the parents). The posi-
tions of Austria, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands seem antithetical to the 
European understanding of integration. From this perspective, it can be explained 
why these Member States in their response to the Green Paper emphasized that inte-
gration policy remains a topic of sovereignty and responsibility of the Member 
States.56 However, their position is not entirely in line with the Treaty of Lisbon, 
which has created a legal basis for incentives and supportive measures towards Mem-
ber States in the field of integration. Article 79(4) TFEU grants the Commission the 
                                                        
55 Commission, ‘Schriftelijke opmerkingen aan het Hof van Justitie in de zaak C-155/11 PP, Moham-
med Imran’, C-155/1 PPU, 4 May 2011, ve11001517. See further in paragraph 5.2. 
56 Commission, ‘Summary of the Stakeholder responses to the Green Paper on the Right to Family 
Reunification of Third Country nationals’, 11 May 2012, which can be found at: http:// 
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-consultation/2012/pdf/0023/summary_of_ 
stakeholder_responses_en.pdf. 
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opportunity to initiate and coordinate intergovernmental cooperation within the 
European framework (Handoll 2012).  
  
Integration as an argument in national family reunification policies  
Integration is a main argument in the development of family reunification policies; 
this will be elaborated on below in the discussion on arguments used for the four 
main requirements. As has been pointed out by many, integration is one of the most 
contested concepts in policy making as well as in academics.  
When used as an argument in family reunification policies, integration is often 
very broadly defined – if it is defined at all – as including social, cultural and eco-
nomic integration. However, a shift seems to have occurred from social and eco-
nomic integration to an emphasis on cultural integration. Most striking is the cul-
turalisation of integration arguments, in which the emancipation of migrants, espe-
cially Muslim women, is a central concern (Bonjour & De Hart 2013) (Scholten et al. 
2011: 89). Such diverse issues as forced marriages, domestic violence and honour 
killings or the labour market position of migrant women are all put under the label of 
integration. As Bonjour and De Hart (2013) have argued for the Netherlands, migra-
tion policy is a product and producer of identities and values. Family reunification 
policies participate in the politics of belonging, and gender and family norms play a 
crucial role in this production of collective identities, i.e. in defining who ‘we’ are and 
what distinguishes ‘us’ from ‘the others’. Our research confirms that this trend can be 
discerned in several European countries, with similar effects.  
It is important to point out that these arguments can work both ways: towards 
more liberal or more restrictive policies. The combat of domestic violence, for in-
stance, was and still is the main argument for reducing the period of dependent resi-
dence and is, thus, a liberalization of family reunification policies. The underlying idea 
of such measures was that a stronger legal position of migrant women would make 
them more independent and less vulnerable to abuse, and that they could flee abuse. 
Austria and Portugal are a case in point. In 2005, Austria amended its law, stipulating 
that divorce or death of the sponsor does not necessarily result in withdrawal of the 
residence permit. In 2012, Portugal granted an automatic autonomous residence right 
to migrant women fleeing their aggressors. On the other hand, pleas for an independ-
ent residence permit for women or reducing the term before such an independent 
permit can be obtained often have to give way to fraud-related arguments, as inde-
pendent permits are assumed to result in fraudulent marriages (see below). This has 
resulted in longer time frames before an independent residence permit can be obtain-
ed, in Germany (from 2 to 3 years in 2011 and the Netherlands (from 3 to 5 years in 
2010). 
Furthermore, restrictive measures such as the strict income requirement, the pre-
entry test and the age requirement have also been introduced with reference to the 
emancipation of migrant women. These policy measures restrict migrant women’s 
rights to establish a family in significant ways, and make it more difficult to obtain an 
independent residence status. A case in point is the Dutch condition of fulfilment of 
the integration requirement for an independent or permanent residence permit in the 
Netherlands (although this condition does not apply in cases of domestic violence). 
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 Meanwhile, Member States are faced with limitations set by the Family Reunifi-
cation Directive to put forward integration as an argument in family reunification 
policies. As the Commission states in its Green Paper, integration measures should 
facilitate integration and should respect the principles of proportionality and subsidia-
rity. Availability and accessibility of facilities as well as individual circumstances 
should be taken into account.57 Hence, Austria and Germany have pleaded for 
amendment of the directive, in order to explicitly allow for pre-entry tests. The Neth-
erlands wanted the directive to explicitly allow for revocation of a residence permit if 
integration requirements are not met.58 
4.2.2  Economy 
In all the countries under study, economy-related arguments have been put forward 
to introduce amendments of family reunification polices. Several arguments can be 
understood to be economy-related: the intent to bring net immigration down (United 
Kingdom), to prevent migrants from entering the social welfare system (Austria, Ger-
many, Netherlands), or limit the burden on the taxpayer (United Kingdom). In using 
economy-related arguments to defend restrictive measures, family migrants and their 
sponsors were perceived as a burden and not an asset for the national economy, as 
well as assumed to be low educated, not working and not able to contribute eco-
nomically.  
However, economy-related arguments may also result in liberal policy measures. 
This is demonstrated by Portugal, which lowered the income requirement in 2009 as 
a response to the economic crisis, in order to not deter the right to family reunifica-
tion. 
4.2.3  Fraud 
Fraud was an important argument in all countries under consideration. Even in a 
country with a relatively liberal family reunification policy, such as Portugal, fraud 
through fraudulent marriages was an important issue in political debates, and Portu-
gal favoured criminalizing fraudulent marriages in the context of the directive.59 The 
policies concerned have proven to be an actual hurdle in practice (see chapter 3). 
Except for fraudulent marriages, two other types of fraud were mentioned in de-
bates in the countries under study. First, the relationship between parents and chil-
dren was often seen as fraudulent. Children were perceived as a means for parents to 
claim residence rights (Ireland) or applications for family reunification were made for 
children who were not the biological children of the parents involved (Netherlands). 
In both cases, suspicions of fraud arose especially in relation to family reunification 
by refugees. 
                                                        
57 Green paper, supra fn. 54, p. 4. 
58 Summary, supra fn. 56, p. 11. 
59 Summary, supra fn. 56, p. 20. 
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A third issue connected to fraud is the so-called ‘Europe route’. This refers to the 
notion that nationals with a TCN partner circumvent restrictive national immigration 
policies by moving to another Member State, even if only formally or temporarily, so 
that the more liberal European free movement policy of the Union Citizens Directive 
applies upon return to the national state. The perception of the ‘Europe route’ as 
fraud was especially significant in the Netherlands. More generally, EU citizens with 
TCN family members are faced with suspicions from authorities more than those 
with an EU family member, and are frequently perceived as having fraudulent mar-
riages (see para. 3.7). 
The aim of combating fraud is supported by the European Commission. In its 
Green Paper on the right to family reunification, the Commission invited Member 
States who reported problems of misuse of family reunification rights, to specify and 
quantify them, so that they could be addressed at the European level.60 In the public 
hearing on the Green Paper, Commissioner Malmström mentioned the tension be-
tween the right to family reunification, and the Member States’ concerns with pre-
venting misuse of this right.61 
4.3  Arguments on the Four Main Requirements 
Now that we have seen how the three arguments of integration, economy and fraud 
were used in policy debates, we will look at the role these arguments played in the in-
troduction of the four main requirements under study. 
 
Income requirement  
In the Member States under study, the income requirement has been introduced or 
made stricter with a mixture of economy-related and integration arguments. In Aus-
tria, the economy-related arguments were dominant. The income requirement was 
defended with reference to the economic autonomy of migrants, and reduction of the 
burden for the state. Similar arguments were used in the United Kingdom, where 
apart from the intention to cut net migration, arguments for reducing the burden on 
the state and the tax payer were put forward. In addition to these economic argu-
ments, the argument of integration was used: guaranteeing a sufficient standard of 
living would further integration. Finally, the argument of practicability was put for-
ward, claiming that the existing system was too complex. The latter argument also 
played a role in the Netherlands, with the introduction of the strict income require-
ment in 1993 and later rising levels of required income. Comparable to the Austrian 
argument of economic autonomy, the ‘own responsibility’ of the sponsor was one of 
the major arguments. When the level was raised in 2004, integration was used as an 
argument, referring to the lack of integration of non-western migrants and especially 
                                                        
60 Green paper, supra fn. 54, p. 2.  
61  Summary report on the Seventh meeting of the European Integration Forum: the Public Hearing on 
the Right to Family Reunification of Third Country Nationals living in the EU, Brussels, 31 May-
1 June 2012. 
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female sponsors, it was argued that the labour market position of female migrants 
could be improved by requiring a higher income level. The expectation that migration 
would be reduced was accepted as a consequence.  
A similar mixture of economy-related and integration arguments, and also fraud, 
played a role in Germany. The discussion on the income requirement emerged after 
the evaluation of the Zuwanderungsgesetz of 2005 had demonstrated that most spousal 
migration involved German sponsors. The government considered extending the in-
come requirement to German sponsors, as it would be an incentive, especially for re-
cently naturalized German nationals, to integrate. Furthermore, migration ‘into the 
welfare system’ would be prevented, as well as fraudulent marriages (Block 2012: 
114). The income requirement can be applied to German sponsors in exceptional 
cases, if they have ties to the country of origin of their spouse, as demonstrated 
through dual citizenship, having lived there or speaking the language. German spon-
sors who are considered Aussiedler remain exempted from the income requirement.62 
Hence, a clear distinction is made between ‘German Germans’ and Germans of mi-
gration background. It caused less public outcry, however, than the introduction of 
the pre-entry test (Block 2012: 118-119). 
Lastly, as we have already seen, Portugal reduced its income requirement in 2009, 
with the economy-related argument of the economic crisis.  
 
Pre-entry test  
Not surprisingly, the introduction of the pre-entry test was defended with the argu-
ment of integration, but other, economy-related arguments played a role as well. 
In Austria arguments put forward were that family migration needed to be re-
stricted. In the discourse, migrants were held responsible for their integration. If they 
would make a successful effort by passing the pre-entry test, they could expect in re-
turn a set of rights granted after entry. Secondly, the arguments of promotion of inte-
gration and emancipation of women were mentioned, with Muslim migrants as spe-
cific target groups. In Germany, besides the argument that language tests would fur-
ther integration, the idea was that the insight already gained in the country of origin 
on the necessity of learning a language facilitated access to the supportive language 
measures in Germany (BMI 2011: 4). A further argument was that the pre-entry test 
was to prevent forced marriages. During the public hearing on the Green Paper, 
Germany mentioned migrant women as a specific target group: the test would allow 
them to escape social isolation and resist forced marriage, and would promote ex-
change of experiences and information with people in similar situations.63 As we will 
see in chapter 5, this argument was accepted by the German court. The German 
government expected a deterrent effect of the pre-entry test, as an educated partner, 
who would be uncontrollable for the sponsor and family-in-law, would be unattrac-
tive for these migrants (Strik 2011: 163). Finally, the economy-related argument of 
restricting ‘immigration into the social security systems’ was used as an argument for 
introducing pre-entry tests. 
                                                        
62 Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum Aufenthaltsgesetz 2009, par. 28.1.1.1. 
63 Summary, supra fn. 56. 
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In the United Kingdom, ideas to introduce pre-entry tests were developed against 
the background of the race riots in 2001, linking social cohesion to language and 
knowledge of society. Migrant women were mentioned as a specific target group, 
since they were seen as isolated from society by their partners and prevented from 
learning English. However, as well as the social integration of migrants, dominant ar-
guments were that migrants needed to be made economically active, and that they 
should be prevented from becoming a burden on the state. 
In the Netherlands, the own responsibility of the family migrant and sponsor was 
stressed. The government formulated the aim of selecting those who were motivated 
to integrate. Turkish and Moroccan migrants were mentioned as target groups. It had 
to be prevented, according to the government, that backward positions would be 
transmitted from generation to generation. As in the countries discussed above, gen-
der played an important role in the arguments: stressing the vulnerability and depend-
ence of migrant women, their oppression and domestic violence. Defending the dis-
tinction made between those nationalities that had to and others who did not have to 
pass the pre-entry test, the government used economy-related arguments claiming 
that the countries that did not need a long-term visa, were from an economic, social 
and political perspective comparable to European countries (Strik 2011: 210).  
 
Age requirement  
The age requirement of 21 years in Austria, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
and 18 years in Germany was introduced with the argument of protecting young 
people from arranged and forced marriage. As it was formulated in the United King-
dom, the age requirement would ensure that individuals had an understanding of the 
full implications of what they were doing and were capable of making informed deci-
sions about their own future. It was further argued that it would allow couples to 
finish their education, and offer opportunities to victims of forced marriages to es-
cape them.  
In Germany, the discussion on the age requirement was equally influenced by the 
debate on forced marriages, since integration and the lack thereof were perceived as a 
central causal problem of forced marriages (Ratia & Walter 2009: 65). During the 
political debates, forced marriages were in particular linked to Turkish immigrants 
living in Germany.64 The introduction of a minimum age was ‘meant to avoid the 
situation where Turks, in particular, who hold traditional values and who are living 
here, bring very young wives uninfluenced by Western values from their country of 
origin to Germany’ (Severker & Walter 2010: 15). 
Although in the Netherlands the aim of combating arranged and forced mar-
riages was also mentioned as the main argument, an additional, economy-related ar-
gument was put forward, namely that at age 18 it would be uncertain whether the 
sponsor could comply with the own individual responsibility, both in integration and 
financial responsibility.  
 
                                                        
64 Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlini-
en der Europäischen Union, Drucksache 16/506523 (2007), p.172. 
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Housing requirement  
As the housing requirement is not a real hindrance in practice (see chapter 6) and is 
not subject to controversy, there is little information on the reasons behind this re-
quirement in the countries that maintain it. Arguments provided are to ensure suit-
able accommodation and prevent overcrowding, e.g. in Austria. In recent proposals 
that have not come into effect in the Netherlands, the emancipation of women was 
emphasized, as the requirement of independent housing would prevent couples from 
living with the family-in-law and thus protect women from pressure by the family. 
 
Counter-arguments of exclusion, selection and discrimination  
In all the countries that recently introduced the income requirement, pre-entry test 
and age requirement, these measures were severely criticized by political opposition 
parties, NGOs, and academics. In general, the problem definitions, as discussed 
above, were not contested. The main critique in the countries under study was that 
the policy measures had selective and even discriminatory effects. 
The income requirement was criticized as being selective or discriminatory based 
on socio-economic background, and gender, because it ignored gender related in-
come disparities (in Austria and the Netherlands).  
The pre-entry test was criticized for being discriminatory based on nationality 
(Netherlands, United Kingdom), the distinction between so-called ‘western’ and 
‘non-western’ nationalities (Netherlands), and illiterates. At the international level, the 
Dutch pre-entry test was also critically evaluated as being discriminatory on the basis 
of nationality and/or ethnicity or race by the European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
Hammarberg, Human Rights Watch and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD).65 
The age requirement was criticized because of discrimination based on cultural 
differences (United Kingdom), young people where coercion played no role (United 
Kingdom), TCNs and nationals with a TCN partner (Austria, Netherlands). 
Governments have largely ignored these critiques, although they have sometimes 
turned up again in court cases (see chapter 5) or in studies and evaluations of the 
effects of specific measures. This is the next topic of this chapter. 
4.4 Impact of Studies and Evaluations of Family Reunification Policies 
In the countries under study, relevant studies and evaluations have been executed on 
specific requirements and family reunification policy issues, such as the income re-
quirement, the pre-entry test and the age requirement for spouses. The results of 
                                                        
65 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Third periodical report on the Netherlands, Stras-
bourg, February 12, 2008, points 50, 57 and 58; Report by the Commissioner for Human Rights 
Thomas Hammarberg, on his visit to the Netherlands, 21-25 September 2008, 11 March 2009, para-
graph 4.2, no. 83 and recommendation no. 15. The Netherlands: Discrimination in the name of Integration. 
Migrants’ Rights under the WIB, May 2008, www.hrw.org, p. 4 and pp. 24-29. CERD/C/CLD/17-18 of 
16. 
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these studies will be discussed in chapter 6. The question to be answered in this para-
graph is how, if at all, the results of these studies have influenced policy making. In 
order to do so, we limit ourselves to studies that were instigated by the governments 
themselves; other relevant studies on the effects of family reunification policies will 
be discussed in chapter 6. 
 
Income requirement  
The effects of the income requirement were studied in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, this involved a report by the Migration Advi-
sory Committee before the strict income requirement of July 2012 was introduced.66 
The committee’s calculations that demonstrated that as a result of the raise of the 
income requirement 45 per cent of the applications for family reunification would be 
rejected, did not change the government’s determination to introduce this higher 
level. In a similar vein, the Dutch government predicted that the income requirement 
of 120 per cent, effective in 2004, would result in a reduction in family formation of 
45 per cent, without changing its intention to introduce the 120 per cent level. An 
evaluation study on the effects of the income requirement in the first two years after 
it was introduced demonstrated a drop of 37 per cent in the number of applications; 
very close to the predicted 45 per cent. The researchers also concluded that the in-
come requirement did not significantly contribute to the integration into the labour 
market of sponsors and family migrants (WODC 2009a). However, the Dutch gov-
ernment concluded that the income requirement had had ‘positive effects, improved 
the labour market position of partners and sponsors and had resulted in a reduction 
of family formation’. The reaction of both governments indicates that reduction in 
net migration was, if not the aim, a welcome effect of its policies. 
 
Pre-entry test  
The pre-entry test has been evaluated in Germany and the Netherlands. The aim of 
the German study was to gain insight into whether the pre-entry test was doable for 
migrants who had to take the test. The study demonstrated that the pre-entry test was 
failed by more than one-third of the migrants who took it, and in some countries, 
such as Ghana, a mere 38 per cent of the migrants passed the test. This raises the 
question of whether the test was, in fact, ‘doable’. However, the German government 
stressed the positive results for integration – based on impressions by employees of 
the Goethe Institute in Turkey, that could not be quantified – such as the growing 
awareness of the life changes that migration would mean, the course as a first experi-
ence of education in a long time, or women failing the test on purpose in order to es-
cape an unwanted marriage.67 At the European level, the German government claim-
ed that there was evidence for the effectiveness of the pre-entry test, although the 
                                                        
66  Migration Advisory Committee, Review of the minimum income requirement for the sponsorship under the family 
migration route, London: MAC 2011. 
67 Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, Bericht über die Evaluierung des Nachweises einfacher Deutschkenntnisse 
beim Ehegattennachzug nach dem Aufenthaltsgesetz – Sprachlern- und Sprachtestangebote, Visumverfahren, Druck-
sache 17/3090 (2010), p. 5. 
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evaluation research the government referred to, did not actually study the effective-
ness of the test on the integration of migrants (Klaassen & Søndergaard 2012). 
In the Netherlands, the evaluation of the pre-entry test demonstrated that the ini-
tial level A was so low that it did not significantly improve the starting position of 
family migrants for integration. On the other hand, it demonstrated a drop in the 
number of applications of 48 per cent and 54 per cent from Morocco and Turkey re-
spectively (Regioplan 2009a). Although further research concluded that the require-
ment of written language knowledge would exclude large groups of migrants if no 
additional means to learn the language were provided, the Dutch government intro-
duced a reading test, becoming effective on 1 April 2011, claiming that it would make 
integration in the Netherlands more effective.68 Since then, the number of success-
fully passed examinations has dropped from 88 per cent to 75 per cent. Some nation-
alities with a different alphabet have been affected even more profoundly, with Chi-
nese family migrants showing a drop from 89 per cent to 58 per cent since the read-
ing test was introduced. Since the Dutch government before the introduction of the 
pre-entry test stated that delay or even abandonment of family reunification was pre-
ferred to a situation of integration lagging behind after arrival in the Netherlands, it 
seems that the Dutch government may have welcomed these effects. At the Euro-
pean level, the Dutch government has claimed that migrants who took the pre-entry 
test found it a useful preparation for their move to the Netherlands and that there is 
broad support for the pre-entry test, although these claims are not substantiated by 
any of the studies (Klaassen & Søndergaard 2012). 
 
Age requirement  
Before going into the studies on the effects of the age requirement, it is important to 
note that little is known about the scale of forced marriages. Ratia & Walter (2009) 
conducted a study on forced marriages at the request of the Dutch government in 
2009. On the issue of statistics, they concluded that ‘very little can be said about the 
actual magnitude of the problem based on the numbers available’. They mention two 
problems that recur in efforts to measure the issue of forced marriages: the difficulty 
of defining the complex phenomenon of a forced marriage, and the necessity felt by 
both national governments and NGOs to generate numbers, making them try to 
measure forced marriages instead of first trying to tackle this problem. Although the 
Netherlands has acknowledged that it has no clear view of the scale of forced mar-
riages, it has referred to German statistics to defend a bill to make forced marriages 
criminally punishable.69 Austria has also admitted that it has no evidence available as 
to the scale of forced marriages. Only Germany and the United Kingdom claim to 
have reliable information on the scale on which forced marriages occur. The United 
Kingdom Forced Marriages Unit provided support in 1,500 cases in 2010, although it 
claims the actual numbers to be much higher. Germany had 3,400 counselling cases 
in 2008. However, as the researchers of this study themselves point out, there may 
                                                        
68  Triarii, Randvoorwaarden niveau A 1 Inburgeringsexamen Buitenland 2009. 
69 Kamerstukken I, 2012-2013, 32840, no. A. 
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have been more than one counselling contact with one individual, so that these num-
bers cannot be taken at face value.70 
The age requirement was the topic of studies in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands. Before introducing this requirement, the UK government asked the 
University of Bristol to research the impact of the age requirement of 18 years. The 
qualitative study proved that the majority of stakeholders (authorities and NGOs that 
provided support to victims of forced marriages) was against a higher age require-
ment, pointing out the adverse effects of young people being taken abroad to marry, 
entering the UK with false documentation or health issues as a result of the denial of 
family reunification.71 Nevertheless, the British government went ahead and raised 
the age requirement further to 21 years, until this was struck down by the Court with 
its judgment on Quila and Others v. Secretary of State of the Home Department in 2010 (see 
chapter 5). Therefore the age requirement is 18 at present. 
The Dutch government introduced the age requirement of 21 years in 2004, in 
spite of the negative advice of the Advisory Committee of Migration Affairs. The 
evaluation study, at the request of the government, demonstrated that the age re-
quirement did not have a significant effect on integration, and also that the parents 
did not have that much influence on the choice of partner (WODC 2009a). The study 
showed that it did not prevent people from marrying, although it meant that they 
would be separated until they reached the required age. On the other hand, it made 
clear that the number of people affected was limited, since the number of marriages 
below the age of 21 was low. Remarkably, at the European level, the Dutch govern-
ment did not mention this study, claiming that no large-scale studies on the effective-
ness of the age requirement had been conducted, but citing several other reports 
about forced marriages, where the relationship to family reunification was absent 
(Klaassen & Søndergaard 2012). At the same time, the Dutch government announced 
its intention to raise the age requirement to 24 years, although the directive does not 
allow this. 
 
Fraud  
What has been said above about the problems of information on the scale of the 
phenomenon of forced marriages can equally be said about the scale of fraud. Fraud 
is used as an argument to introduce restrictive policy measures, although there are no 
reliable statistics substantiating the idea that a large number of family relationships are 
fraudulent. As concluded in the summary of stakeholders’ responses to the Green 
Paper on the right to family reunification, in most Member States there is little if any 
systematic information available on the scale of forced and fraudulent marriages.72 As 
the study by the European Migration Network (EMN) on fraudulent marriages and 
false declarations of parenthood concluded, the perception amongst policymakers 
and the media in particular indicates that this may be a widespread phenomenon, but 
this could not be substantiated through the EMN study. The EMN study also con-
                                                        
70  Summary, supra fn. 56, p. 2.  
71  Home Affairs Committee, Domestic Violence, forced marriage and ‘honour’-based violence, London: Home 
Affairs Committee 2008. 
72 Summary, supra fn. 56, p. 18. 
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cluded that where misuse had been detected, this was primarily for fraudulent mar-
riages rather than false declarations of parenthood. (EMN, 2012). 
A relevant national study to be mentioned in this context is the Dutch study on 
the use of the so-called ‘Europe route’ by Dutch nationals with a TCN partner, which 
was perceived as misuse of European free movement rights in order to circumvent 
national policies (Regioplan 2009b). This study, executed in 2009 on the govern-
ments’ request, proved that, contrary to earlier claims by the Dutch government, 
most Dutch nationals moving to other EU Member States did not have a migrant 
background and the relationships involved were not fraudulent. The study also dem-
onstrated that most families did not move to another EU Member State only formally 
to claim Union law, but actually lived and worked there. Finally, the study made clear 
that the number of people moving to another Member State was small. Nevertheless, 
the Dutch government persisted in its efforts to limit this form of ‘misuse’, focusing 
on Union citizens with a TCN family member, in control practices of fraudulent 
marriages. Furthermore, in its reaction to the Green Paper, the Dutch government 
proposed to restrict the misuse of the Europe route and reverse discrimination of 
Dutch nationals by making the Family Reunification Directive applicable in all cases 
for admittance of TCN family members, while the Union Citizens Directive would 
apply only in cases where the family migrant had already been admitted. 
4.5  A Restrictive Turn as a Consequence of Europeanization?  
A restrictive turn in family reunification policies has been observed by several authors 
(e.g. Block & Bonjour 2012; Bonjour & De Hart 2013; Pascouau & Labayle 2011). 
Block and Bonjour stated that this restrictive turn in family reunification policies 
started in the mid-2000s, and offer the Europeanization of family reunification poli-
cies as an explanation. Does this hold true for the countries under study?  
 
Restrictive turn since mid-2000s  
As table 4.2 clearly demonstrates in the countries under study, the strict income re-
quirement, pre-entry test and age requirement were indeed introduced largely from 
the mid-2000s. Although this seems to confirm Block and Bonjour’s observation that 
the restrictive turn in family reunification policies started from the mid-2000s, two 
qualifications have to be made. First, some other restrictive measures had already 
been introduced in the 1990s. This goes e.g. for the prevention of fraudulent mar-
riages in 1997 in Austria and in 1994 in the Netherlands. The Netherlands was earlier, 
with the introduction of a strict income requirement in 1993 and the higher level of 
120 per cent in 2004. Secondly, it must be noted that liberal amendments were intro-
duced in the ‘restrictive’ Member States also, such as the independent residence per-
mit for family members in Austria in 2005, and the introduction of a residence right 
for unmarried couples in several of the Member States. Furthermore, restrictive 
measures were abolished, such as the effective family bond (for other than refugees) 
by the Netherlands in 2006. Thirdly, the restrictive turn does not include all the 
Member States under study, Ireland (except for the extremely high income require-
ment for work permit holders) and Portugal being the notable exceptions. This raises 
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questions about Europeanization as an explanation for the restrictive turn in family 
reunification policies. 
 
Table 4.2. Introduction of income requirement, pre-entry test and age requirement in Member States 
Requirement Austria Germany Ireland Netherlands UK Portugal 
Income  200573 
 
2007 (for 
German 
sponsors) 
 1993  
2004 
(120%) 
2010 
(100%) 
 
2012 
2007 
2009 
(lower 
level) 
Pre-entry test 2011 2007 - 2006 (2011, 
higher level) 
2010 - 
Age  2009 2007 - 2004 2003, 
2008 
(21) 
- 
 
Europeanization  
As far as a restrictive turn can be discerned, can Europeanization explain that devel-
opment? In the literature, vertical and horizontal processes of Europeanization have 
been distinguished (Block & Bonjour 2012). In the vertical process, Member States 
strive to ‘upload’ their preferences to the European level in the negotiation of Euro-
pean norms, and ‘download’ these norms when transposing European regulation into 
national policy.  
The interplay between the domestic and European level of family reunification 
policies creates opportunities for national governments to achieve their aims, while 
other stakeholders, such as political parties, parliaments and NGOs are silenced, be-
cause negotiations take place behind closed doors (Block 2012: 110-111; Lavenex 
2001). Later, with the transposition of the directive into national law, the European 
norms create a strong normative power to introduce restrictive amendments, ‘re-
quired’ by the directive. This counted for Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, 
which effectively played the multi-level playing field, created by the development of 
European immigration law and acted together in negotiating this room. As a result, 
Austria maintained its room to use a quota system. Germany maintained the age re-
quirement for family reunification of minor children of 16 years or older in national 
law, after it created room to do so in the Family Reunification Directive. The Nether-
lands interpreted the Directive in such a way that it could justify the raise of the re-
quired income level to 120 percent (until the CJEU in Chakroun came to the opposite 
conclusion). Hence, the three Member States ‘uploaded’ their national law to Euro-
pean law. The Netherlands did even more than that, creating room for the introduc-
tion of new requirements, such as the pre-entry test.  
Of course, the positions of Member States may change over time, due to political 
process and changes of government. The abolition of the clauses for unmarried cou-
                                                        
73  In Austria, the income requirement has not been introduced in 2005, bud uniformed on a national 
level, which in practice implied the raise of the required level in several federal states.  
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ples is a case in point. The Netherlands negotiated the optional clause of recognition 
of a right for unmarried couples to family reunification in the Family Reunification 
Directive. However, on 1 October 2012, the long-standing right (since 1975) for un-
married couples to reunite was abolished, because the directive allowed this, and 
there was no reason to be more generous than other countries, as the government 
stated. The new Dutch government, installed in October 2012, recently announced its 
plan to reintroduce this right for unmarried couples. On the other hand, Portugal was 
among the countries that resisted the introduction of this optional clause during the 
negotiations on the directive, but has since accepted the right for unmarried couples. 
Portugal is a case in point that not all Member States where the directive applies, 
demonstrate the same development of a restrictive turn. Furthermore, Europeaniza-
tion cannot sufficiently explain why Member States like Germany refer to the Nether-
lands as an example to introduce the pre-entry test, but not to other Member States 
that do not have such a test. 
 Europeanization is also conceptualized as a ‘horizontal’ process, not directly 
driven by binding EU norms, but as ‘the result of increased competition and coop-
eration between countries, exchange of information on ideas, discourses and “good 
practices” and mutual learning simply by being part of an integrated Europe’ (Block 
& Bonjour 2012; Vink & Graziano 2007). Although this process of policy learning 
within the European context was not new and was not caused by it, it was at least 
intensified by the European legislative process.  
Although Ireland and the United Kingdom did not opt-in the directive and, thus, 
are not bound by it, they did not stand completely outside of the process, e.g. deliver-
ing comments on the Green Paper. As such, they are still able to draw upon the pol-
icy learning opportunities offered by the development of European Union immigra-
tion law. This could explain the restrictive turn that can also be noted in the United 
Kingdom that, with the introduction of a strict income requirement, pre-entry test, 
and higher age requirement, followed the example of other Member States that are 
bound by the directive. On the other hand, Member States that are bound by the di-
rective do not restrict their policy learning to the context of the directive, but look 
beyond. Both Germany and the Netherlands referred to Danish family reunification 
policies as an example to follow, although Denmark had opted out. 
Ireland (except for the earlier mentioned rise of the income requirement) and 
Portugal are among the countries where a restrictive turn has so far not taken place. 
Although the explanations offered here can only be tentative, it seems obvious that 
we have to return to the national level, in order to understand this. First, both coun-
tries are traditional emigration countries that were confronted with inward migration 
relatively late. Secondly, their perceptions of integration differ from the countries that 
have demonstrated a restrictive turn. In Portugal, where a receptive integration policy 
has been developed, it is an uncontroversial issue. 
In conclusion, the directive has indeed created a multi-level playing field for 
Member States, but it is not carved in stone what the end result will be. Although 
initially some stakeholders were disappointed with the low level of protection offered 
by the directive, it clearly sets limits on the amount of discretion by Member States in 
ways that were not anticipated when the directive came about. The room created for 
national immigration policies turned out to be sometimes less than Member States 
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anticipated, as was most vividly demonstrated by the Chakroun case, that forced the 
Netherlands to lower its income requirement and has also led to amendments in Ger-
many (see chapter 5). Secondly, the Europeanization process not only resulted in 
more restrictive policies (a race to the bottom), but also to more liberal policies. The 
minimum standard set by the directive was in some cases higher than the national 
policies in some Member States; conversely, Member States still go further than the 
directive requires. Furthermore, it is not only the Family Reunification Directive that 
leads to Europeanization of family reunification policies. The Union Citizens Direc-
tive regulates the family reunification of Union citizens and their family members. 
While the reunification with EU family members has remained largely uncontrover-
sial, the reunification of Union citizens with TCN family members has not. It has led 
to controversy in several Member States (especially Ireland, the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom), that see this type of family reunification as a potential misuse of 
free movement rights in order to circumvent national policies. As a result, the Euro-
peanization of migration law has led to debates not only about differentiations be-
tween Union citizens and TCNs, but also between own nationals and Union citizens. 
4.6  Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have looked at how family reunification policies have developed in 
the countries under study in the past decade. As has become obvious, a restrictive 
turn in family reunification policies can be observed, although not all Member States 
studied made this turn.  
Three main arguments played a role in the development of these policies: integra-
tion, economy and fraud, the first and the last of these arguments being the most im-
portant. We have described a struggle over definitions of integration between Mem-
ber States and the European level. Considering that the integration measures in rela-
tion to family reunification are evaluated critically by the European Commission and 
are likely to meet with negative decisions by the CJEU, it can be expected that, in the 
future, Member States will shift their focus from arguments on integration to argu-
ments on combating misuse and fraud, where they find more support at the Euro-
pean level.  
Although at first sight arguments on integration and fraud seem to point to very 
different problem definitions, they are often interrelated and target the same immi-
grant groups (Bonjour & De Hart 2013).74 Both arguments result in expansion of the 
scrutiny of all migrant families, opening up questions as to the normality of migrant 
family lives and conformity with dominant family norms (Mullally 2011). Suspicions 
of widespread fraud or false declarations of parenthood are often based on stereo-
                                                        
74 E.g. in a Norwegian study of fraudulent marriages, the Netherlands mentioned Turkish and Moroc-
can migrants as groups involved in these practices, the same groups that are targeted by integration 
measures. See: Marriages of convenience: a comparative study - Rules and practices in Norway, Sweden, Germany, 
Denmark and the Netherlands, commissioned by the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI, 8 
November 2010). 
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types based on gender and ethnicity and a lack of understanding of ‘deviant’ family 
forms, just as arguments on integration are. 
We have also seen that restrictive measures met with a lot of criticism from 
stakeholders, aimed at its selective or even discriminatory results. Some of these cri-
tiques were evaluated in several studies into the effects of the income requirement, 
pre-entry test and age requirement. Our overview of national studies on the effects of 
family reunification policies indicates that, to some extent, most governments could 
rely on some kind of information on the effects of specific requirements for family 
reunification. However, the governments have either reinterpreted the unwelcome 
results of these studies in their own way, or accepted the consequences of these re-
strictive policies, such as a drop in the number of applications, or the effects for cer-
tain nationalities or women. They creatively use studies on the effects of policies both 
at the national and the European level to defend policy preferences.  
On the other hand, governments do not seem to see the need for precise infor-
mation on the scale of fraud or forced marriages before introducing restrictive policy 
measures to combat these phenomena. Their strong conviction that these phenom-
ena are widespread seems to override any lack of statistical evidence that they are ac-
tually widespread. Hence, it is questionable to what extent family reunification poli-
cies are evidence-based policies; instead governments sometimes seem to be involved 
in ‘policy-based evidence-making’. Others have concluded that such deviation from 
advice and ignoring the results of studies of the effects of requirements could be seen 
as an indication of the politicized nature of family reunification policies (Scholten et 
al. 2011). Finally, this chapter has demonstrated the struggle between Member States 
and the European level about the right to family reunification policies; what some 
have called a ‘tug of war’ between Member States and the supranational level (Le-
gomsky 2011). In the next chapter, we look at the role of the courts in this struggle. 
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Chapter 5 
Case Law 
5.1  Introduction 
In chapter 3, we concluded that the national procedures and their application can 
keep family members from exercising their rights. Yet international and European 
safeguards, like the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 8 ECHR, the Un-
ion Citizens and the Family Reunification Directives, as well as the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights protect the right to family life, if necessary against national sov-
ereignty. Apparently invoking these instruments doesn’t have the same effect in the 
Member States studied. How can this be explained? This chapter tries to answer this 
question by offering an overview of the way the six Member States comply with the 
case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU regarding the right to family reunification. 
What effect does this case law have on the right to family reunification for TCNs 
with their sponsors living in these Member States? Furthermore, this chapter de-
scribes the way national courts assess and influence the national family reunification 
policies. Do courts, by applying national, international and European safeguards, 
(re)shape the national family reunification policy, or do they leave their interpretation 
up to the governments?  
Before we discuss the case law in more detail, it is relevant to look at some fac-
tors that influence the position of the national courts and their role in the ‘struggle’ 
between the national and European level. These factors are: the legal framework 
applying to TCNs, Union citizens and own nationals and their family members, the 
extent to which legislation leaves a discretion to the immigration authorities and 
whether a constitutional right to family reunification exists and if so, for whom. In 
the discussion of case law for TCNs we look specifically at judgments about the main 
requirements: the income requirement, pre-entry test and other integration require-
ments, and the age requirement. Specific issues concerning Turkish nationals, Union 
citizens and own nationals are discussed in separate paragraphs.  
5.2  Factors Influencing the Role of National Courts 
5.2.1  Different Legal Frameworks for Different Groups 
The three target groups of this study rely on different legal frames of reference. Be-
fore 2005, the most relevant norms regarding the right to family reunification for 
TCNs and nationals of the Member States were set by the European Court of Hu-
man Rights (ECtHR), interpreting Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). With regard to Union citizens and their right to family reunification 
with TCNs, the provisions on family reunification in the free movement rules offered 
more concrete and to a certain extent higher norms protecting their family life. With 
the adoption of the Union Citizens Directive, the different instruments in this field 
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have been harmonized and the long-standing case law of the CJEU has been laid 
down in legislation.75 
Since 2005, Union law has also become relevant for TCNs residing in the Mem-
ber States that are bound by the Family Reunification Directive. With this directive, a 
subjective right to family reunification for TCNs has been established in the Euro-
pean Union, offering a substantially higher level of protection, compared to Article 8 
ECHR. As a consequence of the adoption of the Family Reunification Directive, na-
tional policies on family reunification have to comply with Union law, including its 
principles of effectiveness and proportionality, and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. However TCNs residing in Member States that did not opt into the Family 
Reunification Directive (for this study: Ireland and the UK) still fall outside the scope 
of Union law. For them, Article 8 ECHR and the relevant case law remains the most 
important international legal frame of reference. This is also the case for so-called 
‘own nationals’, nationals of the Member States who cannot rely on the Union rules 
for free movement. The only way for them to fall within the scope of Union law, is a 
successful claim to Union citizenship. Since the judgment in Zambrano, the CJEU has 
acknowledged that under strict and special conditions Union citizenship implies a 
right to reunite with the family, if non-admittance of the family members would force 
a Union citizen to leave the territory of the Union.76 In this regard, the court seems to 
attach great importance to the vulnerable and dependent position of young children. 
The different positions of the six Member States become apparent in the analysis 
of the national jurisprudence and the national effects of European case law. As the 
case law on the Family Reunification Directive does not have an impact in the UK 
and Ireland, more attention in these countries is paid to the case law on Article 8 
ECHR. While applying Article 8 ECHR, the UK Supreme Court made clear in the 
case of ZH Tanzania that the best interests of the child must be the primary consid-
eration.77 In the same judgment the court declared the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child as legally binding in procedures concerning family reunification. This ap-
proach is especially meaningful in the Member States which have opted out of the 
Family Reunification Directive, as their TCN residents lack the protection of Article 
5(5) of the directive and Article 24 (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental rights, 
which both prescribe that the child’s interest must be the primary consideration. 
The impact of Union law on the position of own nationals largely depends on the 
national legislator. If their rights have been harmonized with the rights of Union citi-
zens who have made use of the free movement rules, in this study briefly called Un-
ion citizens, they benefit from the CJEU case law on Union Citizens Directive with-
out being able to invoke this directive themselves. If they are treated in the same way 
as TCNs, they benefit from the CJEU case law on the Family Reunification Directive, 
                                                        
75 With Directive 2004/38, Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 has been amended and Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/ 
EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC have been repealed. 
76 Ruiz Zambrano [2011] CJEU C-34/09 (08 March 2011); Dereci & Ors [2011] CJEU C-256/11 (15 
November 2011). 
77  ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4 (1 February 2011). 
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also without being able to invoke this directive themselves. However they are always 
capable of invoking Article 8 ECHR. Turkish nationals who fall under the scope of 
the Association Treaty EEC/Turkey benefit from its large impact on their right to 
family reunification, since the CJEU decided that the standstill clauses of the Addi-
tional Protocol and Decision 1/80 are also applicable to the first entry to the Member 
States.78 Interestingly, not all Member States have implemented this interpretation by 
the court, which results in large differences in the treatment of Turkish nationals 
throughout the European Union (see paragraph 5.3). Since 2008, highly skilled work-
ers have been able to invoke certain rights of the Blue Card Directive. As this direc-
tive is relatively young, European and national case law has not yet been developed. 
Perhaps also the need for case law is absent, as Member States seem to be rather 
eager to facilitate family reunification of this currently most wanted group of mi-
grants. 
5.2.2  Discretion 
Furthermore, the national legal systems influence the scope of discretion of the 
courts and the way in which they interpret the national legislation. As the Irish legisla-
tion lacks detailed rules on family reunification, the Irish courts contribute to a larger 
extent to the national framework of reference than the courts in Member States with 
a detailed legislation on family reunification. This means that the right to family re-
unification is not safeguarded in the same way as in other Member States in many 
respects: first because of the large discretion of the Irish immigration authorities, and 
second because the doctrine of precedent, which binds a court to follow decisions in 
former cases, particularly decisions of higher courts, is a policy and not a binding 
unalterable rule. This high level of discretion at two stages results in unpredictable 
decisions and thus insecurity for applicants of family reunification. 
5.2.3  A Constitutional Right to Family Reunification? 
Although the CJEU has made clear that the Family Reunification Directive has estab-
lished a right to family reunification, this notion has not yet been fully acknowledged 
by all national courts. Such a right laid down in the national constitution, however, 
seems to play a larger role. In four Member States the right to family life has been laid 
down in the national constitution (Austria, Ireland, Germany, Portugal). In Austria 
this is the case because the ECHR is part of the Austrian Constitution. Therefore, 
Austrian courts interpret this term in conformity with Article 8. According to the 
Austrian Administrative Court, a right to family life can exist in individual reunifica-
tion cases in which an expulsion would be inadmissible on grounds of Article 8 
ECHR.79 This assessment has to take place regardless of the residential status of the 
family members. The Austrian Constitutional Court made clear that if such an indi-
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vidual right to family reunification in accordance with Article 8 ECHR has been ac-
knowledged, an application cannot be rejected on the basis of the quota system.80 
Courts in other Member States do not always interpret the constitutional right to 
family life uniformly with regard to the different groups. In their judgments, national 
courts such as the Federal Administrative Court usually take art. 6 of the Constitution 
as well as art. 8 of the ECHR into account while assessing the right to family reunifi-
cation, regardless whether the case involves the reunification with a German or third 
country national sponsor. German citizens however can derive a stronger right to 
family reunification from the Constitution as they enjoy an absolute right to residence 
based on Article 11 of the Constitution (see paragraph 5.3.1). 
According to the Irish courts, however, the constitution is applicable to all resi-
dents seeking justice. In the case of POT v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, Hedigan J. made clear that  
 
‘(…) the requirements of constitutional justice dictate that an applicant seeking administrative 
relief, whether in the immigration context or otherwise, is entitled to a decision within a rea-
sonable time [...]’. 
 
This constitutional approach resulted in the reduction of the length of the application 
procedure from an average of 24 months to 12 months. In the same case, the court 
also recognized the importance of family reunification as a facilitator of integration in 
holding that:  
 
‘family reunification is not only a way of bringing families back together, but it is also essential 
to facilitate the integration of third-country nationals into the State […]. Refugees finding 
themselves alone in a foreign country which has admitted them, traumatised by the events that 
brought them there, more than ever need the society and support of their immediate family. 
Every effort must be made to ensure such reunification occurs as quickly as possible’. 
 
The Portuguese Constitutional Court has produced meaningful judgments by ac-
knowledging the right to family reunification for legal residents as well. According to 
the Portuguese Constitution, parents cannot be separated from their children, unless 
they do not fulfil their fundamental duties as parents. On this basis, the Constitu-
tional Court declared certain articles of the immigration law unconstitutional. These 
articles enabled the immigration authorities to expel convicted TCN parents without 
taking into account the interests of minor children residing in Portugal. In another 
judgment, the court made clear that the decision making on family reunification and 
on entry have to be considered as one procedure. This judgment has significantly 
restricted the discretion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to refuse a visa, once a 
permit for family reunification has been granted (see par. 3.2).81 
                                                        
80 VfSlg, 17.013. 
81 POT v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2008] IEHC 361 (November 19, 2008). 
 
69 
 
5.3  Third Country Nationals 
5.3.1  Main Requirements 
Income requirement 
Chakroun, the second judgment of the CJEU on the Family Reunification, concerned 
the income requirement.82 At the time, the Netherlands required an income level of 
120 per cent of the minimum wage in cases of family formation, whereas in cases of 
family reunification an income level of 100 per cent was required. That difference was 
questioned by the sponsor. The Judicial Division of the Dutch Council of State asked 
two questions for preliminary ruling. The first one referred to the phrase ‘recourse to 
the social assistance system’ in Article 7 (1) (c) of the Family Reunification Directive. 
The Council of State wanted to know if this reference allowed Member States to not 
only take into account the social welfare that meets general subsistence costs, but also 
the special assistance which can be provided in individual cases by municipalities. In 
the second question the Court of Justice was asked whether, while applying an in-
come requirement, Article 7(1) (c) allows a distinction according to whether a family 
relationship arose before or after the entry of the resident into the Member State.83 It 
has been argued that it’s no coincidence that the Council of State requested this rul-
ing (four years after the income level had been raised), shortly after the Commission 
had expressed its concerns about the Dutch required income level being the highest 
in all Member States.84 According to the Commission, this level could, combined 
with the sustainability criterion, hamper the right to family reunification, especially for 
younger people.85 To both questions, the court answered negatively. It made clear 
that the subjective right to family reunification granted by the directive and its aim to 
promote family reunification oblige Member States to interpret the permitted condi-
tions very strictly. A more extensive application than necessary would affect the ob-
jective and, therefore, the principle of effectiveness. According to the court, the in-
come requirement could only function as a frame of reference, as in any case the 
individual interests and circumstances must be taken into account. 
The Chakroun judgment has had a direct effect in two of the six Member States. 
The German Federal Administrative Court revised its case law based on the Chakroun 
ruling. It decided that, given that the tax allowance for employees does not fall under 
the term social benefits according to Community law, this allowance should not be 
taken into account when assessing the income of the sponsor. The court also made 
clear that the actual need for a certain level of income is to be determined on the ba-
sis of an individual evaluation of each application, even if there is an entitlement to 
                                                        
82 Chakroun [2010] CJEU C-578/08 (04 March 2010). 
83 ABRvS, 23 December 2008, case no. 200707879/1. 
84 Chakroun, supra fn. 82, JV 2010/177 (case note C.A. Groenendijk). 
85 Commission, ‘Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the appli-
cation of Directive 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family Reunification’, COM (2008) 610, 8 October 
2008, p. 7. 
 
70 
 
public funds.86 According to the German rapporteurs, however, in practice an appli-
cation is almost always rejected if the fixed income requirement is not met.  
In the Netherlands, the government lowered the required level of income for 
family formation from 120 per cent to 100 per cent of the minimum wage. With re-
gard to the ruling to take the individual circumstances into account, the minister 
stated that the Dutch policy already complied with this obligation.87 With this re-
sponse, the minister also disregarded the criticism of the European Commission on 
the rigid application of the conditions for family reunification in the Netherlands.88 
One District Court referred to Chakroun, ruling that the rejection of an application on 
the sole ground that the income requirement had not been met every month (al-
though on average the sponsor’s income level was higher than required), was not in 
compliance with Article 7(1) (c) of the directive.89 
Although the Family Reunification Directive and Union law are not applicable, 
the First Tier Tribunal in the UK came to a similar conclusion regarding the income 
requirement.90 It held that the income requirement should be the minimum income 
below which the sponsor and family member(s) would be eligible for income sup-
port. This judgment concerned the Immigration Rules as they applied before 9 July 
2012. The national researchers have not reported any cases on the new income 
threshold. The Supreme Court also established that third party support could be 
counted and that admitted spouses or partners could rely on their prospective earn-
ings (based on actual or likely job offers) in the UK to establish that the income re-
quirement had been met.91 Fiancé(e)s could not do so because they were prohibited 
from working during the six-month probationary period before the marriage.  
As we have seen, the income requirement not only plays a role at the time of ad-
mittance, but also for prolonged residence. In a case where the Family Reunification 
Directive did not play a role, as the sponsor was a Dutch citizen, a Dutch District 
Court ruled that the withdrawal of the residence permit of the spouse because the 
couple did not meet the income requirement any longer, was justified and, therefore, 
not in breach of Article 8 ECHR.92 In this case, the sponsor had lost her job and 
received social benefits. Although the municipality had exempted the sponsor from 
the requirement to work, the court approved the withdrawal because she could not 
prove having made efforts to find another job in order to meet the income require-
ment. Despite the Dutch nationality of the sponsor and her children, the court found 
that her Moroccan nationality enabled her to follow her husband to Morocco. The 
court did not take into account that during the appeal period, the sponsor had con-
cluded a new labour contract.  
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Integration requirement 
The pre-entry test for family reunification has been applied in four of the six Member 
States (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom). In three of them, 
national courts approved the requirement for a certain level of knowledge of the 
language of the Member State (only the Netherlands also requires knowledge of the 
society).  
In the Netherlands, the requirement resulted in a large number of judgments, in-
cluding one request for a ruling by the CJEU. At first, a District Court judged in 2007 
that the government was allowed to make the migrant fully responsible for prepara-
tion for the examination, even if that implied (as was the case) that the applicant first 
had to learn the English language to be able to use the preparation package.93 Also, 
the claim that the requirement only applied to certain nationalities, which constituted 
discrimination on the basis of nationality and, therefore, a breach of Article 14 
ECHR, was rejected by the courts.94 At the end of 2008, the Judicial Division of the 
Council of State judged that illiteracy was not a ground for exemption from the inte-
gration requirement. According to the Council, the requirement for passing the pre-
entry test was compatible with Article 8 ECHR since the separation between the 
spouses ‘was in principle of a temporary nature’. The Council relied on the opinion of the 
government that the examination should be eligible for illiterates as well.95 Although 
since that judgment the level of the pre-entry test has been raised and complemented 
with a reading test (April 2011), this conclusion has not been questioned. 
Four years after the introduction of the pre-entry test, a District Court asked the 
CJEU whether this test was in compliance with Article 7 (2) of the Family Reunifica-
tion Directive. The European Commission took the position that this was not the 
case if this requirement meant that family reunification was denied for the sole reason 
that the applicant had failed the test.96 According to the Commission, Article 7 (2) 
aimed to promote integration, but could not be used to undermine the objective of 
the directive of promoting family reunification.97 This position went further than its 
opinion in 2008, when it considered that the admissibility of the pre-entry tests de-
pended on elements such as the actual accessibility of language courses or test cen-
tres, the costs of the course and the test, the capacity of the spouse (illiteracy or 
medical condition), or on ‘whether such measures or their impact serve purposes 
other than integration (e.g. high fees excluding low-income families)’.98 In fact, the 
Commission did not reject the tests as such, but subjected them to a proportionality 
test.99 With its position taken in the Imran case, the Commission no longer left any 
room to the Member States for maintaining these tests. By granting a residence per-
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mit to the appellant, the Dutch government managed to avoid a judgment of the 
CJEU with probably the same content as the Commission’s view. 
Although the CJEU has not yet ruled on the admissibility of the pre-entry test, 
the Commission’s view has already altered the position of some national courts. Pre-
viously, the German Federal Administrative Court had judged that the pre-entry test 
was in accordance with the Family Reunification Directive. According to the court, 
the requirement serves the legitimate aim of promoting integration and preventing 
forced marriages.100 According to the court, the language requirement at least ham-
pered the conclusion of forced marriages and enabled victims to communicate with 
officials when they sought protection. Furthermore, the requirement prevented 
spouses from being dependent on their family-in-law.101 The Constitutional Court, 
being asked to judge on the legitimacy of the pre-entry test, approved the attacked 
decision of the Federal Administrative Court, considering that a test was justified if 
the aim of preventing forced marriages might be better achieved with it.102 These 
judgments offered the German government wide discretion to judge the effectiveness 
of the pre-entry test for this purpose. 
The judgment of the Federal Administrative Court was also sharply criticized in 
German legal literature, because it did not refer to the CJEU judgment in the Chak-
roun case delivered three weeks prior to the German judgment, or to the opinion of 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) published in the 
same period (see chapter 4), criticizing the different treatment of nationals. The main 
point of criticism was that the court had determined the issue without acknowledging 
the need for a reference in circumstances that were not an acte clair. Afterwards the 
same court judged that the Commission’s view expressed in the Imran case should 
have been reason for a preliminary ruling.103 In that case, the procedure was termi-
nated in the meantime because the Department of Foreign Affairs had issued a visa. 
Finally, one year later the Administrative Court of Berlin requested a preliminary 
ruling. It asked, first, whether the language test was in compliance with the standstill 
clauses in the EEC-Turkey Association law and, second, whether it was in compli-
ance with Article 7(2) of the Family Reunification Directive.104 
One month after the Berlin judgment, a Dutch District Court fully endorsed the 
position of the Commission. According to this court, a request for a preliminary rul-
ing was not necessary as the interpretation of the Commission was crystal clear.105 
Another issue addressed in the German case-law, was whether the pre-entry test 
applied to the family members of German sponsors, as the German Constitution 
offers Germans a right to residence. In September 2012, the Federal Administrative 
Court held that the German sponsor can, therefore, not be expected to live abroad in 
order to enjoy family life. If the TCN spouse of a German sponsor has undertaken 
reasonable efforts to pass the test, a separation for more than one year between the 
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spouses would be incompatible with Articles 6 (the right to family life) and 11 (the 
right to residence in Germany) of the Constitution. This period of one year does not 
need to be fulfilled if there are no courses (or alternatives) available or if participation 
in a course implies a high security risk.106 
In the UK, the pre-entry test has also been challenged in the case of Chapti & Ors 
v. SSHD, which led to a judgment in December 2011 by the High Court for England 
and Wales.107 The court held that the requirement was in compliance with Article 12 
(the right to marry) taken with Article 8 ECHR, as well as with Article 14 ECHR. 
Judge Beatson found that the aims of the pre-entry test for spouses were ‘fundamen-
tally benign’, as it was uncontested that knowledge of the English language is benefi-
cial to a person’s ability to integrate into UK society.108 Furthermore protecting pub-
lic services was accepted as a legitimate aim in the context of Article 8 (2) ECHR. 
Leave to appeal was granted and the case is pending. 
 
Age requirement 
In two of the three Member States studied with an age limit of 21 for spouses, this re-
quirement has been challenged, with different national outcomes. The Austrian Con-
stitutional Court ruled that the rise in the age limit to 21 years is in accordance with 
Article 8 ECHR and the Family Reunification Directive. It considered this restriction 
as a legitimate means to avoid forced marriages, especially of young TCNs. With this 
argument, the court approved the justification given in Article 4 (5) of the Directive. 
Even the absence of any transitional arrangement, which affected spouses between 
18 and 21 years old who had already applied for reunification before the age limit was 
raised, was declared to be unobjectionable.109 
In the UK, however, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State had 
failed to establish a justification for the rise in the age limit. It therefore considered 
the interference with the right to family life under Article 8 that had been caused by 
the rule.110 According to the Supreme Court, the rule was  
 
‘rationally connected to the objective of deterring forced marriages … [b]ut the number of 
forced marriages which it deters is highly debatable. What seems clear is that the number of 
unforced marriages which it obstructs from their intended development for up to three years 
vastly exceeds the number of forced marriages which it deters’. 
 
This comparison shows that the national interpretation of the directive does not al-
ways lead to more protection of the family members than Article 8 ECHR, especially 
if national courts fail to respect the EU principle of proportionality and the obligation 
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to take the individual interests and circumstances into account.111 Although the legis-
lator in both Member States had justified the age limit with the same arguments, the 
legitimacy in the context of Article 8 (2) ECHR can be judged differently. In the UK 
case, the government had pointed out the risk of a more stringent interpretation. 
Following this, in his dissenting opinion Lord Brown referred to other countries as a 
justification for the age limit:  
 
‘Are we really to say that the position is plain and that Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Denmark and other such Council of Europe states with similar rules must also 
necessarily be in breach of article 8? What if the equivalent rule is later challenged elsewhere in 
Europe and eventually upheld in Strasbourg?’112 
5.3.2 Other Issues 
Admittance of children 
While defining the scope of the family, the Austrian Administrative Court has made 
clear that, except for children of refugees, minor children who apply for family reuni-
fication are only considered to be members of the nuclear family if they are still mi-
nors at the moment of decision on the application.113 As a result of this interpreta-
tion, the right to family reunification can be influenced by the way the immigration 
authorities organize their application procedures: if these take long, minors run the 
risk of being denied reunification because of their coming of age in the meantime. 
The restriction of the reunion of TCNs with children aged under 15, in force until 
2005, was also regarded as a legitimate restriction by the Constitutional Court. In the 
ruling, it was argued that for children of this age employment is of greater importance 
than family reunification.114 
In the Netherlands, the case law of the ECtHR on Article 8 ECHR and Euro-
pean and national case law on the Family Reunification Directive has led to the aboli-
tion of the requirement of an effective bond between minor children applying for 
family reunification and their parent(s) living in the Netherlands. This requirement 
implied that minor children lost the right to reunification if they had lived separately 
from their parents for more than five years. In the Tuquabo-Tekle case there had been 
a separation exceeding five years between the mother and the daughter.115 The court, 
however, pointed out that the length of the separation between Mrs. Tuquabo-Tekle 
and her daughter was not a result of her own choice, but had occurred against her 
will. She took steps to be reunited as soon as she had acquired a residence right in 
Norway. The court ruled that parents who leave their children behind while they 
settle abroad cannot be assumed to have irrevocably decided that those children are 
to remain in the country of origin permanently and to have abandoned any idea of a 
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future family reunion. In this case, it had always been the intention of the mother for 
her daughter to join her. It was also questionable whether the mother could be said to 
have left her daughter of ‘her own free will’, bearing in mind that she had fled Eritrea 
during the course of a civil war. At the end of 2005, a number of Dutch District 
Courts ruled that the requirement of an effective family bond is incompatible with 
Article 16(1) (b) of the directive.116 One of the arguments was that Article 16 (1) (b) 
of the directive does not give the Member States leeway to establish their own rules 
on what is to be considered a ‘real family relationship’. Although the Judicial Division 
of the Council of State annulled all of these judgments of the courts, the Minister of 
Alien Affairs and Integration announced in September 2006 that the five-year ‘period 
of reference’, which served as the main criterion for an effective bond, would no 
longer be applied.117 Although the minister only referred to the case of Tuquabo-Tekle 
and Article 8 ECHR, representatives of the government also mentioned the Family 
Reunification Directive during court hearings as a reason for this policy change. 
 
Application from abroad 
Article 5 (3) of the Family Reunification Directive requires that the application of a 
family member of a TCN is submitted and examined while the family members reside 
outside the territory of the Member State. The second paragraph, however, allows 
Member States by derogation ‘in appropriate circumstances’ to accept an application 
submitted when they are already in the country. How to define appropriate circum-
stances is not yet clear, as case law of the Court of Justice is absent. The scope of the 
derogation varies substantially between the Member States studied. But the ECtHR 
formulated a minimum obligation in 2006, when it determined that family members 
with part of their family residing legally in the Member State cannot be denied reuni-
fication for the sole reason that they haven’t acquired a long-term visa. According to 
the court, such practice can be defined as excessive formalism, and is, therefore, a 
breach of Article 8.118 
In some of the Member States, family members who apply for family reunifica-
tion on their territory are being directed to their country of origin or the country of 
main residence for filing their application, regardless of whether they reside legally in 
the Member State, for instance on the basis of a short-term visa (see further chapter 
3). Some other Member States are less stringent in that regard. Do courts allow Mem-
ber States to refrain from an assessment of the application simply because it has been 
lodged at the ‘wrong’ place? 
The Austrian Administrative Court has developed its reasoning on this topic. Al-
though it pointed out that inland applications are legitimized by Article 5 (3) second 
paragraph of the Family Reunification Directive, it also emphasized that this directive 
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does not give a right to apply in the country.119 In another decision, this court judged 
that the requirements to apply for reunification abroad and to meet the quota crite-
rion are not disproportionate and therefore, in principle, not in breach of Article 8 
ECHR.120 However: if a right to stay directly emerges from Article 8 ECHR and the 
sponsor legally resides in Austria, an inland application has to be accepted.121 
A similar line is drawn in the Netherlands as a result of the case law of the 
ECtHR on this topic (see the above-mentioned case Da Silva Hoogkamer). In 2009, a 
new exemption ground for the requirement of a long-term visa was created for aliens 
whose expulsion would be a violation of Article 8 ECHR.122 One year later, the Judi-
cial Division of the Council of State decided that the government, when assessing 
whether an application could be denied because the applicant did not possess a valid 
long-term visa, had to scrutinize fully if expulsion was in compliance with Article 8.123 
 
A genuine marriage? 
In the case Hamza & Anor, Minister Justice Cooke criticized the required prove of 
the validity of the marriage.124 The judge described this practice as follows:  
 
‘Throughout 2009 and 2010, a practice developed whereby the Minister would insist that a 
declaration as to the validity of the marriage under Irish law from the Circuit Court was pro-
vided before he would grant reunification or even deal with the family reunification appli-
cation. This practice appeared to apply to all Muslim marriages, traditional African marriages 
and any marriages “by proxy”. The general idea appeared to be that these marriages were not 
valid under Irish family law and that the wife or husband was not therefore the “spouse”.’ 
 
According to Cooke J. however, it is incompatible with the exclusive competence of 
the Minister to decide whether the person comes within the definition of a family 
member or that the person concerned and the refugee are parties to a subsisting mar-
riage, if he requires a declaration from a third party on the validity of the marriage.125 
Accordingly, an assessment under the Refugee Act as to whether a person is a family 
member of the refugee can be based upon the reality of the conjugal relationship 
rather than the availability of a formal verification of the legality of the marriage con-
tract.126 Supporting this decision, the High Court held, on appeal, that a customary 
marriage conducted in Zimbabwe was valid and subsisting at Irish law.127 
In the case of O’Donoghue v UK the ECtHR judged that the requirements for con-
tracting a marriage in the UK violated Article 12 ECHR and were discriminatory on 
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the grounds of religion.128 The legislation required foreigners, except those wishing to 
marry in the Church of England, to pay a high level of fees for permission from the 
Home Office to marry. According to the court, this requirement was not rationally 
connected to the stated aim of reducing the incidence of sham marriages, since no 
enquiries were made to establish the genuineness of the marriage. 
In the so-called ‘paid love’ case, a Portuguese court protected a couple against 
suspicions on the basis of the constitutional right to family life.129 It argued that the 
police could not violate the right to private and family life provided for in Article 26 
of the Portuguese Constitution as a result of investigations based on suspicions. Ac-
cording to the judge, as long as applicants submitted proof of their marriage,  
 
‘it is irrelevant if she does not cohabit with the husband and provide “paid love” to others’.130 
 
In Germany, as an additional requirement spouses (of TCNs or German nationals) 
need to intend to have a marital relationship. In a case where the German authorities 
doubted the existence of such intention, the Federal Administrative Court concluded 
that in the case of existing doubt regarding a sham marriage, the burden of proof for the 
existence or the intention of having a marital relationship lies with the applicant.131 At the 
same time, however, the court stated that even though the provisions of the Family 
Reunification Directive are not directly applicable to the present case of a German 
sponsor, art. 16 (2) b of the Directive is to be taken into account for the interpreta-
tion of the Residence Act – as the provision concerned is applicable to both German 
and third country nationals.132 Article 16 (2) sub b of the directive grants Member 
States the right to reject, withdraw or refuse to renew a family member’s residence 
permit in case of a fraudulent marriage. Nonetheless, according to sub 4 of the same 
paragraph, specific checks and inspections are only allowed where there is reason to 
suspect that there is fraud (Ratia & Walter 2009: 333). In May 2012, the Administra-
tive Court of Bremen decided in a case of a Turkish/German couple that the review 
of a marriage is only admissible where there is ‘actual evidence in the particular case’ 
for such a review.133 
5.4  Turkish Nationals 
In the Sahin case, the CJEU decided that the fees charged in the Netherlands to Turk-
ish nationals were disproportionate in comparison with the fees required from EU 
                                                        
128 O’Donoghue and Others v United Kingdom, 34848/07 [2010] ECHR 2022 (14 December 2010). 
129 http://www1.ionline.pt/conteudo/7191-tribunal-considera-irrelevante-exercer-o-amor-remunerado-
e-contraria-sef. 
130 Rapporteur Carlos Araújo in the Central Administrative Court of the South. 
131 BVerwG, 30 March 2010 – 1 C 7.09. 
132 A reversal of the burden of proof arises, if a criminal procedure is initiated because of subreption of 
a residence permit. In this case, foreigners’ authorities and investigation authorities have to provide 
proof for the existence of a sham marriage. See: Müller (2012: 13). 
133 VerwG Bremen, 23 May 2012, Az. 4 V 320/12.  
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nationals.134 Two months later, the Dutch legislator brought the fees for Turkish na-
tionals down to the level for Union citizens as a consequence of this case.135 The 
judgment of the court, implying that the standstill clauses also apply to the first ad-
mission of Turkish nationals to the Member State, had divergent effects in the Mem-
ber States.136 In the Netherlands, it was first the Central Appeals Tribunal which held 
that the standstill clauses of the Association Treaty prohibit the application of the 
integration requirements after admission laid down in the Act on Civic Integration.137 
As the integration requirement abroad, laid down in the Act on Civic Integration 
Abroad, is only applicable to the target groups of the Act on Civic Integration, the 
Minister for Integration announced that there would no longer be a requirement for 
family members of Turkish nationals (relying on the Association Treaty) to pass the 
pre-entry test.138 Other restrictions introduced in recent years are also not applicable 
to them.  
With regard to Austria, the CJEU considered that the obligation of Turkish na-
tionals to apply for reunification from abroad constituted an illegal ‘new restriction’ 
within the sense of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol. As a result, the Adminis-
trative Court concluded that newly introduced or strengthened admission criteria 
(since the entry into force of the Treaty) like the pre-entry test and the income re-
quirement represented an unjustified restriction.139 The Austrian government adapted 
its administrative practice accordingly. Thus, in both Member States, some restrictive 
measures on family reunification have been abolished for one of the largest groups of 
TCNs living in their territories.  
In Germany, however, neither the government nor the courts take the Associa-
tion Treaty Turkey/EEC into account when defining the right to family reunification 
of Turkish nationals, who constitute the largest minority group in Germany. In other 
Member States, with significantly fewer Turkish migrants, the CJEU case law on the 
Association Treaty did not result in a more favourable family reunification policy 
towards Turkish nationals. In March 2010, the Federal Administrative Court judged 
that the standstill clauses are only applicable to access to the labour market and not to 
access to the territory. Even if this was the case, the court continued, the standstill 
clause would only apply to persons wishing to make use of the freedom of movement 
in order to access the labour market, not to persons wishing to reunite with the fam-
ily.140 This example shows that the establishment of certain rights at the Union level 
does not always guarantee the possibility to invoke them in the Member States. Har-
monization, however, seems to be a matter of time: in September 2012, the Verwal-
tungsgericht Berlin requested a preliminary ruling by the CJEU on the question of 
                                                        
134 Sahin [2009] CJEU C-242/06 (17 September 2009), para. 75.  
135 Staatscourant 12 November 2009, nr. 17361. 
136 Commission v Netherlands [2010] CJEU C-92/07 (29 April 2010), paras. 49 and 50. 
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139 VwGH, 19 January 2012, 2011/22/0313. 
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whether the Association Treaty prohibits the application of the language requirement 
for spouses of Turkish nationals (relying on the Association Treaty) who apply for 
family reunification.141 
5.5  Union Citizens 
Prior legal residence  
Family members of Union citizens are not obliged to submit an application from 
abroad. In the case of Metock, the Court of Justice made clear that family members 
don’t need to prove legal residence in the European Union prior to their application 
for family reunification either.142 According to the CJEU, such a requirement is 
unlawful as it is not part of the qualifying requirements in the Union Citizens Direc-
tive. This judgment raised a lot of resistance in a number of northern Member States, 
which considered the judgment as a threat to their sovereignty, and expressed their 
fear of abuse of the rules on free movement.143 The judgment, nevertheless, led to 
the removal of this prior residence condition in Ireland and the UK in their legisla-
tion, and adjustments to the administrative conditions in Austria, Germany and the 
Netherlands.144 In answer to a reference by the UK Upper Tribunal (Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber) for a preliminary ruling, the CJEU judged that this require-
ment of prior residence is also not applicable to family members who don’t belong to 
the nuclear family, but who are dependent on Union citizens.145 
 
Combating fraud 
The intensified attention for possible fraud and abuse of the right to family reunifica-
tion, already noted in chapters 3 and 4, has led to quite a number of judgments in 
various Member States. On the basis of the Union Citizens Directive, the Court of 
Justice has developed concrete and detailed standards with regard to research meth-
ods and rejections on the basis of suspicions. In response to the judgment in Metock, 
and the subsequent debate in the Council of Ministers, the Commission developed 
guidelines on how to apply the Union Citizens Directive in this regard.146 National 
courts increasingly take the relevant CJEU case law into account. Some examples are 
given below:  
                                                        
141 VerwG Berlin, 25 October 2012, VG 29 K 138.12V. 
142 Metock and Others [2008] CJEU C-127/08 (25 July 2008). 
143 See the debate in the EU Council of Ministers, Council document 16483/08 (Presse 344), 28 No-
vember 2008. 
144 More Member States applied this condition, see Commission, ‘Report from the European Commis-
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After having adjusted its policy rules to the CJEU judgment in Metock, the Irish 
government expressed its concerns that some applications for residence made on the 
basis of EU Treaty Rights might be based on ‘marriages of convenience’ (Quinn & King-
ston 2012: 21). However, the High Court held in 2011 that the Irish authorities ‘are 
not empowered to prevent the solemnisation of a marriage on the grounds that they 
suspect – even with very good reason – that the marriage is one of convenience’.147 
This case concerned a Lithuanian national whose Egyptian fiancé, in respect of 
whom a deportation order was in place at the time, was detained following his arrest 
at the registry office immediately prior to their marriage. The judge concluded that if 
the authorities feel the legislation is unsatisfactory they should turn to the Union 
legislature.  
In 2011, the Dutch Judicial Division of the Council of State made explicit refer-
ence to the 2009 Guidelines of the Commission on the application of that directive 
with regard to the proof of a ‘durable relationship’, or how to ascertain whether a 
marriage qualified as one of convenience. The Council required that the definition of 
a ‘durable relationship, duly attested’ should not be interpreted too narrowly.148 It 
furthermore ruled that the state authorities had to substantiate why they felt that 
there was no ‘durable relationship, duly attested’ if evidence of a durable relationship 
had been presented by the applicant.149 A mere reference that there was no registra-
tion in the municipal administration (GBA) was insufficient, according to the Coun-
cil. These rulings led to the adaptation of the Dutch policy rules, offering more pos-
sibilities for applicants to show the durable nature of their relationship.150 
Where in these two judgments Union law offers protection to applicants for fam-
ily reunification, in Portugal it appears to be a justification for measures combating 
fraudulent marriages, even in cases concerning Portuguese nationals. In a certain case, 
the authorities had refused to grant a residence card to a spouse because the marriage 
proved to be a simulated marriage.151 The Portuguese husband had declared that his 
spouse did not co-habit with him, nor did he know where she was, and that advertis-
ing of her sexual favours could be found in newspapers with her mobile phone con-
tact. The Supreme Court approved the appeal considering that, although the law on 
family reunification does not define cohabitation as a prerequisite, it is only applicable 
to relatives in the true sense of the word. According to the court, the police investiga-
tions were executed on the basis of the national and European community frame-
works criminalizing ‘marriages of convenience’. The second judgment involved a 
third country male citizen married to a Portuguese woman. SEF removed his resi-
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148 ABRvS, 6 September 2011, 201009139/1/V4, LJN: BS1678, JV 2011/429. See also 10 May 2012, 
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dence card claiming abusive and deceptive use of the right of European family mem-
bers.152 The Central Administrative Court of the North rejected the appeal of the 
immigrant, as the Portuguese former spouse had declared that she had received 
money for the marriage and did not have any other contact with the immigrant after 
the marriage.  
5.6  ‘Own’ Nationals and the Applicability of Union Law 
Union citizens who cannot rely on the rules of free movement are mostly dependent 
on the decision of the national legislator to treat them in the same way as TCNs or as 
Union citizens who can rely on the free movement rules. Yet they sometimes manage 
to invoke Union law in order to reunite with their TCN family members. This con-
cerns young and dependent children: since the Zambrano judgment, they can some-
times claim the right to family reunification with their TCN parents on the basis of 
Article 20 TFEU. Furthermore, they are allowed to rely on the rules on family reuni-
fication of the Union Citizens Directive if they have enjoyed the right to free move-
ment and have subsequently returned to their country. Below we discuss several 
judgments on these different issues of the applicability of Union law. 
 
Children 
In the Zambrano judgment of 8 March 2011, the CJEU ruled that on the basis of Arti-
cle 20 TFEU, Union citizens cannot be deprived of their right to stay in the EU terri-
tory, which implies that TCN parents should be granted residence and the right to 
work in order to take care of their (small) EU children on EU territory. With Zam-
brano, the court created a new basis for family reunification derived from Union citi-
zenship, regardless of whether cross-border elements were applicable. This judgment 
does not seem to have had an impact in Austria, Germany and Portugal, but it did in 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK.  
In January 2003, Irish judgments led to a suspension of the Irish policy under 
which parents of Irish citizen children were usually granted permission to remain in 
the state.153 In these cases, the Supreme Court reconfirmed that under Irish law a 
foreign national parent of an Irish-born child did not have an automatic entitlement 
to remain in the state with the child. As a result, many of the 11,493 parents of Irish 
citizen children who had outstanding applications for residence were issued with noti-
fications of intention to deport them. In relation to the deportation of parents of 
Irish citizen children, the Supreme Court required, on the basis of Article 8 ECHR, 
that the authorities assess whether there were any ‘insurmountable obstacles’ to the 
family moving abroad with the deportee.154 
In response to the Zambrano case, the Irish High Court, has clarified that  
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‘Ruiz-Zambrano turns on factors (…) such as dependency, residence in the territory of the 
Member State in question and the right of European citizens to enjoy one of the real benefits 
of that citizenship, namely, the right to reside within the territory of the Union’.155 
 
In this case, Hogan J. found, therefore, that in a situation where the parents of an 
Irish citizen child were separated and, with the mother having been granted refugee 
status, there was  
 
‘no real prospect that the deportation of the applicant would bring about a situation where [the 
child] would be compelled to leave Ireland or, for that matter, the territory of the Union, (…), 
there are no grounds for contending that [the father] is entitled to an interlocutory injunction 
restraining his deportation on Zambrano grounds’.  
 
Interestingly, when Hogan J. went on to assess the child’s right to the care and com-
pany of his father under the Irish Constitution, he found himself coerced into the 
conclusion that  
 
‘there [are] abundant grounds for suggesting that the substance of [the child’s] constitutional 
right to the care and company of his father would be denied were his father to be deported’,  
 
and that  
 
‘this would ordinarily be sufficient in itself to justify the grant of an interlocutory injunction 
restraining the deportation of [the father], his disreputable and egregious conduct not-
withstanding’.  
 
And he concluded that although the father in this case had ‘manipulated the asylum 
system’ and (…) ‘engaged in egregiously wrongful conduct’ and although  
 
‘(H)e has no personal merits which would entitle him to administrative or judicial protection, 
(…) the court must (…) approach this application not from the perspective of the father, but 
rather from that of the child.’  
 
In the Netherlands, the Judicial Division of the Council of State on 7 March 2012 
handed down two judgments in which, according to the Council, the ‘genuine enjoy-
ment test’ (can the Union citizen stay on the EU territory while living with his or her 
family) should have resulted in the issuing of a residence permit and a long-stay visa 
respectively. These cases have in common that there was only one (TCN) parent 
involved in the children’s care as one Dutch parent had passed away (long-stay visa) 
and the other had disappeared from the scene to an unknown destination (residence 
permit). The argument that the children could live with the paternal grandparents 
who were residents of the Netherlands without considering whether the grandparents 
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were willing and capable of caring for the children, was dismissed by the court. Ac-
cording to the State Council, the test was whether the children would have to leave 
EU territory in order to live with their parent(s), not whether there might be a third 
party in the Member State of which the children were nationals who could care for 
them. It also found immaterial the fact that the children had limited ties with the 
Netherlands as they had spent all or most of their lives in Indonesia where they at-
tended an international school and did not speak the language of that country. These 
judgments have limited the possibilities for the government to refer to other adults 
who can take care of Dutch children or to other countries with which the children 
also have ties. 
At the same time, the Council of State has rejected claims that Article 20 TFEU 
obliges Member States to ensure that both parents can live in the Netherlands in 
order to enjoy family life with their Dutch children. If one of the parents is Dutch or 
legally resides in the Netherlands, the other parent does not have a right of residence 
on the basis of Dereci or Zambrano. According to the Council, the Zambrano judgment 
doesn’t imply a right of residence for both parents. This principle remains unchanged 
if this single parent in the Netherlands faces problems with raising the children, for 
instance because of medical or psychological problems. In these situations, this par-
ent can request assistance from the relevant Dutch institutions.156 The government 
need only derogate from this principle if it is clear that the parent, who resides legally 
in the Netherlands or is a Dutch citizen, is not in the factual situation to look after 
the children, for instance because he or she is in jail.157 The District Court of Zwolle 
also applied this derogation in a case where the mother, who took care of the Dutch 
children was to be expelled, while the father had threatened to kill the mother and 
children and had gone underground. The court rejected the Dutch position that this 
father was able to look after the children and decided that the mother should be 
granted the right to residence.158 The District Court of Haarlem ruled in a case where 
the Dutch father suffered from leprosy and lived in a nursing home where no chil-
dren could be housed, that the mother should be granted legal residence.159 In July 
2012, the Dutch government informed the Parliament that according to the jurispru-
dence of the Judicial Division of the Council of State, it would admit the ‘second’ 
parent to the Netherlands if there was an objective obstacle for the Dutch or legally 
residing parent to take care of the Dutch child in the Netherlands (e.g. on medical 
grounds or because he or she had been deprived of his or her parental rights).160 
Following the Zambrano judgment, the British government implemented its pro-
visions in November 2012 to cover TCNs on whom a British citizen child or adult is 
dependent. The Certificate of Application scheme that operated in the interim period 
and permitted a ‘Zambrano parent’ to work in the UK while their application was 
outstanding, is no longer in operation. 
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Spouses 
In its judgment on Dereci, concerning an Austrian case, the CJEU narrowed down the 
scope of those who could benefit from Zambrano to those for whom refusal of a right 
to live and work would mean that the Union citizen would have to leave the EU as a 
whole, and not only the state of which he or she was a national.161 The court left it to 
the national court to make that assessment. The CJEU further noted that Union 
citizens, who did not exercise their mobility rights could not rely on the Union Citi-
zens Directive. However, the court reasoned that Union citizenship itself implied cer-
tain core rights upon individuals, otherwise the Union citizenship would be deprived 
of its practical relevance. As an example, the CJEU mentioned that Union citizens 
could in fact be forced to leave the EU territory, if their Union citizenship did not 
entail a right of residence within the EU territory. However, the national courts had 
to decide case by case whether Union citizenship led to a residence right for family 
members.  
In several judgments, the Austrian High Courts have touched upon the legal dis-
tinction between Austrian sponsors who have or have not realised their mobility 
rights. While referring to the Metock case, the court determined that the applicability 
of Union law depended on the existence of a cross-border element. Such a situation 
was assumed even in the case of irregular marginal employment by an Austrian wife 
of a Nigerian citizen in the Czech Republic.162 However, the court did not consider 
cross-border employment to be sufficiently relevant in the case of an Indian citizen 
married to an Austrian national, who had stayed for several weeks in Greece to par-
ticipate in a ‘turtle project’.163 According to the Austrian Constitutional Court, this 
distinction should be based on objective merits and, therefore, be justified according 
to the principle of equality as laid out in the Austrian Constitution. However, as a 
result of the Dereci judgment, the Austrian Administrative Court has put this distinc-
tion into perspective. In a recent judgment, it argued that substantive Union citizen-
ship rights may never be refused. This would be the case if the sponsor was forced to 
leave Union territory.164 
5.7  Conclusion 
This chapter shows that the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU has a significant 
impact on the national legislation and policy regarding family reunification of TCNs 
or EU nationals with TCNs and the rights of third country family members after 
admission. It can be expected that the case law of both courts will grow in impor-
tance in the coming years, as the national reports show that requirements for admis-
sion have recently become or are about to become more restrictive and the possibili-
ties for loss of residence rights will be extended.  
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In our study, we found that the national courts cannot be characterized in the 
same way, even if they belong to the same Member State. In general, national courts, 
exercising restraint, seem to endorse the stated aims of restrictive measures without 
question. The critical assessment by the British Supreme Court of the arguments for 
the age limit, however, illustrates that some courts tend to take an autonomous stance 
towards the national policies, by attaching more importance to family life. Bonjour 
contested Joppke’s conclusion that national courts contribute significantly to 
strengthening the right to family reunification, as she found that, at least until 2011, 
the authority over the Dutch conditions for family reunification was entirely in the 
hands of Dutch politicians and civil servants (Bonjour 2011: 113). This chapter, how-
ever, shows that once governments have adopted a legislative instrument at the EU 
level (which they have influenced by negotiation), judicial authorities gain more influ-
ence, on both the European and national level. National courts more easily criticize 
their government’s policies and judge in favour of family reunification, if the case law 
of the European courts encourages them to do so: the explicit confirmation by the 
CJEU of the subjective right to family reunification for TCNs worked that way. With 
regard to the income requirement and the pre-entry tests, the position of the Com-
mission also made national courts question their governments’ interpretation and 
refer to the CJEU.165 
One-way pressure, however, is not always sufficient. According to Van der Vleu-
ten, compliance by governments that do not intend to comply only occurs if there is 
pressure from both the national and the European level (Van der Vleuten 1998). 
After all, the Court of Justice cannot make conclusions in a judgment without a re-
quest for a preliminary ruling by a national court, or an infringement procedure by 
the Commission. The latter is in most cases the result of a large number of com-
plaints from national NGOs or other interest groups. Also, judgments of the ECtHR 
often result from national lawyers or NGOs litigating or writing reports supportive of 
individual complaints. This means that the extent to which national governments are 
being compelled to adjust their legislation to European case law, largely depends on 
the position and perseverance of national actors. This is clearly demonstrated by the 
application of the CJEU case law on Turkish nationals relying on the Association 
Treaty. The German government still manages not to lower the requirements for 
them, as the national courts have approved this policy. Only recently a court at state 
level has turned to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on this case. Until now the Aus-
trian, German and Dutch governments have succeeded in preserving their pre-entry 
test, while attempting to avoid any development of EU case law on this topic. Their 
main strategy for influencing European case law is delaying an enforced adjustment 
of their policies by granting a residence right prior to a forthcoming judgment.  
Although European case law does not always strengthen the right to family reuni-
fication, in all cases it contributes to more harmonization of this right throughout the 
EU Member States. Also, the CJEU’s coherent interpretation of the migration direc-
tives leads to a slight approximation between the right to family reunification of Un-
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ion citizens exercising their right to free movement and this right of TCNs. Strength-
ening these rights by Europeanization at the same time implies widening the gap be-
tween those able to rely on these rights and those who can’t, namely own nationals 
and TCNs residing in the states that have opted out. Whereas the focus of the 
ECtHR is on whether a particular state has overstepped its margin of appreciation in 
respecting individual rights, the question for the CJEU has been whether a restriction 
on family migration may act to discourage EU citizens from exercising their rights to 
free movement, undermine the right to family reunification for TCNs, or impede the 
enjoyment of EU citizenship. Consequently, the parallel development of case law has 
resulted in the unusual situation whereby many Union citizens exercising treaty rights 
now enjoy far greater rights to family reunion than the states’ own nationals do. 
However, Zambrano was the starting point for national courts to take consequences 
from Union citizenship for own nationals, albeit with divergent outcomes. 
With regard to TCNs, the gap is growing between those residing in a Member 
State that is bound by the Family Reunification Directive and those who are not able 
to rely on Union law. Compared to the income requirement in the Member States 
that are bound, having been moderated by the Chakroun judgment, the required in-
come level for work-permit holders in Ireland and more generally in the UK are 
amongst the highest (see chapter 2). If the CJEU interprets the admissibility of the 
pre-entry test in the same way as the Commission did earlier, the UK will remain the 
only Member State imposing a language condition for admission. 
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Chapter 6 
Lives on Hold: The Impact of Family Reunification 
Policies on Family Life and Integration 
6.1  Introduction 
So far, we have looked at the rules, background and development of family reunifica-
tion policies. In this chapter, we look at the impact of family reunification policies on 
migrants’ family life and integration.  
As in the rest of the report, we specifically looked at the income requirement, 
pre-entry test and age requirement. Since the housing requirement proved to be no 
hindrance in practice in any of the countries under study, we have omitted it from 
this chapter.  
 To study the effects of the income requirement, pre-entry test and age require-
ment, we made a quantitative analysis, for which we collected statistics and other data 
on the fluctuations in the number of applications for family reunification and visas or 
permits granted and, as far as available, on the effects for certain groups of sponsors 
or family members. For the qualitative analysis, we made use of the interviews with 
individual family members and sponsors, as well as other stakeholders that were con-
ducted in the Member States under study. We compare our results with other studies 
on family reunification requirements, and illustrate our findings with interview ex-
cerpts from the country reports.  
6.2  ‘Self-selecting’ Family Members: The Numbers 
When looking at the quantitative effects of policy measures on the number of TCNs 
reuniting with their family members in the Member States, we have to involve both 
the development of the number of permits granted and the number of applications 
submitted. The combination of these data can show whether the introduction of 
more impediments resulted in fewer awarded applications, or also in fewer submitted 
applications. The latter can especially occur if submitting an application involves 
considerable costs and trouble, like long-distance travel to the consulate. In earlier 
research into family reunification requirements, the phenomenon of self-selection has 
been mentioned (Regioplan 2009a). Some people, who fear they cannot meet the 
requirements, do not apply for family reunification. This self-selective effect may 
explain the decrease in family reunification applications as a consequence of restric-
tive measures. Do we find these effects in the six Member States? 
But first some introductory remarks on the data. It turned out to be very difficult 
to get a precise and comparative overview of the development of the applications and 
permits granted regarding family reunification of TCNs with TCNs, own nationals 
and Union citizens, due to a number of reasons. First, the groups are not uniformly 
classified: some groups are not registered separately, others are included in groups 
which are not taken into account in this research. Besides difficulties of comparison 
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between Member States, several researchers also reported difficulties in conducting 
an analysis in their own Member State because the way of registering has changed in 
the course of time, as the introduction of a new law or certain evaluations served as a 
reason for amending the kind of data collected and registered. This turned out to be a 
severe obstacle to making a precise overview of the development in the relevant 
numbers in the last ten years. Second, with regard to the different target groups, dif-
ferent kinds of data have been collected and registered. In Austria, for instance, with 
regard to TCN sponsors the granted residence permits are registered, but for own 
national sponsors it is the number of applications submitted. This complicates an 
accurate comparison. Despite these difficulties, the data collected have enabled us to 
draw some tentative conclusions on the quantitative effects of the policy measures. 
These findings proved to be relevant in combination with the information gathered 
in the interviews and in other evaluations. 
 
An overall drop 
The available statistics show that in all the Member States studied, the number of 
applications, visas and residence permits granted on grounds of family reunification 
have dropped in the last decade (since 2000). Depending on the Member State, the 
drop in numbers varies from one-third to more than half. Germany was the Member 
State where the drop in the number of long-term visa applications started first, in 
2003: from over 85,000 in 2002, ending up to 40,000 in 2010. In the Netherlands, the 
number of long-term visa applications went down from 2005 (from 29,000 in 2004 to 
almost 12,000 in 2007).  
In Austria, the numbers started to decrease a few years later, from 2007. The 
quota and the registration system make it impossible to gain insight into fluctuations 
regarding the number of applying TCNs. However, the number of Austrian citizens 
(not falling within the scope of the quota) applying for family reunification has 
dropped from nearly 9,000 in 2006 to 5,000 in 2011. The UK report suggests declin-
ing numbers of permits granted between 2007-2009, but there is limited data avail-
able. The available data however show the issuance of more than 70,000 Entry Clear-
ance Visas (for family reasons to TCNs and UK citizens) in 2006, decreasing to just 
over 45,000 in 2011. These figures potentially include EEA national family members 
of EEA nationals. 
Both Ireland and Portugal also demonstrated a decline, which has occurred since 
2008. Since then, the number of arrivals in Ireland (their nationality or purpose is not 
registered) have dropped by one-third, whereas in Portugal the number of visas is-
sued for family reunification has halved. Although the drops in most cases concern 
family members of TCNs and own nationals, the Irish report specifically points to 
the declining family permits granted to Union citizens as well. As Ireland and Portu-
gal did not introduce the restrictive measures that other Member States did, and Un-
ion citizens are not affected by restrictive policies in any case, these drops raise ques-
tions about their causes. 
  
Restrictive measures explaining the drop 
An exact link between the policies and the actual immigration cannot always be estab-
lished. After all, restrictions were often introduced as part of a larger reform on this 
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policy. Furthermore, statistics on the effects of migration measures in general show a 
peak just before and a sudden drop just after its introduction, followed by a gradual 
recovery (this sudden drop and gradual climb occurred, for instance, in Germany and 
the Netherlands after the introduction of the pre-entry test). But taking into account 
the fluctuations over a longer period, we can conclude that the decrease in Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands is closely related to the introduction of restrictive 
measures targeting family members of TCNs and own nationals. With regard to these 
Member States, the self-selecting effect has been confirmed. In Austria, the drop 
clearly started after the introduction of the New Residence and Settlement Act in 
2005. The Act affected the position of Austrian citizens, as it abolished their equal 
treatment with Union citizens (having exercised their EU mobility rights). As one of 
the consequences, own nationals for the first time had to meet the income require-
ment. Because of its recent introduction (2011), the quantitative effects of the pre-
entry test could not yet be clarified. 
Researchers in Germany attributed the sudden drop in applications in 2007 to the 
pre-entry test introduced in that year. An earlier sharp decrease, in 2005, is not related 
to family reunification restrictions, but to the accession of ten Eastern European 
states to the EU, implying the waiver of the visa requirement for these nationals.  
The drop in the number of applications in the Netherlands can be explained by 
several policy measures introduced at different times. First, the abolition in 2004 of 
the more favourable income requirement for Dutch citizens, refugees and holders of 
a permanent residence permit while raising the level of the required income to 120 
per cent of the minimum wage; second, the introduction of a higher age requirement 
for spouses in the same year, and third, the introduction of the pre-entry test in 2006. 
After the required language level of the pre-entry test was raised in April 2011, a 
further drop in the number of long-term visa applications became visible.  
A more general reason for the decline can be found in the increasing preference 
of Turkish and Moroccan nationals to marry a partner who already lives in the Neth-
erlands. In 2002, almost half of them selected a spouse living abroad, while in 2012, 
only one in six Turkish or Moroccan spouses did so. While several explanatory fac-
tors are involved in this tendency, it cannot be excluded that it is also related to the 
restrictions introduced since 2004. 
A gradual partial recovery of the number of applications after a sudden drop is 
another indicator that the decrease results from restrictive immigration measures. Al-
though for some of the applicants the measure implies a permanent impediment to 
reunite with the family, for others it means a delay in the reunification process. Both 
spouses need preparation time in order to adjust to the new criteria, be it for the 
sponsor to improve his or her income, or for the spouse to pass the pre-entry test. 
 
Economic factors explaining the drop 
In Ireland and Portugal, the decline seems not to be caused by immigration measures 
but by their national economic contraction. In both Member States, the decrease is 
not specific to family members of TCNs or own nationals. A large part of the de-
crease in Ireland concerns family members of Union citizens, as a consequence of the 
declining numbers of Union citizens settled there for work. The economic recession 
in Portugal makes TCN labour migrants and their families return to their country of 
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origin. This is even more the case with Brazilian nationals, where the economic 
growth in their home country has led to an upsurge in their return and a decrease in 
their inflow to Portugal. At the same time, sponsors who have suffered from the ef-
fects of the economic crisis have more frequently failed to comply with the criteria on 
income and housing, despite the government’s lowering of the required income level. 
Due to the same reasons, the number of residence permits granted for family reunifi-
cation has declined by one-third. At the end of 2011, two-thirds of the applications 
for family reunification were granted, and three-quarters in cases where children were 
involved.  
The decline since 2006 in the UK can also not be easily linked to certain policy 
changes on family reunification. The requirements on housing and income remained 
constant between 2001 and July 2012, albeit with a more concretely defined income 
requirement from 2006, resulting from a tribunal decision. As the age limit for 
spouses was increased to 21 years no earlier than 2008, and the pre-entry test was 
introduced at the end of 2010, these measures cannot explain the drop since 2006, 
although they may have strengthened the decreasing trend. As the number of permits 
issued to family members of Union citizens shows a similar trend, the economic 
situation might be a more relevant explanatory factor than the admission criteria.  
 
Which groups are affected? 
As far as statistics are available, they demonstrate that certain nationals are affected 
more by restrictive measures than others. It seems that Turkish nationals have suf-
fered the most from the measures introduced in Germany. In 1998, they formed one-
third of the total number of visa required family members, and in 2010 less than one-
fifth. In the period under study, the proportion of spouses immigrating to TCNs 
decreased by 6.5 per cent, but the percentage of spouses immigrating to Germans 
increased by 8.5 per cent. According to the German Federal Ministry of Interior, this 
trend of family reunification to Germans could be explained by the higher number of 
naturalizations, combined with the reunification of foreign spouses with the so-called 
Aussiedler, repatriates from Eastern Europe of German origin. Whether this first ex-
planation holds true, is questionable since the naturalization rate in Germany has not 
increased, but decreased since the amendment of the citizenship law of 2000, espe-
cially for Turkish migrants (Van Oers, forthcoming: 150; Thränhardt 2008: 12).  
In the Netherlands, the number dropped most dramatically for immigrants origi-
nating from Turkey and Morocco. Since the applicability of the pre-entry test to Tur-
kish nationals was abolished in 2011, their numbers might recover in the near future. 
More generally, statistics show that the category of TCNs who need a long-term visa 
in order to reunite with their family in the Netherlands has the most problems in 
meeting the requirements introduced since 2004/2005. This means nationals from 
the non-OECD countries. Furthermore, refugees suffer severely from the restrictions 
introduced in 2009, concerning the ‘effective family bond’. The percentage of re-
jected applications for family reunification by refugees rose from12 per cent in 2008 
to 81 per cent in 2011; many of them concern children. By far the largest group af-
fected were Somali refugees.  
In Portugal, Brazilians dominate the list of the TCN sponsors, accounting for 
more than one-third of all applications for family reunification followed, at a large 
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distance, by sponsors from Cape Verde, Ukraine, China and Moldova. At first glance, 
it seems remarkable that nationals with historical and linguistic ties with Portugal and 
belonging to the oldest immigrant communities (from Angola, Guinea Bissau, SAO 
Tome and Principe) lag behind these countries. The researchers, however, explained 
this order by the amendment of the citizenship law in 2006, making Portuguese citi-
zenship substantially more accessible. A large number of Portuguese speaking TCNs 
who have benefited from this, have since then registered as Portuguese sponsors if 
applicable. The German and Portuguese examples show that other developments, 
like in these cases fluctuations regarding naturalization, may influence the classifica-
tion of the affected groups. 
6.3  Capital and What People can Do 
Of the earlier studies on the impact of restrictive family reunification policies, 
Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow’s (2011) work on the consequences of the Dutch income 
requirement offers a useful analytical framework to gain insight into the conse-
quences of family reunification policies for family members. They found that people 
adjust their behaviour to the requirements of family reunification in certain ways. 
According to their analysis, restrictive family reunification policies increase the costs 
of migration not only for family migrants, but also for the denizens or citizens in the 
country, the sponsors. How these sponsors respond is determined by capital (finan-
cial, social and otherwise) and the degree to which sponsors are willing to pay the 
price, in other words: their emotional commitment to the relationship (Leerkes & 
Kulu-Glasgow 2011). 
Although Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow’s study was limited to the income require-
ment, we assume that this analysis is also applicable to the other requirements of 
family reunification policy. We further assume that the extent to which behavioural 
adjustments are required may increase because of the cumulation of several require-
ments that have to be met, an issue addressed in para. 6.6. Finally, behavioural ad-
justments do not limit themselves to the admission procedure. As Strasser et al. 
(2009) point out, families found themselves constantly strained to adapt their family 
project to the external circumstances of family reunification policies, rather than ac-
cording to their own wishes and priorities. Hence, as long as secure residence (per-
manent residence or citizenship) is not acquired, family reunification policies may 
have a profound impact on the lives of migrant families. This raises the question of 
what people have to do to gain secure residence and with what effects for integration. 
The individual family members and sponsors interviewed for this study almost all 
met the requirements. Few applications were denied because e.g. the income re-
quirement had not been met. This can partly be explained by our selection of respon-
dents, who often had a high educational background and favourable economic posi-
tion. That does not mean that the application procedure was always easy. Applicants 
sometimes had to pay a high price to be able to be together. As previously stated, 
these costs depend on capital (what people can do) and emotional commitment (what 
people are willing to do). Often, the main goal of respondents is to be together and 
they will do whatever it takes to meet whatever requirements they have to meet.  
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That also means that most of them did not purposely challenge the requirements. 
Although, as we have seen in chapter 3, NGOs and lawyers stress the importance of 
legal aid to get through the complicated immigration procedures, most people do so 
without such aid, and do not start legal procedures. Rather, they submit their applica-
tion again once they meet the requirements. Of the three strategies sought by indi-
viduals to solve legal issues (remain passive, do-it-yourself, finding legal aid (WODC 
2009b), most families did it themselves. Hence, we assume that the interviews with 
lawyers give information on a different group of applicants: those who had no choice 
but to contact a lawyer because the application was initially denied. 
That families did it themselves, does not necessarily mean that they did it alone. 
Many respondents mentioned forms of support by family, friends, and employers 
who helped them meet the requirements, or offered other forms of support. Their 
help was sometimes vital to the positive outcome of the procedure. For example, in 
Ireland, employment permit holders from Pakistan and India had difficulties obtain-
ing information through the official channels, and relied on the information and 
support provided by their employer, who had done this before with other employees, 
to be able to bring over their family members. 
Support by NGOs was also often mentioned, as well as internet forums of expa-
triates and bi-national families, as important sources of information and exchange of 
experiences. In contrast, immigration authorities were not experienced as helpful, but 
rather as a hindrance to family reunification. This issue has already been addressed in 
chapter 3. 
6.4  The Four Main Requirements 
As already mentioned, of the four main requirements, the housing requirement had 
little impact on family reunification, since it formed no significant hurdle. We have 
omitted it from our analysis.  
The income requirement and pre-entry test, on the other hand, are a considerable 
hurdle, mentioned as such in all countries that have these requirements, whatever the 
required level of income or language proficiency and regardless of the way the lan-
guage test was organized.  
 
Income requirement  
Respondents in the qualitative part of the study, mentioned specific groups that they 
expected to be affected most by the income requirement: women, low income 
groups, returning expatriates, disabled people and people with medical problems, and 
students. Can we say anything about the impact on these specific groups, based on 
the statistics available?  
Although this could not be substantiated in the other national reports, the as-
sumption of a selective effect based on gender has been evidenced by a Dutch study 
on the effects of the increase in the level of the income requirement from 100 to 120 
per cent in 2004 (WODC 2009a). This study showed that after the increase in the 
income level, the number of female sponsors applying for reunification dropped by 
48 per cent, while the number of male sponsors went down by 32 per cent. Accord-
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ing to this study, this difference can be explained by the fact that female sponsors 
more often have a part time job, especially if they take care of children at the same 
time. As figure 6.1 demonstrates, the gender pay gap is still significant in most EU 
Member States. Hence, it is inevitable that a similar gendered effect of the income re-
quirement occurs in other Member States.  
 
Figure 6.1. Unadjusted gender pay gap in EU166 
 
 
The Dutch 2009 research also revealed the effects of age and ethnic background. The 
increase in the income level resulted in a drop in applications by male sponsors aged 
21-27 of 52 per cent, against a drop of 26 per cent in applications by older sponsors. 
Some difficulties younger sponsors faced could be identified, like the lower minimum 
wage under the age of 23, and the required durability of the income, being offered 
only temporary labour contracts. Due to a relatively weak socioeconomic position, 
more sponsors with a non-western migrant background failed to meet the income 
requirement: the drop in the male non-western sponsors concerned on average 54 
per cent, western migrants 34 per cent and Dutch natives 22 per cent. These effects 
are probably also not country specific: the German report refers to data of the Sta-
tistisches Bundesambt, showing that the risk of poverty for persons with a migrant back-
ground is twice as high as for German natives. The most recent report on poverty in 
Austria also demonstrates that migrant households are particularly prone to being 
threatened by poverty. About 27 per cent of all households at risk of poverty are 
households with a migration background. Although unemployment is an influential 
factor related to poverty, 41 per cent of the persons at risk of poverty are employed 
(ÖGPP 2008: 119 ff.). 
Finally, the Dutch study on the income requirement demonstrates the effects due 
to the intersection of various factors, e.g. of gender and migration background. As al-
ready demonstrated, the number of applications by female sponsors went down by 48 
                                                        
166 We used the percentages of the unadjusted gender pay gap because this gives the best insight into 
the labour market position of women.  
 
94 
 
per cent, as compared to a fall of 32 per cent of applications by male sponsors. How-
ever, comparing female sponsors of Turkish background to Dutch born male spon-
sors, the difference is even more striking: the number of applications by female Turk-
ish sponsors dropped by 57 per cent, while that of Dutch born male sponsors 
dropped by 22 per cent (WODC 2009a). 
Because of its impact on specific groups, the income requirement was critically 
evaluated by respondents, individuals and stakeholders alike, who did not support it. 
They criticized that individual circumstances were not taken into account, and even 
individual respondents were critical when they easily met the income requirements 
themselves.  
In our study, there were a few couples who could not meet the income require-
ment. In the Dutch country report, a Turkish woman who had been living in the 
Netherlands for more than 25 years, and wanted to be reunited with her Turkish part-
ner had not yet applied for family reunification because she did not fulfil the income 
requirement. She received welfare, because of medical problems which made it im-
possible for her to work. Although the couple considered living together in Turkey, 
she had a disabled son who lived in a home for disabled people in the Netherlands 
and whom she did not want to leave behind. In her view, she should be exempted 
from the income requirement. The German national report provided the example of 
Mrs. B., a citizen of the Philippines, who had been married to her German husband 
since 2007. In the same year, their child of the marriage was born in the Philippines. 
Mrs. B. was issued a visa as the mother of a German child and she and her daughter 
entered Germany in 2010. Mrs. B. had a minor son from a previous relationship with 
a citizen of the Philippines, whom she wanted to join her family in Germany. How-
ever, Mrs. B. and her husband were reliant on benefits according to the Social Secu-
rity Code: Mrs. B. had not been placed in a job since her arrival in Germany and Mr. 
B. was unemployed and planned to go into business for himself. Since they could not 
meet the income requirement, Mrs. B. was only able to see her son during the holi-
days. 
That, on the whole, most of our respondents in our study have met the income 
requirement, can partly be explained by our non-representative selection of respon-
dents, but also by the behavioural adjustments that we found in our studies.  
The first type of behavioural adjustment of sponsors is related to the labour mar-
ket position. Students dropped their studies to work in order to meet the income re-
quirement. Although this meant that they had a job in the short term, in the long run 
this hampered their income level and career opportunities. Other adjustments affect-
ing the labour market position was that sponsors dropped career plans, because they 
chose job and income security over work satisfaction. Finally, the income require-
ment resulted in deskilling, because the sponsor sometimes chose a job (far) below 
the educational level that provided the required income or long-term contract above 
the lesser job security that corresponded with his or her own educational level. 
Hence, the income requirement had a significant impact on the labour market posi-
tion of the sponsor, which seems contradictory to the aims of the policy of labour 
market integration.  
A second type of behavioural adjustment is emigration. Sometimes people have 
no choice but to go and live in the country of origin of the family migrant, in order to 
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be able to be together as a family. Nationals sometimes have the choice of moving to 
another EU Member State. Emigration may be temporary, but if one leaves the Euro-
pean Union, it may become harder to return as time passes.  
These adjustments only applied to TCN and citizen sponsors. EU citizens had no 
problems with the lower income requirement in EU law and, as noted in the Austrian 
report, had no problems pursuing their career plans and job opportunities. 
 
Pre-entry tests 
Both the German and the Dutch reports give evidence of a significant and sudden 
drop in the number of visa applications after the pre-entry test was introduced. 
Breaking down the pass rates of the pre-entry test according to age, education level, 
nationality and gender, Dutch statistics make it obvious that this admission criterion 
hinders low educated family members more frequently from reuniting than middle or 
high educated. Since a reading test was added to the Dutch test in 2011, the gap in 
pass rates between the low and highly educated has reached a percentage of 23. Es-
pecially illiterates and migrants from countries with another alphabet fail the test 
more frequently. The differences are even greater if the self-selective effect of the 
changing composition of candidates is taken into account: since the level was raised, 
more candidates are high educated (from 27 to 37 per cent), and fewer are low edu-
cated (from 23 to 19 per cent). Furthermore, older applicants fail more often. Finally, 
nationals from certain countries (like Morocco and China) have more problems meet-
ing the required level than others. Also in Germany, large differences emerge be-
tween the pass rates broken down by nationality. In 2009, of the applicants from 
Ghana only 38 per cent passed the test, from Macedonia 33 per cent, Kosovo 51 per 
cent, while 82 per cent of the candidates from the Russian Federation passed the test. 
These figures might imply that family members from more industrialized countries 
have better prospects. As so-called ‘western’ TCNs are exempted from the test in 
Germany and the Netherlands, they cannot be affected by the pre-entry test.  
Several national and international evaluations of the German and Dutch pre-
entry test come to the same conclusions as regards the effects on integration. Both 
the INTEC and the PROSINT studies conclude that that effect of the pre-entry test 
on integration is ‘marginal’ (Strik et al. 2012: 329) or ‘modest at best’ (Scholten et al. 
2011: 86). One of the explanations is that the level of the test is insufficient to signifi-
cantly contribute to language proficiency, but also that other factors play a role in 
integration, which is a long-term process. This also points to the difficulty of assess-
ing the effectiveness of integration programmes. In this respect, the PROSINT study 
listed a number of other factors, besides language proficiency, impacting the labour 
market position: recognition of foreign qualifications, legal labour market barriers, 
economic situation, and discrimination (Lechner & Lutz 2011: 9). All of these factors 
were mentioned by our respondents as hindering their labour market position, in all 
of the Member States studied.  
Respondents in our study were also critical of the effectiveness of the pre-entry 
test. Although nobody denied the importance of integration and language proficiency, 
it was questioned whether the pre-entry test actually contributed to it. Besides the low 
level of the test, respondents also thought it to be much more effective to learn the 
language inside the country.  
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Another reason is that in both countries, a significant part of the test participants 
did not participate in a course, due to the costs involved. As the before-mentioned 
studies indicate and our study confirms, the costs of the pre-entry test involve not 
only the test itself, but also costs of the course to be taken, travelling to the embassy, 
often more than once, and travelling and staying for weeks or months in a large city 
to take a course, which may even involve quitting a job or taking a leave of absence. 
These costs may add up to considerable amounts, up to several thousand euro, which 
the couple cannot devote to other things that could further integration, such as hous-
ing or education. Hence, the financial capital of the family was negatively affected.  
Although the interviewed migrants in both the PROSINT and the INTEC stud-
ies and in both countries were positive about the need to learn the language, they 
were critical about the test and its selective effects. This finding was confirmed by our 
study. In general, the pre-entry test was criticized for its selective effect on certain 
groups: low income and education groups, illiterates, women, elderly people, people 
living in less developed countries and rural areas or war zones. Another important 
critique was that only certain nationalities had to take the pre-entry test and other na-
tionalities did not. Also the lack of exemptions for e.g. illiterates and people with 
learning difficulties was mentioned.  
Several specific problems were mentioned in the PROSINT and INTEC studies 
and in our study: the difficulty of people living in war zones in travelling to the em-
bassy to take the test, the lack of available means, e.g. language courses or approved 
tests in the country of origin of the family member. An example from the British 
report of a British husband and his Honduran wife:  
 
‘The main issue was the English test. My wife’s English is perfect but it’s not academic. The 
only test you can do in the whole of central America is the TOFL test and at the time that was 
set at the B2 level instead of the A1 level. I was trying to make her take the A1 test in the 
Cayman Islands and we spent a lot of money on Visas etc. But then the place went bust. She 
took the TOFL test twice and failed it.’ 
 
Finally, the husband moved to Honduras to be with his wife.  
In our study, the long period of separation of family members, as a consequence 
of the test was mentioned as a major problem. In this respect, the pre-entry test was 
seen as just another bureaucratic hurdle to take, one of many. The long-term separa-
tion led to emotional stress that, according to respondents, did not weigh up to the 
assumed integrating effects. In the British report, a woman described how her Yem-
eni national husband gave up a career as a headmaster in Yemen in order to move to 
Jordan to take an approved language course and test. As he could not find a job in 
Jordan, due to the economic downturn, he could not afford many English lessons. In 
addition, he was not in contact with English speakers on a daily basis. So, despite his 
good academic background, the interviewee’s husband had failed his A1 language test 
twice and had been living in Jordan, without a job, for a year. This had had a detri-
mental impact on the couple, both financially and emotionally:  
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‘I’ve been supporting him, but I’m having babies soon, and it would be nice for him to be 
there to help me … It’s been an absolute nightmare. Words can’t describe the emotion. I’ve 
been referred to a psychologist for prenatal stress. I’ve been hospitalised’. 
 
Nevertheless, as with the income requirement, most couples managed to meet the 
pre-entry test requirement. Except for the selective sample of our respondents, with a 
relatively high level of education, this can be explained by the behavioural adjust-
ments made by family migrants and sponsors to make sure that the test was passed 
successfully, indeed moving to the main city or a third country to take a course or the 
test, studying as well as having a full-time job, etc. The family migrant often relied on 
the sponsor to provide study materials, to pay for the course and other costs, and to 
offer language practice through telephone and Skype.  
In the German part of the INTEC and PROSINT studies, emigration to another 
EU country was mentioned as a behavioural adjustment by stakeholders. We found 
some indications that this happened also in other countries. For example, a British 
male sponsor moved to Germany after difficulties in finding an approved language 
testing centre in Russia where his Russian wife could take the test. It was not a choice 
made easily:  
 
‘After two years apart we have now decided that for me to relocate to Germany would be our 
best chance to be together and enjoy our remaining lives as a family. This of course plays well 
into the government’s hands and maybe forcing British citizens to move abroad is part of their 
plan to reduce the net migration.’ 
 
Age requirement  
It is difficult to establish the effects on the number of applications in the countries 
that introduced a higher age requirement. As in the Netherlands, where the higher 
age requirement was introduced together with a higher income requirement in 2004, 
its effects are difficult to establish. A Dutch study established a small negative impact, 
due to small number of couples who did not meet the age requirement (WODC 
2009a). In the other countries, the quantitative effects are not clear. In Austria, the 
number of applications for family reunification fell by one-sixth at the moment of in-
troduction of the stricter age requirement, but the exact cause is hard to establish. In 
the UK, the introduction of the higher age requirement is at most only one of the 
factors contributing to the drop in the number of issued visas that had already started 
in 2006. As noted in chapter 4 and 5, the age requirement of 21 was struck down in 
2011 and therefore no longer applies.  
A British study provides insight into the opinions and expected consequences of 
the age requirement, as the study was conducted before the requirement was intro-
duced. The study proved that the majority of stakeholders was against a higher age 
requirement, pointing to the adverse effects of young people being taken abroad to 
marry, entering the UK with false documentation, or health issues as a result of the 
denial of family reunification (Home Affairs Committee 2008).  
The Dutch study somewhat nuances these expectations of British stakeholders. 
The Dutch researchers concluded that there was little evidence that this requirement 
strengthened the defensibility and autonomy of the young people involved. The first 
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reason – besides the difficulty to study this question in the first place – was that in 
most couples under study, the parents had had little influence on the choice of part-
ner of the youngsters. Secondly, the partners choosing a partner from abroad acted 
autonomously, irrespective of age. The researchers also found that most couples did 
not marry at a young age and that parents did not want them to. Even without the 
pressure of an age requirement, they preferred their children to finish their studies 
(WODC 2009a). 
The researchers found several forms of behavioural adjustments to the age re-
quirement among couples that were affected because they had married below the re-
quired age. Most frequently, couples waited before applying for family reunification 
until the required age was reached. Other forms of adjustment, used in exceptional 
cases, were (prolongation of) illegal residence of the family migrant, emigrating to the 
country of origin of the family migrant, ending the relationship and age fraud 
(WODC 2009a: 130).  
In our study, we found no significant problems with the age requirement. 
Whether the level was 18 or 21 years, the age requirement was not mentioned as an 
important hurdle. Most individual respondents were older than the required age. 
In the Austrian country study, one group that was affected by the age require-
ment came up, that may have not been at the forefront of the minds of policymakers, 
namely Austrian citizen students. In this context, Austrian stakeholders pointed to 
early parenthood as a possible behavioural adjustment, resulting from the exception 
to the age requirement in case a child was born from the relationship.167 
Contrary to the age requirement for partners, the age requirement for children in 
Germany caused significant problems and may result in permanent separation of 
parents and children. This is the topic of the next paragraph.  
6.5  Separation of Parents and Children 
An issue that came up during the interviews in all Member States was the separation 
of parents and children. The family reunification requirements sometimes result in 
the long-term or even permanent separation of parents and children in several ways. 
In Ireland, lawyers reported the common refusals of residence to a non-Irish father 
of a citizen child, with the argument that the family could reside together outside Ire-
land. In the Netherlands, lawyers were concerned that, in the case of divorce, parents 
were separated from their children, because the immigration authorities considered 
this the normal state of affairs. Another issue in the Netherlands was the separation 
of refugee parents from their children, as a consequence of two separate require-
ments: the three-month period within which the favourable requirements for refugees 
apply, and the additional criteria on the effective family bond (see chapter 3). 
                                                        
167 The behavioural adjustment of early parenthood has been found earlier in the Netherlands, where 
until 2004 a child below the age of five could be exempted from the income requirement (De Hart 
2003). 
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In Germany, the criteria for children between 16 and 18 were so strict that family 
reunification became impossible in practice and parents and children were separated 
permanently. A final problem, mentioned in Germany as well as Portugal, was the 
condition that single parents provide proof of custody of the child or the agreement 
of the other parent to the migration of the child. This condition caused problems if 
there was no contact with the other parent or he or she could not be traced. Finally, 
in Germany there was a practice of not admitting TCN fathers who want to join their 
German child while the female sponsor in Germany was pregnant, although this had 
no legal basis. This prevented fathers from being present at the birth of their child. 
If parents and children are involuntarily separated for years, this may cause stress 
for all family members and even negatively impact their relationship. In the Portu-
guese report, a Chinese mother, still waiting to reunite with her child, commented on 
how the wait had become a burden in her life:  
 
‘My daughter should live with us – no family should be torn apart at any circumstance, she was 
even born here (and then went to China). We cannot wait anymore’. 
 
In the Irish country report, a father reflected on how his children’s social life had suf-
fered while he was separated from the family:  
 
‘Other daddies will be taking their children out. There’s no daddy for them to take them out to 
give them that fatherly guidance. That’s impacted much on them, especially on the second 
child [who was then 6 years]. I used to coach them or help them with their homework. Teach 
them other things […] to help them in school. Used to take them to school and bring them 
back. I used to bring them to all those [cultural sites showing them] Madonnas and other 
things. Nobody was doing it for them anymore.’  
 
In the time of his absence, his wife, besides having to manage two businesses on her 
own, was also left to rear the children as a ‘single mother’. He further exemplifies 
how the overall well-being of one of his sons had particularly improved since his 
father’s return: 
 
‘I have not got any bad reports on [my son] since I came back. Even the teachers are telling me 
that he has improved since I came back. Because every time he was in class, when he withdrew 
from other people, they’d be asking me: “What is the problem?” and I was telling them: “He 
needs his daddy”. Since I’m back he has improved; has no more problems.’ 
 
Another father described a conversation with his daughter illustrating his emotional 
turmoil:  
 
‘I was even feeling guilty like I abandoned them. I remember, my first daughter, one day we 
were talking on the phone and she said: “Dad. Why don’t we come over there? You always tell 
us you love us but why don’t we come over there? You know there is a war here!” She’s very, 
very intelligent. And she was challenging me like that. And you can’t imagine when the con-
versation is over, what happened in my head and in my heart.’ 
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This emotional impact is especially strong when refugee parents are separated from 
their children. In the Dutch country report, a Burundian refugee woman whose fam-
ily reunification process with her five children took more than four years stated: 
 
‘I came as a young and healthy women and now I am a wreck.’ 
 
These examples put into perspective the findings of earlier research on the continu-
ing transnational bonds of migrant families (e.g. Baldassar 2007; Gardner & Grillo 
2002; Mason 2004; Di Leonardo 1987), which may be not the result of choice or life 
designs, but involuntary, as it is immigration laws that create the need for and pro-
long family separation (Fresnoza-Flot 2009; Dreby 2010). 
6.6  Permanent Residence and Integration 
Inland integration requirement 
As became clear in chapter 2, four of the six countries in this study have an inland in-
tegration requirement: Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Experiences with the inland integration requirement have been studied earlier (Strik 
et al. 2012 and Lechner & Lutz 2011).  
These studies show that the inland integration requirement has to some extent a 
similar effect as the pre-entry test, in selecting the candidates based on factors such as 
age, gender and education. Statistical evidence indicates that female candidates, older 
migrants and nationals from certain countries are affected the most. Pass rates bro-
ken down by age and sex available in the Netherlands demonstrate that until mid-
2010, female candidates performed slightly worse, as 76 per cent passed the test as 
against 83 per cent of the male candidates. Young candidates up to 25 passed the test 
much more frequently (85 per cent) than migrants aged 56 and older (60 per cent).  
Pass rates broken down by nationalities are available for the Netherlands and the 
UK. From the larger migrant groups in the Netherlands that are obliged to take the 
test, Turkish nationals had the lowest pass rate (63 per cent), followed by Chinese (73 
per cent) and Moroccans (74 per cent). Amongst the highest percentage were nation-
als from the former Soviet Union (90 per cent) and former Yugoslavia (85 per cent). 
Since September 2011, the worst performing group, the Turkish nationals, are no 
longer obliged to take the test. In the UK, candidates originating from an English 
speaking country produced much better test results (86 per cent), compared to na-
tionals from a non-English speaking country (70 per cent). Still, as also within the 
well performing group a distinction could be made between western countries (97 per 
cent) and the Caribbean (70 per cent), it seems that candidates from more developed 
countries have fewer problems in meeting the criteria than those from less developed 
countries. Within the group of nationals from non-English speaking countries, a dis-
tinction between the less and more developed countries occurred: 95 per cent of the 
nationals from Singapore and Japan passed the test, whereas this percentage of many 
other Asian nationals was below 50 per cent.  
Statistics also indicate the consequences for refugees. In the United Kingdom, a 
substantial part of the holders of a permit on humanitarian grounds did not manage 
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to pass the test. Most of them had fled war situations: Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Afghani-
stan and Iraq. In the Netherlands, a similar effect is visible with regard to Somali and 
Ethiopians.  
These effects on the distinctive groups appear in all Member States with integra-
tion requirements. In Germany, a longitudinal study showed that participants in an 
integration course have a better chance to make progress if they are young, highly 
educated and not born in Turkey, the former Soviet Union or South or East Asia.168 
These selective effects also show themselves in the access to permanent resi-
dence. The Dutch statistics demonstrate that the number of permits issued for per-
manent residence decreased following the introduction of the integration requirement 
in January 2010, from 17,520 in 2009 to 10,520 in 2012. The number of permanent 
residence permits granted to Moroccan migrants, dropped by two-thirds.169 
Nevertheless, the earlier studies on the inland integration requirement are some-
what more positive about its integrating effects than about pre-entry tests. For exam-
ple, the PROSINT study concludes that inland integration requirements have an in-
dependent positive effect on the language proficiency of migrants. However, it also 
concludes that language proficiency is not the only factor contributing to the position 
in the labour market (Lechner & Lutz 2011: 44). Migrants, on the whole, seem posi-
tive about the inland integration requirement, even if this is obligatory (Strik et al. 
2012). Nevertheless, language teachers doubted that the low level would contribute to 
integration, although some migrants found that it did (Strik et al. 2012: 354). 
These findings are largely confirmed by our study. All respondents stressed the 
importance of integration and for the countries that have an inland integration test or 
obligation to take a course, the opinions about them were much more positive than 
for the pre-entry test. Nevertheless, some difficulties were mentioned. First of all, 
there was the difficulty of combining work obligations with the obligation to inte-
grate. In the United Kingdom, it was mentioned that people sometimes had to quit 
their job to take a course. It was also noted that the combined obligations of the in-
come requirement and integration requirement could work against each other: to 
fulfil the income requirement one needed a full-time job, but with a full-time job it 
was difficult to live up to integration obligations.  
A second problem was related to the connection of the integration requirement 
and residence rights. This was thought to hinder language acquisition and integration 
into the labour market, since an insecure residence status might hinder job opportuni-
ties. This might have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the integration re-
quirement. 
 
Independent and permanent residence  
Obtaining an independent or permanent residence status was mentioned as a prob-
lem in all countries except Portugal, because it has become more difficult to obtain 
such a status in recent years (see chapter 2). 
                                                        
168  N. Rother (2009), Working Paper 23, Das Integrationspanel, Entwicklung von alltagsrelevanten Sprachfertig-
keiten und Sprachkompetenzen der Integrationskursteilnehmer während des Kurses, www.bamf.de. 
169 Number of granted permanent residence permits 2009-September 2011, with reference to national-
ity, gender and age. Source: IND.  
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Continued legal insecurity and dependence may hinder integration and emancipa-
tion. The behavioural adjustments to the income requirement at the moment of first 
admittance, as described above, will continue as long as residence is not secure and 
the income requirement can lead to refusal of renewal or withdrawal of the residence 
permit. As a result, the income requirement may hamper the labour market position 
and financial capital of the family for a number of years.  
Insecure residence hinders emancipation of female family migrants, because 
choices made in the relationship and tensions within families may have consequences 
for the residence status. But as has been noted elsewhere, and was confirmed in our 
study, a residence status dependent on the relationship not only has consequences for 
female family migrants, but also for male family migrants and for the sponsors 
(Strasser et al. 2009; Van Walsum 2000; De Hart 2003). The literature has noted how 
the dependent status of male migrants may result in a reversal of gender roles and 
tensions within families as a result (Refsing 1998). Stakeholders in our study noted 
that male family migrants may be dependent and vulnerable after divorce, if there are 
children from the relationship, and with custody and access rights, their residence is 
at stake. In the German country report, a German female sponsor related how the 
dependent residence status invoked uncertainty in her husband, who feared that he 
would not acquire equal father’s rights for their child of the marriage. 
Sponsors, on the other hand, may feel responsible and not act freely within their 
relationship, because of the consequences it may have for the family migrant. As it 
becomes harder to obtain independent or permanent residence status, it becomes 
more difficult for couples and families to reach some form of equality of gender re-
lations within their relationship. Hence, although equal gender relations are a major 
topic and an often mentioned goal of family reunification policies, it is these family 
reunification policies that cause inequalities within families. As an Austrian sponsor 
related about the prolongation of her husband’s residence permit:  
 
‘And because of all these requirements, there simply are barriers always present in your mind. 
And I really can observe, in the weeks before we prolong his residence title, we get increasingly 
tensed and for instance quarrel more. It really has some psychological impact, also in terms of: 
How do I organize my relationship? Due to this extreme dependency, which is not solely 
economic […], but also simply caused by the fact that his residence title is tied to mine. […] I 
take up responsibilities differently than I was used to in other relationships.’ 
6.7  Lives on Hold and Sense of Belonging 
In several country reports, the consequences of long application procedures with 
insecure outcomes were vividly described. During application procedures, migrants 
and their family members cannot build their family relationship and build their life as 
long as they have to wait for the outcome of the procedure and the admittance of the 
family member. Waiting during the procedure means they are oriented towards the 
future, the present becomes secondary to the future. The present loses meaning, élan, 
creativity and vitality that is transposed to the future. Applicants are waiting for a 
decision, for security of residence and security of existence (De Hart 2003). Many 
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individual respondents described the period that they had to wait for admittance of 
the family member as a period that their lives were on hold, void of sense, and para-
lysing. It is difficult to make plans for the future (buying a house, starting an educa-
tion) if one is not sure whether it will be possible to be together and build a life to-
gether. These effects are stronger as the procedure takes longer. Especially if the long 
procedure separated parents and children, this caused a lot of stress and anxiety. 
Emotional stress as a consequence of long procedures, separation, insecurity of 
outcome and unclear conditions, were mentioned in all country reports. This con-
firms earlier research that mentioned signs of stress (De Hart 2003; Van Walsum 
2000; Strasser et al. 2009; WODC 2009a). Prolonged stress sometimes resulted in 
serious health issues, such as depression or miscarriage. Stress may again make it dif-
ficult to focus on building a life and making plans for the future, or even to work. 
The stricter requirements for a secure residence permit may in a similar way hin-
der couples from developing long-term projects. Legal insecurity may negatively af-
fect job opportunities, because employers may hesitate to hire an employee whose 
residence is not secured. It may affect families’ housing arrangements, because it is 
more difficult to buy a house if residence is not secured. As was noted in the coun-
tries with the strictest requirements, permanent immigrants may be hindered from 
ever obtaining a permanent residence status (or, as in Ireland, where a permanent 
status does not exist in the same way as in other Member States). Naturalization of-
fers no realistic alternative, since this has also become more difficult in these coun-
tries.170 
While Leerkes and Kulu-Glasgow indicated that capital may inform how appli-
cants deal with requirements, we found that the requirements may negatively impact 
financial and other forms of capital. First, the growing financial costs involved with 
every step in the procedure until residence is finally secured can negatively impact fi-
nancial capital and as a result integration, as the family cannot spend the money on 
other things, such as housing, education or simply social contacts and participating in 
society. Hence, the lack of financial capital may impact social capital. As one individ-
ual interviewed in the UK explained:  
 
‘It was a huge financial commitment ... we have spent so much money to be here. You have no 
idea. It’s unbelievable ... I’m almost integrated but not yet because I don’t have [enough] 
money or a stable income. That makes me stay at home a lot. I don’t go out and socialise be-
cause I don’t want to spend money.’ 
 
Second, behavioural adjustments, such as emigration, may have a negative impact on 
forms of social capital and, as a result, integration. A Dutch respondent, who had 
difficulties meeting the various requirements, observed that using his mobility rights 
to move to Germany with his Chinese wife meant that he had to leave his family, 
neighbourhood, and large social network behind. When the family returned to the 
                                                        
170 This goes for Germany, Austria, the Netherlands. See: Van Oers et al. (2010). For Irish naturaliza-
tion policies, see John Handoll, EUDO Citizenship Observatory Country Report: Ireland, available at 
http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/CountryReports/Ireland.pdf.  
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Netherlands after a couple of years, this social capital was lost and could not be used 
for integrating the family. If the family had emigrated to China, his Dutch children 
could have entered the Netherlands at a later age, but then with a large backlog re-
garding their integration. Third, those with the weakest capital bear the largest costs, 
financially and otherwise, which further deteriorates their access to financial, social 
and other forms of capital. Instead of more, they seem to get less access to the capital 
needed for integration.  
A final consequence that we want to point out is that negative experiences with 
family reunification policies and immigration authorities may have an impact on the 
sense of belonging, which is vital to integration. Yuval-Davis has described a sense of 
belonging as emotional connection to the country of residence, a sense of being at 
home, safe and secure. (Yuval-Davis 2006: 197). Earlier studies have indicated that 
sponsors felt ashamed of the country they were denizens or citizens of, felt that their 
family members were unwelcome, felt different from fellow citizens in this respect 
(Van Walsum 2000; De Hart 2003) and had difficulty sharing experiences with fellow 
citizens. Especially for citizen sponsors, it was often their first and unexpected ac-
quaintance with immigration laws and their impact, which resulted in feelings of 
alienation from their own society (De Hart 2003). We have some indications in the 
interviews of this negative impact on the sense of belonging, as a consequence of im-
migration procedures. As expressed by a Dutch sponsor, looking back at a long and 
complicated procedure to bring his wife over:  
 
‘I have the feeling that I do not want to be in the Netherlands anymore, I do not want to live 
here anymore.’  
 
Another Dutch sponsor, born in the Netherlands, with Dutch citizenship, of Turkish 
descent said that her partner did not feel welcome in the Netherlands, but also that 
she herself did not feel welcome any longer. In this manner, requirements that have 
the aim of integrating migrants and their sponsors may have the opposite effect.  
6.8  Conclusion 
Our discussion on the impact of family reunification policies is that there is no evi-
dence that restrictive measures have the integrating effects at which they were aimed. 
On the other hand, there are clear indications of unintended effects of these meas-
ures that may hinder integration: the behavioural adjustments that people develop in 
order to meet the requirements may hinder rather than further their integration, long 
and complicated procedures lead to delaying family reunification, stress and feelings 
of lives being on hold and lesser feelings of belonging. Although it is not clear that 
family reunification policies are the only factor in the integration of family migrants – 
and migrants may integrate against all odds, even as undocumented migrants – it is 
clear that restrictive family reunification policies do not contribute to integration. 
Also clear is the selective effect of the income requirement, pre-entry test and age 
requirement, on the basis of gender, education, nationality, ethnicity and age. The 
requirements are more difficult for women, low-educated people, certain nationalities 
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and ethnic groups and elderly people to meet. It is relevant to point out that selection 
often takes place not on the basis of only one of these factors, but on a combination: 
being a migrant and a woman. To acquire an inadequate insight into the effects of the 
main requirements, future studies should take this intersection into account. 
As we have seen in chapter 4, it is especially these selective effects that are at the 
core of the critical evaluation by international organizations, NGOs and other stake-
holders. The development of evidence-based family reunification and integration 
policies requires looking at its unintended consequences and selective effects. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
 
 
 
In the IFCAP project, we have tried to answer the question to what extent certain 
family reunification policies hinder or promote reunification with TCN family mem-
bers, and also their integration. Our findings show that throughout most of the 
Member States, family reunification policies have changed rapidly during the last ten 
years. Although some of the changes have implied liberalization, most of them have 
narrowed down the right to family reunification for TCNs and own nationals with 
TCN family members. The main restrictions concern strengthened income require-
ments, introduced pre-entry tests, raised or introduced age-limits and procedural and 
financial thresholds, for instance with regard to fees and visas. At the same time, we 
have seen that during this period the number of applications and granted permits for 
family reunification have dropped dramatically. Although other factors (like the eco-
nomic situation or the upward trend of TCN sponsors preferring a –TCN– spouse 
already residing in the Member State), can partly explain the decrease, it is more than 
likely that the largest part of the drop relates to the restrictive measures introduced in 
the last decade. As the latest restrictions have only been introduced quite recently, 
this downward trend is expected to continue. The British Migration Advisory Com-
mittee, for instance, foresees that 45 per cent of applications are going to be refused 
as a result of the increase in the required income level from July 2012.  
 
Different groups 
These developments, however, are not applicable to all groups. As a result of the case 
law on the family reunification rules for Union citizens exercising their mobility 
rights, the rights of Union citizens and their family members have been strengthened. 
Furthermore, the CJEU has granted more legal protection to Turkish nationals and 
their family members, based on the Association Treaty with Turkey. Thus, the liberal-
izing trend towards these groups does not derive from political preferences, but from 
the obligation to comply with Union law. Highly skilled workers and their family 
members have gained a more privileged position, due to the Blue Card Directive, as 
well as to their attractiveness to national labour markets. As the latter form the only 
category of explicitly wanted migrants, their example shows that governments are 
aware that the conditions on family reunification can deter or further reunification. 
The restrictive trend for TCNs and own nationals on the one hand, and the par-
allel liberalization towards Union citizens on the other hand, has further widened the 
gap in the right to family reunification between these two categories. This result con-
tradicts the aim the European leaders formulated at their Tampere Conference in 
1999, to approximate the legal position of Union citizens and TCNs by strengthening 
the legal rights of the latter. At this meeting, the Member States acknowledged that 
strong legal rights for TCNs, including the right to family reunification, promoted 
their integration into the societies of the Member States. Nevertheless, the Family Re-
unification Directive, adopted with precisely this objective, has mainly been used by 
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Member States to justify new restrictions, by applying optional clauses in order to 
weaken the right to family reunification. This development reveals a reversal in the 
attitude towards family reunification, from perceiving it as a chance to integrate mi-
grants to a threat to social cohesion and integration. The analysis of the political de-
bates, elaborated in chapter 4, demonstrates large similarities in the arguments Mem-
ber States use to justify their restrictions: these are, apart from promoting integration, 
protecting the national economy and preventing fraud. Member States mainly learn 
from other national policies by copying them, at least as far as they imply restrictions. 
This learning process seems to be furthered by the Family Reunification Directive, as 
the negotiations on the directive and meetings on its implementation have increased 
the number of occasions to exchange information. Hence, the search for possibilities 
to reduce the number of family migrants within the limits of the directive has a har-
monizing effect, albeit not in the upward sense that the directive was initially meant 
to create.  
This brings us to the question of to what extent Member States still support the 
official arguments for the establishment of an EU right to family reunification and to 
a long term-residence status. Interestingly, the CJEU has taken this objective seri-
ously, as it is part of the instruments with which Member States now have to comply. 
The way in which the court seeks a coherent interpretation of the provisions of the 
directive, in line with case law on the free movement rules, results in a certain level of 
approximation. Judgments, therefore, limit the sovereignty of the Member States to 
further weaken and force them to strengthen the right to family reunification. In this 
sense, the Family Reunification Directive has created a bottom, preventing further 
downward harmonization. 
The protection of TCNs at the EU level places own nationals in a more isolated 
position, as the only group that solely falls within the scope of Article 8 ECHR and 
national law. During the last ten years, their position has been weakened by the loss 
of their privileged position, sometimes even with the argument of equal treatment 
with TCNs. With the Europeanization of the right to family reunification of TCNs, 
own nationals now lag behind. While in 2000 the Commission proposed to equalize 
their right to family reunification with the right of Union citizens with mobility rights, 
the political will to strengthen their position seems to have faded away. Member 
States show a reluctance to bring own nationals within the scope of Union law. The 
tendency to minimize the application of certain granted rights creates more and more 
different categories, leading to a further fragmentation of the family reunification 
rights in the European Union. Furthermore, Member States seem reluctant to respect 
the rights of Union Citizens with TCN family members.  
 
Different Member States 
Although the different treatment of these groups mentioned above shows large simi-
larities, the Member States studied can be classified into three groups. First, Austria, 
Germany and the Netherlands have in common that they were the ones who started 
to restrict the right to family reunification for TCNs and who actively negotiated in 
order to be allowed to do so by the directive. The Portuguese government takes the 
unique position in that it perceives family reunification as beneficial to integration, 
and takes measures in order to enable TCNs to bring their families. The Portuguese 
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are treated equally with Union citizens exercising their mobility right. Ireland and the 
United Kingdom are not bound by the Family Reunification Directive, with the result 
that they apply the highest income requirement and that Ireland lacks a statutory right 
to family reunification for TCNs. The wide discretion of the Irish authorities creates 
insecurity and lack of transparency, and carries the risk of arbitrary decisions which 
migrants cannot challenge properly. 
 
Practice 
In all Member States, however, not only legislation determines the extent to which 
migrants can exercise a right to family reunification. The way requirements are ap-
plied or assessed and procedures are organized are equally important for their possi-
bilities to bring their families. We learned that the attitude of immigration authorities 
or the (lack of) cooperation between agencies frequently cause delays, which seem to 
be unnecessary, and limited transparency. National incentives to guarantee speedy, 
transparent or impartial decision making, like the Dutch example of fines for immi-
gration authorities if a decision is not taken in a timely manner, could be further in-
vestigated and promoted. Our study of the practice can contribute to the interpreta-
tive guidelines the Commission is going to formulate for applying the Family Reunifi-
cation Directive.  
Furthermore, Member States have intensified their assessments of the applica-
tions, focusing on the verification of family members’ identity or relationship or the 
genuineness of the marriage or partnership. Again, these methods, applied on the 
basis of a wide range of indicative criteria, cause delays, and also frustration amongst 
the applicants. These methods seem to be a response by governments who first es-
tablished a strong right to family reunification, followed by the realization and regret 
that they had lost sovereignty in this field. Verification, however, still falls within their 
scope of competence. In the interviews, it emerged that many applicants feel treated 
with suspicion. Own nationals using the EU route are treated as abusers of mobility 
rights; Union citizens and own nationals with a TCN spouse feel discriminated 
against as bi-national couples are targeted in the combat of fraud; nationals of ‘non-
western’ countries feel discriminated against because they are faced with extra authen-
tication procedures and with more requirements, like the pre-entry test.  
 
Selection 
Certain groups not only feel more affected than others, statistics clearly show that the 
admission rules actually lead to selective effects. In chapter 6, we investigated that the 
most vulnerable groups have the most difficulty reuniting with their family: older, il-
literate or low educated family members, nationals from certain countries and female 
sponsors. The income requirement and the pre-entry test are the main obstacles for 
them. Thus, although the conditions are formulated neutrally, their impact is not neu-
tral. This is not taken into account in the making of the policy, for instance by impact 
assessments, but selective effects shown in evaluations are no incentive for govern-
ments to adjust their policy. This makes one wonder whether these selective effects 
are intended. At least, politicians and policy makers seem to respond indifferently to 
these results. 
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Previous research demonstrated that migrants have developed five strategies in 
response to the difficulties mentioned: they give up and remain living separately, they 
reunite in the country of the family member, they come and live irregularly in the 
Member State, they keep on trying to meet the requirements at any cost, or – if they 
are own nationals – they move to another Member State in order to apply their mo-
bility rights. In all situations, the rules create long-term separation, make reunification 
costly, frustrate people and further tensions between the spouses and families. 
We found evidence for the last two strategies, which we have described as behav-
ioural adjustments in chapter 6. With regard to the first three strategies, we were not 
able to collect reliable information, as the respondents we spoke to had finally met 
the requirements or had succeeded in exercising mobility rights. We think that more 
research should be done to find out about these strategies and their effects. The ones 
who met the requirements had given up things that could have offered them better 
prospects, like a good education or new job opportunities. Own nationals who 
moved to another Member State, gave up their social network and stable living cir-
cumstances. In both situations, the conditions for a smooth integration of the family 
after admission deteriorated.  
 
On hold 
These obstacles not only occur at the moment of admission. As in most Member 
States, the residence right of the family member depends on meeting the admission 
conditions, sponsors and family members keep on adjusting their lives in order to 
secure their family life. To secure their family life, sponsors are stuck in an employ-
ment situation, regardless of whether it’s the best choice to do so, and family mem-
bers have to meet integration requirements in time. As it has become more difficult 
to acquire independent or permanent residence rights (in the Netherlands the number 
of permanent permits granted has substantially decreased since this is dependent on 
meeting an integration requirement), their insecurity remains for a longer period of 
time. Respondents often described their lives during the application procedure as 
being on hold. But as the admission requirements are more frequently also applied 
after admission, this frozen situation is maintained for years. This effect contrasts 
with the situation of Union citizens: as the policy on this group is designed not to 
create any obstacle to free movement, Union citizens are more free to make choices 
in life. Their rights are adjusted to these choices, whereas TCNs and own nationals 
have to adjust their choices to their rights. 
 
Integration  
An important question for this project was to what extent the family reunification 
rules promoted or hindered the integration of sponsors and their families. The evi-
dence is that the response to this question is very difficult to measure, as the integra-
tion process takes a long time and is determined by many factors, like the economic 
situation in the host country, the absence or existence of discrimination, especially 
within the labour market, more general policies like education, and the personal back-
ground of the people concerned. However, we are able to conclude that the restric-
tive measures on the admission and residence of family members have not furthered 
integration and in many cases may have actually impeded it. Being excluded means, in 
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any case, that integration is not promoted. Delay in the process means that the family 
members live separately, and thus, focus on the process and not on the host society. 
Children are badly affected by the delay, because they miss at least one parent and 
their language learning and integration process are delayed. These conclusions con-
trast with the objective of integration, formally used by governments to introduce 
restrictive admission rules. 
 
Future 
On the basis of our findings, we would recommend that further research is under-
taken on the ‘dark numbers’ and the effects for family members who are excluded by 
the family reunification rules. As it emerges that the national policies, copied by other 
Member States, lead to exclusion and obstacles to integration, the policies should be 
evaluated more precisely. Alternatives for measures safeguarding inclusion and inte-
gration should be studied. 
Our conclusions more or less confirm previous research conducted in similar 
contexts, like the INTEC and PROSINT projects. Those research projects also have 
in common that they are small-scaled and were conducted within a relatively short 
timeframe. Any future and similar studies will not extend the conclusions on the re-
search in this area much further. We would, therefore, recommend that future re-
search should be conducted on a larger scale and over longer periods. Our study 
clearly shows that certain conditions on family reunification affect some groups more 
than others. This should be taken into account while conducting further research. All 
the studies also have in common that they have faced huge difficulties in conducting 
statistical research. Yet a precise examination of the effects cannot be undertaken 
without proper and reliable data.  
We would, therefore, suggest that statistical registration on family reunification is 
harmonized at the European level. The IFCAP, INTEC and PROSINT projects 
form a useful basis for a study on what kind of data would have to be collected and 
differentiated for which groups, in order to find more accurate answers. This will not 
only contribute to further research, but will also facilitate a public and political debate 
on family reunification policies, including their aims and their effects. 
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